

Education prepares men to live well, and its practice, therefore, depends on a vision of the good life. That vision is incarnated in heroes, perfect human types who, although they exist only in books, act as objects of imitation and aspiration. The kind of man a boy longs to be when he is grown up acts more powerfully on him than any other lesson and determines what he will take seriously, what he conceives to be noble and base.

Western man, until only yesterday, was formed by two views of the whole stemming from Jerusalem and Athens. Nothing else within our horizon could match the grandeur and dignity of the models provided by the Bible and Plutarch. No man could be said to be educated who had not experienced the sublimating charm of Moses and Jesus, Achilles and Socrates. Such heroes embody the limits of the human potential and act as proof of the plausibility of the vision of which they are the expression.

But the education founded on the books of the Christians and the Greeks is, according to Rousseau, the problem of Western man because it produces a divided human being. However noble are both the saints and the Homeric heroes, they represent contrary goals and incompatible ways of life, thus leaving their imitators unsure as to who they are and what really counts. On the one hand they are shown the grace of humility, peace, love of all mankind and overcoming the lusts of this life in favor of the next. On the other hand they thrill to the exploits of proud warriors, who have undying love of their friends and hatred of their enemies, and who have a fierce attachment to the earthly city and its glory. No one can combine these two visions and live consistently and without being undermined by doubt and guilt. War and Peace, written by one of Rousseau's disciples, is an

excellent primer for this problem.

Rousseau proposes to heal this split with a new education that produces a new kind of man who combines the various charms of the others in a coherent way, an education for all men, in all places, at all times. He makes a new beginning which results in his *Emile*, whose flesh and blood reality, as opposed to any abstract arguments, proves he surpasses the others in nobility and truth. The pious man and the citizen are to be replaced by the natural man.

Emile is to be the worthy alternative to the heroes of the Bible and Plutarch. That is the literary goal Rousseau sets for himself. He is like Socrates in the Republic who suggests a new poetry to take the place of Homeric poetry for the sake of man's wholeness. Rousseau's *Emile* is the first serious modern alternative. Although Rousseau accepted the principles of modern natural and political science, he saw that it offered no admirable human type. It suffices to look through the political writings of Hobbes and Locke to discover that the poetry had gone out of life. One might be a fearfully obedient man or a rationally industrious one, but one can hardly admire such men. All to the contrary the human type which emerged from modern philosophy is a degradation of man. Rousseau was the first to identify, analyze and name this type: the *bourgeois*. He thereby initiated almost all the social criticism of the last two centuries.

The *bourgeois*, simply put, is the man who is constitutionally incapable of resolving the conflict between duty and inclination, caring for others and caring for himself. He lives in society where one is supposed to care about the common good, so he acts as

though he does. But he has no sufficient reason to overcome his private desires, so he covertly pursues them in contradiction to his public duty. Those private desires however are formed by his dependence on others. He wants those things which society admires and rewards. His selfishness is not based on an authentic self. His public life is overwhelmed by his private desire, and his private desire is formed by the publicly respectable. He is, according to the modern jargon stemming from Rousseau's analysis, the *alienated* or *other-directed* man.

Now Rousseau argues that the *bourgeois* is the necessary consequence of modern political philosophy which tried to found political obligation on natural desire thus bridging the unbridgeable gap dividing the natural man and the citizen. Thereby it undermined both. Petty dependent desires which make society necessary for the individual are encouraged. And civil society is limited to serving such motivations. The great danger for the future is not monarchy or aristocracy, but the dominance of a small-souled man who debases the idea of humanity. Rousseau knew that the inner vitality had left the old regime and that it would collapse of its own dead weight. The principles of the Enlightenment would prevail, but those principles, unless corrected – corrected, not abandoned – would spell the end of decent humanity. Tocqueville's concerns are derived from his profound meditation on Rousseau. Rousseau was not preparing the revolution, which he knew to be inevitable, but its results, which were not inevitable. It was a time fraught with dangers and possibilities. His primary concern is the protection and enhancement of man.

The *bourgeois*' dividedness is the result of a failed attempt to

heal the dividedness caused by the tension between Christianity and the ancient city. Rousseau asserts that the whole man must either be a natural man or a citizen. "To be something, to be ourself and always one, a man must act as he speaks; he must always be decisive in making his choice, make it in a lofty style and always stick to it. I am waiting to be shown this prodigy so as to know whether he is a man or a citizen, or how he goes about being both at the same time." Wholeness is the goal, and one can have it in the direction of public spiritedness or selfishness, but not both at the same time. The two tacit assumptions of this argument are that man is naturally selfish, not a political animal, and that Christianity does not make a choice between the two alternatives. Rome and Sparta made citizens who did their duty and lived for the common good, but the price was a complete abandonment of nature, a "denaturing of man." This can only be achieved in small communities. It requires the most intense loyalties and training. It is incompatible with cosmopolitanism. It would seem that only citizenship in a good city is choiceworthy for only it combines wholeness with public-spiritedness. That is why Plato's book is the finest ever written on education. It describes the public education, although the philosopher Plato did not understand the denaturing character of the education as did the legislator Lycurgus.

But, "Public instruction no longer exists and can no longer exist, because where there is no longer fatherland there can no longer be citizens. These two words, fatherland and citizen, should be effaced from the modern languages. I know well the reason for it, but I do not want to tell it. It has nothing to do with my subject." The reason he refuses to reveal here, he tells in the Social

Contract. It is Christianity. It has torn up the roots which attached men to their earthly fatherlands and given them a single heavenly fatherland. The "ardent love of glory and the fatherland" which devoured the "generous peoples" of antiquity and constituted the mechanism of their success has been replaced by a desire for a life after death. In order to suppress private interest men must be passionate about their country, regard it as part of them and themselves as part of it, with the same, or even greater, reverence that one has for a father or a mother. The city must be animate and its citizens flesh of its flesh. Christianity set a higher goal and in so doing destroyed the city. On the one hand it left politics to the completely vicious because it forbade Christians the means to combat them. And, the standards it set for Christians themselves were so high as to be disproportionate to human nature and incompatible with life on earth. Two moralities emerge, that of the city of man and that of the city of God, each undermining the other. The Christian is racked by guilt for his worldly concerns and his piety is undermined by his lusts. The city, which was proportionate to man's nature, could suppress that nature and use its energy for the common good. Christianity, in asking too much, liberates lower nature and corrupts man.

This utterly Machiavellian analysis is accompanied by a Machiavellian solution to the problem. Rather than attempting to return to the city and its public-spirited human wholeness, Rousseau suggests going in the other direction, toward a selfish wholeness, a life directed by natural inclination rather than duty, a man concerned only with himself. Christianity's rejection of the city is in accord with nature and, hence, the truth. The attachment to this particular place is accidental and arbitrary as is

the supposed special kinship with all the citizens as opposed to all mankind. Men are really all brothers, and it requires a lie, albeit a noble one, in order to constitute the city. The Greeks and Romans knew what a community is as have no other peoples, but they were not conscious of the *denatured* character of political life. Caring for others goes against the grain of man's nature and is always threatened by the reemergence of the natural. Plato's Republic forces men to sacrifice their dearest natural sentiments for the sake of the community. The scheme is predicated on a forgetting of the body. Not only is public education impossible now, it is undesirable. It is not in the interest of happiness nor is it securely founded in what is most powerful in man and is thus uncertain.

The Emile is thus an investigation into the possibility of maintaining natural wholeness while ultimately conciliating it with the demands of political community. A proper understanding of nature may, Rousseau suggests, reveal that the intransigent opposition between natural man and citizen is only superficial, a result of previous ways of posing the question. But one learns from this beginning that a happy whole man living in society must combine the savage's utter self-regarding indulgence in natural inclination with the citizen's total dedication to the common good. Either of the extremes by itself is superior to the bourgeois half-way house which perverts nature and stifles citizenship.

Rousseau's suggestion is indeed a paradox. It requires the harmonization of nature with society the opposition between which was the burden of Discourses on the Arts and Sciences and on the Origin of Inequality. Rousseau's education must do for the man conceived as naturally concerned only with himself what

Plato's education did for man conceived as naturally political. This project is the culmination of the one undertaken by Machiavelli. To understand what Rousseau is about, it is well to look at that beginning point. The original paradox is made plausible if one sees how the good Rousseau was inspired by the bad Machiavelli.

Machiavelli tried to reunite divided man by abolishing the "imaginary cities" in favor of the real cities. Those imaginary cities provide men with standards of conduct which alienate them from this earth and make them incapable of founding and preserving cities and codes of law. The deeds which appear virtuous from the latter perspective often appear vicious from the former. By removing the horizon in which these deeds appear to be vicious, men can be reconciled to political necessity and do away with the paralyzing distinction between how one ought to live and how one does live. The political problem is not man's viciousness but the kind of high demands made on him. Machiavelli's return to political practice and denial of transcendent standards is, of course, in the first place directed against Christianity. But it is not a return to the ancient city as understood by ancient political philosophy, for ancient political philosophy culminated in utopias which acted as standards for political practice and introduced a dualism between the city in deed and the city in speech, with the latter having primacy. Both Greek philosophy and Christian revelation, for all their differences, were in agreement that man had to be understood in terms of his end or his perfection. The end or the perfection is rarely actualized in any individual and even less so in any city. There is, therefore, always a tension between the actual and the desirable. The elaboration of the desirable is what Machiavelli called an "imaginary city." The disproportion is

admittedly much greater between Augustine's "City of God" and his city of man than is that between Plato's "city in speech" and his "city in deed." But both have the same critical flaw for Machiavelli, they make men desire the impossible and despise the possible.

In order to insure dedication to this life and the actualization of solid regimes, Machiavelli took the decisive step of denying any status to the ends or perfections by which men are ordinarily judged. Men are blamed for love of conquest, but all men would like to conquer and do so if they can. The justice on the basis of which they are blamed exists only in imagination whereas the goods connected with the conquests are real. The selfish interests, not the common good, are the basis of civil society. By way of this acceptance of what is, he argues, it is possible to ground political orders on men's real passions rather than on the existence of improbable virtues. Machiavelli was the first to suggest that by turning to the selfish inclinations rather than depending on the virtues man could be rendered whole and happy and political society rendered effective. From Machiavelli through Nietzsche the theme has been reconciliation with this earth as opposed to all transcendence. Rousseau, along with Hegel and Nietzsche, is one of those who most profoundly meditated on the meaning and possibility of this modern alternative to the great ancient choice between two kinds of transcendence.

The link between Rousseau and Machiavelli is made by Hobbes and Locke whose teaching about the state of nature completed Machiavelli's project of removing the tension between the way men do live and the way they ought to live. Machiavelli in effect denied that the love of justice or the common good are

motives founded in human nature and insisted that it is folly to make demands on men which are contrary to nature. But every city makes demands on men which require the sacrifice of their selfish desires. If then such a sacrifice has no basis in the common good, civil society can only be justified by serving other, more fundamental, selfish desires. And it will only be effective if it can be so justified. The arguments of justice and effectiveness coincide. The state of nature teachings undertook to show what are the fundamental desires or passions and how the civil state can satisfy those desires. In other words, the state's legitimacy is defined in terms of the desires which are at its origin rather than in relation to the citizen virtues which might be conceived to be its end. A standard of legitimacy is still needed by which to take one's bearing in civil society, which is always ambiguous. But that standard cannot be sought in the end but in the beginning, not above civil society but, as it were, beneath it. The city does not properly make men as they ought to be but adjusts itself to what they are.

There must, therefore, be a quest for which man really is prior to the distorted demands of politics in order to found a healthy politics on that reality rather than on an imaginary potentiality. There must be a pre-political state from which the political state is derived. The abandonment of utopia as the standard leads inevitably to the state of nature. A new understanding of nature as the origins or the genesis of things rather than their end or perfection – the understanding connected with the new natural science which developed after Machiavelli – corresponds perfectly with his intention. His new understanding of the human things thus agrees with and requires the point of

view of modern science and its abandonment of what we call teleology.

In accordance with these demands both Hobbes and Locke identified a universal, fundamental passion which all men – and all animals – share, a passion that is undeniably natural to them, as opposed e.g. to love of country; fear of death. As a basis for civil society this passion fills Machiavelli's prescriptions precisely. It is always actual. There is a perfect harmony between the commandment "Preserve yourself" and the desire to obey. The state which has this beginning as its end encourages man to live as he does really live, and its ought is the same as his is. The state which exists for the sake of the preservation of its members has the immediate support of the passions. If preservation is less secure in the natural state than in the civil one, real, possible states take the place of the utopias which fulfilled longings not grounded in nature and which undermined real states.

Rousseau is in explicit agreement with the most fundamental theses of Hobbes and Locke. Man's primary desire and concern is his preservation; he must have lived in a pre-political state, and the political state must be a purely human convention designed to satisfy the desire for preservation; sentiment is prior to and more important than virtue or reason, nature is the origin and not the end. His objection to the modern natural right teachers is that they did not think through the consequences of their true premises. The amazing transformation of the intellectual world wrought by Rousseau is a result of his doing that thinking through.

He introduces his profound reflection with his usual deceptive simplicity: "The philosophers who have examined the foundations of society have all felt the necessity to go back to the

state of nature, but none of them ever got there." They mistook civil man by natural man, whereas, if man is not naturally a social or political animal, he must have been radically changed in order to want and be able to live in society. Natural man is no longer readily accessible to us, for there must have been a process by which the almost miraculous transformation from natural self-sufficiency to civil dependency was effected. Man has not only a nature but a history. Hobbes, to find the state of nature, took civil man and imagined how he would be without the laws which restrain him. He would, Hobbes found, be at war with his fellows and need the protection of the state to preserve him. He presupposes in man just those characteristics which cause him to found civil society. He deduces civil society from man's needs and man's needs from civil society. There is a harmony between man's nature and civil society, and Hobbes remains a teleologist although his understanding of nature no longer permits him that luxury. The consequences of abandoning purposiveness in nature have not been thoroughly assimilated. To apply the new view of nature to an interpretation of the human things, to give an account of the coming to be of the phenomena of civilized man without distorting or impoverishing them, is according to Rousseau, the task which remains to accomplish. And that task is the hardest part of the revolution in thought required by the new science's break with common sense or the pre-scientific world where things are understood in terms of their ends. The being who made the revolution must become the object of its reform. Nature, the beginning point of a process without intention, is very far away, and to rediscover it much science is needed. Machiavelli abolished the city in the sky for the sake of remaining content with the

earthly city. Hobbes and Locke said that one had to go one step below it to find out what is real in the earthly city. And Rousseau says that one has to go very much further than that. What began as an attempt to narrow, or reduce to nothing, the chasm separating man's existence from his perfection culminates in as great a chasm separating his civil being from his natural being. It is no longer precisely a tension between ought and is but between is and is, because the natural in man is always fully present. It is to the resolution of this tension, no longer easily or automatically accomplished, that Rousseau and all later thinkers have addressed themselves. His quest for the discovery of natural man, begun in the Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, is the fountainhead of evolutionism, depth psychology, historicism, romanticism and idealism. The structure of the human problems as seen by Rousseau remains ours.

The inadequacy of Hobbes' science is the source of the moral inadequacy of the man it depicts. The simple solution of basing obligation on fear of violent death and making civil society's function the protection of the individual from such a death does not succeed in resolving the tension between inclination and duty, for civil society at times requires that its subjects die for it. A split human being remains, but a debased one, no longer a man trying to live up to noble goals which are beyond him but a fear-ridden, small-souled one escaping minimum responsibilities. None of man's passions, thoughts and deeds have an independent status but must be reduced to the only admissible source – the desire for mere preservation. Rousseau's new science of man promises to restore true wholeness and a richness of soul comparable to that found in Plato but on a true basis.

The Emile is the completion of his project of rediscovering natural man. "But what will a man raised uniquely for himself become for others? If perchance the double object we set for ourselves could be joined in a single one by removing the contradictions of man, a great obstacle to his happiness would be removed. In order to judge of this he would have to be seen all formed; his inclinations would have to have been observed, his progress seen, his development followed. In a word, the natural man would have to be known. I believe that one will have made a few steps in these researches after having read this writing." What Rousseau did for the species in the Origin of Inequality he does in the Emile for the individual living in society. And, to use a phrase popularized later, ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny. The individual from infancy to adulthood goes through the same stages as does man from the state of nature to civil society. But in the latter case mere accident prevailed and the opposition between nature and society made man's misery. In the former case the art of the teacher can reconstitute a unity between natural wholeness and the acquisitions of civilization so as to make man's happiness.

The new understanding of nature necessitates a new education in conformity with the way things really are. Only Locke had tried in his Thoughts on Education to propose one. But he made the same error as did Hobbes in his search for the state of nature. "Childhood is unknown...The wisest men concentrate on what it is important for men to know without considering what children are in a condition to learn. They are always seeking the man in the child without thinking of what he is before being a man." Men are in the habit of examining children in terms of social demands which have nothing to do with their natures.

Childhood is a state which is not by nature directed to adulthood, at least as we conceive it. It is an end in itself, or rather the beginnings are what is important, not the end. The painstaking observation and protection of the fullness of being at each stage is the goal of education. This has become commonplace, but Rousseau started it and provides the best reasons for doing so.

The thought that was intended to make man content with what civil society can offer – to still the longings that led him out beyond toward oneness with the principles of things – culminated in a powerful longing to return to the freedom and the wholeness of the state of nature. This longing – in its protean expressions from the romantic poet to the hippy – has been the source of the most powerful reactions against liberal society throughout the last two centuries. To give comfort to Rousseau's legion of enemies, he is the founder of the movement. The state of nature teaching produced the two peculiarly modern reactions to civil life, conformism – satisfaction with whatever is established because there is no standard above it, and non-conformism, the rejection of everything established because it is established.

In its Hobbean-Lockean version the state of nature was a negative standard. There was war and penury. Civil society brought peace and comfort. Nature was to be fled and if possible mastered. Rousseau's revision of the state of nature made nature again the positive standard, *mutatis mutandis*, that it was for the Greeks. If war and penury are of human institution as much as is the civil state which corrects them, then the blame belongs not so much to nature as to man; or if not to man, to the fatal accidents which made him no longer able to live in the state of nature. Rousseau persuasively argues that the war of all against all

presupposes a mutual dependency and contact among men which is contrary to the unsocial premises of the state of nature; and the penury is only relative to desires which are bloated by imagination and have become needs only through habit. Looking at plants and the other animals – as well as reasoning about what is natural to man – inclines one to think that nature is good and that a life in accordance with it would lead to satisfaction. A being is what it is naturally. Men's works are neither the completion of nature, as the ancients thought, nor the overcoming of it as the moderns thought, but the perversion of it. Rousseau agrees with the ancients that nature is good and must be the standard, and with the moderns that civil society and its civilization are not natural and that nature is the origin and not the end. Thus the uncivilized origins become the standard. The opposition between civilization and nature, and the ambiguous goodness of civilization, is a standpoint which attracts the immediate sympathies of most moderns and is indicative of the power of Rousseau's articulation of the human problem. But Rousseau never suggests that man could or should return to the state of nature. He only encourages the voluptuous imaginations concerning how one can most taste of its joy in the civilized state.

Nature can no longer set man's goals because what is non-natural is now a part of him. The final form of man is not determined by it, but it is a presence, a guide; and it limits the possibilities of man's good acquisitions to what is not at odds with it.

It is thus that Rousseau can refer to two types of natural man, the sub-human brute of the Discourse on the Origin of Inequality and the fully civilized Emile. What links them is the fact that the

first sentiments and inclinations have been preserved in both of them, that they are both wholes. In the Discourse civilization meant the suppression or distortion of all the first movements of the soul and the loss of the inner freedom which characterized the first man. It is the history of man's alienation from himself by the development of his virtual faculties. The Emile is the careful preservation of the beginnings throughout that development in the intention of reconciling nature and history.

Without attempting to elaborate Rousseau's whole understanding of nature, it is well to underscore the few indications he gives about it in the beginning of the Emile. It is that which is not affected by human doing or making. The way plants grow on their own, by an internal necessity, is natural. Man is the only natural being part of whose nature contains the possibility of moving away from nature or becoming double, whose determinateness contains indeterminacy. Therefore nature is a problem only in man. Man has three teachers, nature, men and objects. Nature is "the internal development of our faculties and our organs." Plants need only nature. Animals need only nature and objects. Only man – civilized man – needs men as well as nature and things to become what he is. And, therein, consists the difficulty. The education of men is mixed with the self-interest and prejudices of the men who give it. To understand a plant one need only watch its cycle of growth in its usual or natural circumstances. The plant cultivated by man will regain its natural direction once one removes the constraints he puts on it. The natural man, in the primary sense, can be observed as one would observe plants or animals. This is what Rousseau does in the Discourse. But that animal man, unlike the other animals, had

potentialities which remained undeveloped in the original state. One must stand at the end of the process of his development – accidental development – to see his nature completely. But that development has not only involved other men, it has meant being controlled and distorted by them. To get to the fully developed *natural* man, one must reason from what one knows about the original condition to what man's developed condition would be if it were not perverted by other men. The project of the Emile requires defining nature as "habits in conformity with nature." This means that all of man's acquisitions which he did not possess in the state of nature and which do not contradict that first nature can be called natural. Rousseau requires the knowledge of the first man, and the experience of all that man has acquired in his history – both because only as a result that history is there science which can understand nature and because only from this privileged standpoint, which Rousseau claims he is the first to have, can one know all of man's potentiality – in order to reconstruct natural man. The only determination of naturalness in man on the level of civil society is wholeness.

In this way Rousseau is able to distinguish three levels of development in our disposition to seek or avoid the objects of our sensations: a) the pleasure or the pain they cause us, b) our discovery that they are or are not suitable for us, c) "according to the judgments we make about them on the basis of the idea of happiness or of perfection given us by reason." Only the first of these levels, that connected with pleasure and pain, is to be found in the natural man in the state of nature; the third is only conceivable in fully developed civil society and is not, as it is in Hobbes, simply reducible to the first. The activity of education is

delimited by the following reflection: "These dispositions are extended and strengthened as we become more sensitive and more enlightened; but constrained by our habits, they are more or less corrupted by our opinions. Before this corruption they are what I call in us nature." Education positively furthers sensitivity and enlightenment. Negatively, and perhaps most importantly, it controls the emergence of opinion. Opinion is the source of corruption, the destroyer of nature. Rousseau, the great democrat, is the enemy of opinion in all its forms. More than anything the Emile is an analysis of the sources of opinion in man. The forming of opinions is the peculiarly human capacity and danger. From it stems the opposition between the real and the imaginary world which Machiavelli identified as the problem but did not adequately comprehend. Opinion must be understood in opposition to ignorance and to knowledge. On the capacity to control opinion depends the possibility of freeing man from unnatural conventions. The unprejudiced man is the whole man.

One can, on the basis of Rousseau's list of dispositions towards objects, make a rough outline of the Emile. Books I and II relate the child to objects on the basis of pleasure and pain. In Book III the child learns the science of things in order to judge of their utility. Books IV and V treat of the relation to other human beings and the emergence and satisfaction of desire and duty with respect to them. In Books I and II the education of nature and that of objects are merely protected by the teacher who represents the education of man. The usual mediation between the organs and objects effected by adults for the child – which is the first source of prejudice – is done away with and the teacher as it were disappears in nature. In Book III he is the collaborator in scientific

research about what is useful. And in Books IV and V he becomes a friend in the quest for happiness. The education of men becomes fully human only when the child's objects are humans.

The education from birth to twelve takes place in the state of nature. Pleasure and pain in physical objects are the child's only motivations as they would have been in that state. Here the teacher's function is to let the child grow in freedom from constraint as would an animal. Nature in the simple sense suffices. This part of Rousseau's scheme is the source of progressive education and seems to give credence to the belief that Rousseau's idea of living naturally is to do whatever one pleases. But this is a misinterpretation, for Rousseau makes it clear that, while indeed a child should do what he pleases, he should please to do only what he ought to do. Rousseau presents a complex argument to show that the free flow of natural impulse will suffice during the first years, but that requires a very great activity of limitation on the teacher's part, for nature needs protection from the corruption of civilization amidst which he lives. There is a clear standard of natural need which defines what is admissible in the early years. The teacher's function is to prevent anything getting in the way of the child's development or his acquiring unnatural inclinations from false opinions about things. This will be seen to require considerable harshness and constraint, but of a particular kind.

The equivalent of a return to the state of nature which is childhood means that the pupil cannot be considered as a citizen of a city, the member of any class or the practitioner of any trade. Political life and the economic division of labor provide an education which destines the child to fulfill the functions assigned

to him. Thus men are differentiated and separated from one another. But such educations are based on conventional ends. The sole real vocation is that of man. Rousseau sets a goal for all men which ancient philosophy thought possible for only a few: not to be determined by time or place; to be the same everywhere and under all conditions; to be in principle physically and spiritually independent of civil society; in other words, to be cosmopolitan. But both consider it the goal, not to be dependent on accidents, conventions, or what is essentially arbitrary and changing but on nature. Modern political philosophy had argued for attachment to civil societies because of the imperfections of nature. The same motives in all men everywhere were to incline them to particularize themselves in nations and stations which would protect them.

The moderns thought it possible by science – natural and political – to master fortune. War, poverty and disease and the deaths, slavery, loss of loved ones which follow from them and which constitute human misery could be overcome by an enlightenment which would "ease man's estate". Rousseau, to the contrary, argued that this would make men only more dependent and not more secure. They would spend their lives seeking for powers which would never suffice, forgetting the real purpose of their lives and finally, because of their hopes, be unprepared to face the inevitable blows of fortune, blows which would now be more terrible because of the force of enlightened despots with new instruments at their disposal. Rather one must attach oneself to those things which do not depend on fortune and learn to endure the loss of those things about which we care and which are inevitably allied to fortune. Not the Machiavellian conquest of

fortune but the classical acceptance of it is the purpose of education. In this Rousseau agrees completely with Plato and the Stoics. He differs in that he believes that independence more easily accessible, requiring less extraordinary virtues, than did they. He argues for a combination of the egalitarianism and reliance on sentiment or passion of the moderns with the supra-political freedom reserved by the ancients for the rarest few.

This resignation before fortune diminishes the anxiety which made preservation so central to Hobbes and Locke. The fear of death was singled out by them because of its power and ubiquity. If death is the worst thing, then it follows that life should be primarily dedicated to pursuing the power to preserve it. It was part of their calculation that men could agree on the means to life but not its ends. Their scheme took away the objectivity from the various notions of happiness, about which men were willing to fight, and left objectivity only to the means to happiness – "life, liberty and the pursuit of property." Rousseau, without precisely denying that man's primary natural concern is his preservation, argues that the life to be preserved must be something, that it must somehow be good. A man in the grip of fear ceases to enjoy his life; his activity is totally directed to doing away with the cause of the fear. But that fear threatened something that he perceived to be good. If he is never again to enjoy that experience, the activity of preservation loses all sense, particularly since a man must die sometime. Rousseau restores happiness as the goal of life and the central concern of political philosophy. "To live is not to breathe; it is to act; it is to make use of our organs, of our senses, of our faculties, of all the parts of ourselves which give us the sentiment of our existence." A sweet experience must be at the

root of our activity. The best thing is to sense our own existence. The sentiment of existence is Rousseau's substitute for Plato's and Aristotle's contemplation of being as the experience of pure pleasure which makes life worthwhile and can act as an end and justification for man's other activities. It is an experience of which all men are capable; its seat is in the sentiments or feelings and not in reason (and therefore can be a part of the beginning, the state of nature). But, for all of its differences, it has the same formal position in his thought as contemplation does in theirs and provides a plausible goal for life, a fundamental experience of life's goodness. This is the most important discovery Rousseau makes in thinking through the meaning of the state of nature. The sentiment of existence is what is forgotten in civil life and without it life is not worth living. Education must above all preserve it.

The education of nature requires an entirely new beginning. Mothers and fathers must be banished, and Jean-Jacques must take the place of both. Emile will be raised as the first man, the new Adam guided by a new governor who knows, on the basis of his science, how to form a man and how to provide him with a woman. These two, properly united, will then become the educators of the next generation, and so on for the future.

The way Rousseau leads us toward the necessity of a governor is an excellent example of his rhetoric – its depth, wit, and capacity to mislead. He begins by complaining about the constraint in which man is kept and launches almost irrelevantly into sermons on two of the earnest and somewhat cranky "causes" for which he is known and which ushered in the age of reform. The two bad institutions are swaddling and wet-nurses. Rousseau had a lot to do with the abandonment of swaddling and the return

to nursing one's own children, just as he gave people a taste for the country and for walks and as he discouraged wigs and encouraged vegetarianism. He undoubtedly thought that each craze he initiated in a world entranced by his speech was better than its opposite. But he was aware that these were only superficialities – popular means of touching what remained of natural sentiments, of encouraging healthy dispositions – which do not get to the roots of problems either theoretically or practically. They serve as indications of the problems, edifying for most, perplexing for the thoughtful. He introduces the Emile by saying he is addressing mothers, but elsewhere he avows that he wrote only for philosophers. Mothers are properly the ones who care for children, and Rousseau exhorts them to do so. But reflection makes clear that the book is about why mothers cannot raise children well – at least until there has been a total transformation of society guided by philosophy.

Swaddling is a little model of all the laws of society. Instead of being left in freedom so that their limbs can grow naturally, and they can move as their needs incline them, they are bound. Why are they bound? Because their nurses are less bothered by them that way. Children need constant attention, but that attention must be at the expense of the self-love of adults. They say that swaddling is for the good of the child, but that is an excuse for their self-interest. The regime is established in the interest of the rulers, and the ruled are exploited. The nurses are paid for caring for the children, the reward is not in the activity itself. Thus their principal concern is not the development of the child for its own sake.

And the veritable cause of swaddling is that mothers no

longer suckle their children and hence no longer develop that natural affection which gives them selfless devotion to their children. The mothers want to lead their own lives and have learned pleasures in contradiction with those of the family. Thus they turn the children over to wet nurses who in turn swaddle them. Only if the care of children could be a way of life completely satisfying to mothers would there not be a contradiction between their interest and that of their children.

Rousseau's premise is that all human beings by nature care first about themselves. The only *natural* caring for others which can sometimes take precedence even over self-preservation is the attachment of a mother for her child. This is only sign of what might be called a social instinct. Rousseau is aware that naturally it endures only a short time and is not enough on its own to motivate care throughout the entire education of a civilized child. That instinct, however, is the seed of a possible social group which would follow from inclination rather than be based on compulsion, conventions, laws and myths. The mother is the key to the family. Her love of her children causes her to develop the arts necessary to keep the man who will protect and provide for her and them in the periods of their weakness. The man's desire for the woman, which is not a desire for permanent possession or for offspring but for present enjoyment, can be kept alive by the woman's charms and gradually be converted into an affection and a habit. Thus the family rather than the individual becomes the unit on which civil society is based and which it is designed to protect. This is a surer bond of attachment to civil society, and the passions generated by the family are more generous and less petty than those which motivate the selfish individual. Natural selfishness is thus

sublimated without denaturing man. This is again a middle solution between those of Plato and Hobbes.

But the mother's love, in civil society, is also subject to the contrary perversion. Once attached to the children, she is likely to become too attached, partly because, unlike the woman in the state of nature, she has no life other than them. She forestalls the harsh ride of nature's education, that which is given by pain, disease and wounds and which frequently results in the death of the child. The child becomes soft, unable to endure pain, and full of terrors, the perfect subject for the despotism of the fear of death. Rousseau does not want to teach children the virtue of courage to suppress natural fear of pain. His child is not to be a hero. But natural education hardens a child to the experience of pain and provides a substitute for courage. Not every pain can be overcome by natural habituation, but it will take much more for a savage than for a bourgeois to enslave himself out of fear. Thus the mother's instinct must be controlled and corrected by the father's strength and reason. The father too must devote himself to the children. But the fathers do not now have the same reason to do so. Both their natural freedom and their civil preoccupations turn them away from such an activity. Just as mothers hire wet nurses, fathers hire teachers or governors.

After formally disapproving of this practice as he does that of wet nurses, Rousseau adopts both for his education of Emile. Only with Rousseau's education will Emile become such a father as is necessary, one suitable to a woman capable of caring for children. The most important things in life will then be in agreement, procreation and rearing of children with the natural freedom and pleasure of man. The duality of father and mother must be

suppressed by the governor's unity in order to provide for the education of a unified man who will re-establish the family on a new basis of unity. In this passage Rousseau extols the family and covertly teaches that it is not simply natural. It is a perfect example of his mixed speech.

The invention of the governor is a necessity because a new beginning is necessary. Parents are part of the old order and contribute to preserving it. They lack the knowledge and the motive for the new education. There seems to be nothing in nature which can solve the problem of raising a child for itself, and the governor appears as a *deus ex machina*, his role in the Emile resembling that of the legislator in the Social Contract (and that of Wolmar in the Nouvelle Héloïse). "In order to discover the best ruler of society suitable to nations, there would be needed a superior intelligence which saw all men's passions and experienced none of them, which had no relation with our nature while knowing it profoundly, whose happiness was independent of us and who nevertheless was willing to be concerned about ours; finally, who, although reserving for himself a glory distant in the course of time, could work in one age and enjoy in another. Gods would be needed to give laws to men." (Soc. Con. II, vii). The egalitarian Rousseau recognizes that a certain kind of greatness or genius is required for foundings. The founder must have the wisdom which is not accessible to most men but which his legislation will make accessible. He must know how to control men in such a way that they will recognize afterwards that they wanted what they would have never dreamed they wanted. In particular he must know human nature. But he must be above the passions which induce men to act for their own interest when

ruling others. He must want nothing for himself. He must be independent of the men he rules but must want to do good for them. In all this the governor must resemble the legislator. Moreover, they are alike also in that they must come, as it were, from nowhere. Their ruling rests, on no precedent right, such as that of parents, kings or elected officials. And they must disappear. They can only set the machine in motion because the individuals must finally be free and equal and choose their own rulers.

This insistence on the special role of the founder, the extraordinary individual who stands outside of all legality and in a sense outside of nature, in order to establish what is naturally good is another instance of Rousseau's return to the ancients or even against the moderns. In various ways almost all modern thinkers endeavored to do away with the necessity for conscious foundings. In Hobbes and Locke this was part of the plan which made the actualization of decent regimes less dependent on chance and more certain. The operation of certain natural motives would almost automatically produce the desired result. The love of life and comfort would, with a minimum of enlightenment, produce the needed civil disposition. With Adam Smith's "hidden hand" – which is but an extension of Locke's thought – the good of society if thought to be possible without the risks of the ruler's all too visible hand, and the classical idea of the legislator almost disappears. After that, founding became the business of history.

The legislator's role is not, as is thought, one of those wildly hopeful notions which lead to the failure of the Terror. If it is possible to found, of course, then founding is always a temptation. But the view that the revolution and the coming of the revolution

are inevitable did not prevent Lenin from acting with even more ferocity than did the men of the French Revolution who thought they were encouraged by Rousseau. And, actually, Rousseau, as was the case with Plato, meant to show that good regimes are unlikely, for it is difficult to find such men as the founders, willing to rule, with a population willing to follow them and all in the circumstances in which a founding is possible. And that all these circumstances should coincide is mere chance. Moses and Lycurgus accomplished great acts of founding, but their heroic character is an indication of the rareness of such events. And even they, from Rousseau's point of view, lacked the perfected understanding requisite to perfect foundings.

Rousseau and Plato did not exclude conscious foundings, as did some, out of an excess of hope or of fear. In principle human reason and human art can improve the human condition by means of good legislation. Rousseau is surely more outspoken on this issue than is Plato, and it is a very long question to determine whether and why he more than Plato encouraged men to such action. But the great caution he counseled is not taken seriously enough. The very description of the legislator is sufficient to demonstrate his reserve. He really meant to show that the kind of natural motives relied on by Hobbes and Locke would not suffice to form a real community and would at the same time release the lowest in man.

Simply put, the natural inclinations suffice to motivate a solitary man in the state of nature to take care of himself. They do not lead to submission to the law or concern for the common good. At the very least, a transformation and redirection of those inclinations, if not Lycurgus' denaturing, is required to turn a

collection of individuals into a people. Moreover, the natural passions on which Hobbes and Locke rely are already really social corruptions of natural passions which were originally only indifferent to other men and now are concerned with getting the better of them.

The legislator is needed because the movement from nature to convention which is the founding of civil society requires inventions which are not natural, the construction of a bridge of habits and morals linking the two. This necessity flows from the primary disjunction he makes between nature and civilization, between man's progress in morality and happiness and his progress in science. The parallelism of the two was the foundation of the Enlightenment and the basis in the belief in the automatic coming into being of decent regimes as a result of enlightenment. Rousseau insists that only human action can bring the disparate strands together. That action is an exercise in pure freedom for there is no natural model on which to form it and no natural potential which seeks its solution in the solution. The founder is guided only by the original wholeness which has been fractured and must be repaired in wholly unprecedented ways.

And in this Rousseau differs from the ancients. Aristotle says that the city is natural but the founder of the city deserves the highest honor. The city does not grow like a tree, but the life lived in common with others is a natural potentiality of man. The founder assists the actualization of that potentiality; his art is ministerial to nature. He is necessary, for nature contains potentiality, of which the activity of human reason is a part; nature is not the pure actuality of the moderns. In Rousseau, for all that nature is his standard, the final product is art correcting rather than

completing nature.

The governor does for the individual what the legislator does for society. In one sense it is Rousseau's formation of the man capable of fully and honestly making a social contract. In another sense it is the making of a man who unites nature and civility without the need of a society supportive of his qualities, one who can be a good man in bad nations, recovering thus natural independence. The governor is given that name because he is the child's guide, the only guide he will ever need. True government exists to make men free. Emile will emerge as the self-governing man who fulfills the requirements of democracy.

The great difference between Rousseau's presentation of the governor and that of the legislator is that for the latter he provides an explicit motive for his concern with founding a nation: a great-souled love of eternal glory. He is silent about the motive of the governor who must devote his whole life to this child. Inasmuch as this governor in this novel – whose name is Jean-Jacques – is more clearly Rousseau himself than is the legislator, the governor's motives fuse with those of Rousseau. Only through reflection on the governor's role throughout the book can one arrive at some clarity. We know him through his deeds, not through any self-revelation. By watching what he does we can discover what he knows and why he acts. He is Rousseau made young and beautiful. We can compare him with the real Rousseau as man and teacher (who is presented in several stories both succeeding and failing in less than perfect circumstances with less than perfect pupils), the Rousseau who indicates here that he abandoned his own children. We not only learn about Emile, the good, average man; we also learn by implication about the character and motives of the other

kind of man, the genius who needs no education but is necessary for the education of mankind. The book is essentially a theoretical book, one that envisages a possibility and presents a perspective from which to view what really happens. Its many facets project a light compounded by an imaginary pupil compared to real men and an ideal governor compared to Rousseau as he really was.

The governor has the right to choose his pupil, the material on which he has to work. Not every individual is proper for the governor's education anymore than every people can receive the legislators' laws. However, since this is intended to be the education of natural man, or of all men in principle, the conditions Rousseau sets are minimal. The first and most important is almost certain to be met and resembles in this the Machiavellian imperative that men must be accepted as they are. Rousseau, if he could choose, would want only a common mind, for, according to him, only ordinary men (*hommes vulgaires*) need to be raised. The others rear themselves. And by this simple condition Rousseau marks out the most profound difference between Plato's view of what education can accomplish and his own. In a word, Rousseau has much greater hopes than Plato. The Emile is intended to demonstrate that his new science of human nature makes it possible in principle to make all normal men autonomous, in the literal sense of self-legislating, whereas Plato's Republic teaches that only the rarest of men, the philosophers, can be self-legislating. On the decision in this dispute turns the justice and desirability of democracy. Rousseau was not a sentimentalist in the modern use of the word. Men's equality in desire for happiness and capacity to suffer is not sufficient for according them all equal esteem. The real test, particularly from a political point of view, is their capacity

for independence. Do they need guidance from other men? In other words, do they have prejudices which make them incapable of seeing the world as it is, and are they capable of controlling their passions so that they can act in accordance with the way things are? Plato and Rousseau agree that for now – and for all of the past – the answer is emphatically no. Their difference concerns whether this is necessarily the case.

Plato's education of ordinary, and even better than ordinary, men, consists of training in good habits and, especially, in salutary myths and noble lies. These myths and lies concern e.g. the character and behavior of the gods, the significance of death, the reasons for attachment to one's country, obedience to the laws, and love of one's fellow citizens. These myths take the place of bad myths and ignoble opinions, ones that would make men fanatics or imitators of immoderate gods, overwhelmed by fear of death, careless of their country, disobedient of the laws, or partisans of factions or clans. These latter opinions have such effects as Thrasymachus' definition of justice as the advantage of the stronger and its corollary that men must spend their lives mastering the bodies and opinions of other men in pursuing scarce goods. The former opinions have as their double effect the possibility of a life in common and an openness to reason. Plato substitutes one set of opinions for another; he does not expect a transcendence of opinion. And for precisely this reason aristocracy according to him is the just regime. There are those who can indeed transcend opinion, and by right they should form the opinions of others and not be forced to accept their opinions.

Plato uses an image to describe men's natural situation with respect to education. He compares it to a cave in which all men

are bound looking at the shadows of artifacts projected on a wall. Their lives are spent in identifying them, predicting their appearance, living in accordance with them. The cave is the necessary beginning point of all learning and the ending point for most. Men naturally live in groups which are bound together by authoritative opinions, opinions necessary to the survival of the group, the character of which is partly natural, partly due to accident and convention born of the here and now. Fear of death and other powerful passions tie them to the group on which they depend for survival. The young learn about things, not by direct experience with them but from the opinions about them which their teachers have, opinions distorted and mediated by the needs and passions of the group. They necessarily learn through speech. And the speech of their elders is not only partial, but the law, and all that supports it, keeps that speech partial. This place and these lives have to have a cosmic significance, and the partial truths or total lies which give them that significance are furiously protected. The movement from opinion to knowledge is impeded by powerful passions. There is a possible escape from the world of the cave into the light of the real world of nature. It is by way of examination of the contradictions inherent in all such opinions. But first a man must have the intellectual force to see the contradictions and then the moral force to carry through the analysis which will separate him from his fellows and deprive him of the consolation of the gods of the cave as well as make him a criminal in the eyes of the city. What is required in order to leave the cave and the risks it entails are incarnated in the life and death of Socrates. Rousseau's own quest and sufferings are also illustrative of the same problem.

The almost prohibitive odds against emerging from the cave and the at best imperfect reform of the cave, the recognition of which was at the source of Plato's educational moderation, induced Hobbes and others to try to cut the Gordian knot and bring light into the cave. He proposed a universal education, reasonable and within the reach of all normal men. This new rational education has two foci: a) dispelling the myths of the cave which have the function of attaching men to the city and overcoming their fear of death on the basis of poetic or religious fictions about the way things are. Political obligation is reconstituted on the basis of a new teaching about nature, a nature immediately accessible to all unlike the Platonic *ideas* which come to light only at the end of a process of reasoning. The new teaching is that the most powerful passions which all men experience are the core of human nature. The turning out of the old myths, which cause men to believe in shadows, and to fear imaginary evils, is almost identical with learning about nature, for the fear of what is naturally terrible – death – remains when the shadows disappear. b) From here one can move quickly to a political adhesion which serves the most powerful passions. Reason, when it cooperates with passion instead of trying to control it, becomes effective, the instrument of utility, and neither great genius nor great daring is required for its use. It clarifies the rules which make civil life possible in a way comprehensible to most men. Enlightened self-interest is the formula for this use of the reason. It is dedicated to the search for the useful in political and physical science. Descartes' promise that medicine – transformed by the new science – would lengthen men's lives is the manifesto of a reform which unites the interests of the cave with what was once the domain of purely speculative

endeavors. All men desire the fruits of knowledge, and knowledge is sought to serve men's desires. The method of science, as introduced by Descartes, has the effect of equalizing capacities for knowing. Altogether, the new education of enlightenment is coordinate with and serves the new political science. The lower demands made on the citizen make it possible to rationalize politics and politicize science. The Platonic distinction between the citizen and the philosopher is another expression of the distinction between the real city and the imaginary city, and the former distinction is collapsed along with the latter.

The Enlightenment solution is for Rousseau no solution. As we have seen, the modern educated man is according to him neither a real citizen nor a real knower. Such a science does not teach duties, or completely reduces duties to desires, thus destroying the independence of morality without really establishing the kind of obligation required for decent political life. And the passions which act as the first premises of the individual's calculations of utility are neither reasonable nor natural. In fact, calculating rationalism preserves and bloats those passions by providing new hopes of satisfaction, so that the very premises from which the reasoning began become arbitrary and changing. To put it in Platonic language, enlightenment preserves the fundamental prejudices of the cave – those that cause men to believe the cosmos must care for their poor individual beings – while destroying the myths which counterpoised the extremes of selfishness. Science becomes the tool of prejudice rather than its corrective and loses its nobility and real utility. The bourgeois, the man supposedly liberated from the chains of false opinion and hence able to be a rational citizen, is more than anyone, the creature of other men's

opinions and dependent on the whims of the collectivity.

Rousseau, in short, accepts the view that there is no rationalizing of the cave. His use of the word *people* in the Emile is, surprisingly, akin to Plato's use of the word *dēmos*: both are the seat of illusion, fanaticism and prejudice. And what is required to recognize that the cave is a cave and then to free oneself from it can belong only to a rare man. Where he takes issue with Plato is whether the cave is natural or not. The Discourse on the Origin of Inequality may be viewed as an account of the genesis of the cave, of how men came to need one another and how their needing and living together engendered certain false opinions. Convention was not, as Plato believed, part of man's nature. And since the cave came to be, there was a time – when man was man – at which he did not need opinions and was yet able to live independently. If this original freedom from prejudice or direct contact with nature could be preserved during the acquisition of civilization, then there would be no need of greatness to be free. Rousseau is uncompromising and takes Plato as his model. Democracy is only legitimate if men are equal in their understanding of nature. The citizen must be able to make laws for man as man and not for this particular individual. He must be a universal legislator and not a clever fellow calculating the means of saving himself. Only in this radical way can the moderns' assertion of equality be defended. Rousseau stands forth as the defender of modernity against Plato, a foe who had not yet been bested.

The Emile develops a *method* which can in principle make all men, or at least any man, if not philosophers at least autonomous in a rigorous sense. As such it responds point by point to Plato and shows where the passions are transformed and opinion enters and

the means of closing off those entrances. It analyzes the cave and sets nature over against it while trying to make plausible the psychological emergence of the former from the latter. On the successful education of a common mind, an ordinary man, depends the fate of Rousseau's democratic preference.

His profound agreement and disagreement with Plato is nicely illustrated in his insistence on taking on only a healthy baby. Beginning from the sensible, and almost platitudinous, point that in order to live one must not spend one's life caring for one's health, Rousseau ends with what can only appear to be an intemperate attack on medicine, just another one of his ticks – charming or repulsive to various tastes but never really serious. Actually this passage is an imitation of one in the Republic in which the treatment of medicine is almost exactly the same, one which begins as a discussion of the gymnastic producing health and in fact turns out to be almost exclusively a criticism of medicine. And the underlying issue in both is men's disposition toward death, an issue we can hardly take seriously anymore – at least in the form proposed by Plato and Rousseau – because the view they proposed has been overwhelmed by the opposing view.

The classic view, apparently reiterated by Rousseau, is that the body is the servant of the soul and that for the soul to engage in the activities proper to it the body must be in a good condition. Life is the condition of the good life, and the body should assist and not impede the activity of the soul. Body and soul are related as means and end, condition and cause. This common sense analysis is, however, contradicted by much everyday experience. Men seem to love life for its own sake or at least to resist giving it up, even when their continued existence means abandoning the good life. In fact

there is a contradiction between being concerned with the preservation of life and living the good life and the acts of the virtuous soul sometimes require not only indifference to life but the sacrifice of it. Actually the demands of life, if thought through, would seem to exclude concern for the good life. At least the former would be primary, for the good life requires life, and this already undermines the claim of the good life to be the most important thing. "Better Red than dead" means that liberty is of secondary importance. The claim of the soul would seem to be a moral rather than a natural imperative. The good life requires the mediation of a difficult and relatively rare virtue, courage, in order to overcome the inclinations. Based on the way men actually live the body would seem to have primacy, and the primacy of the good life is the preserve of the heroic few who transcend nature.

Now medicine is the art which cares for the body, and it reveals and increases the tension between life and the good life. It has no concern for the moral life of those for whom it cares, except insofar as that moral life affects health. It serves the most selfish of passions and augments men's hopes for the satisfaction of that passion. Rather than teaching men to accept their vulnerability and carry on with their duties, medicine allows their imaginations to expand the limits of the possible and forget that they must die. Medicine, founded on fear of death and feeding it, can construct a whole world in which all the resources of mind and body are used for the prevention and curing of disease or the prolongation of life. Medicine gives us "cowardice, pusillanimity, credulousness and terror of death," summarizes Rousseau.

The simple solution to the problem is given by Plato. Medicine is a ministerial and ancillary art which must be guided by

an architectonic art, political science, which will limit its use so that the concerns of health do not detract from the fulfillment of duties or hinder the activities of the highest faculties. Politic Asclepiads will prevent medicine from emancipating itself. However, this simple solution does not quite suppress the conflicting duality as is indicated by the fact that the medicine permitted is primitive and the full development of the art is prevented. Moreover this medicine is used by men who have been trained in a poetry which tries to make them believe that death is not terrible or a thing to be feared for oneself or one's loved ones. Men not thus prepared by myths will emancipate medicine and carry it to its perfection. The treatment of medicine in the Republic reflects the utopian character of the whole book and is another aspect of the problem of the unity of man. The unity achieved in it is founded on an impossible overcoming or taming of the body and its demands. That unity really gives witness to the dualism of how men ought to live and how they do live which Machiavelli criticized.

And the Machiavellian reconciliation of is and ought found one of its most powerful and profoundest culminations in the complete emancipation of medicine, accompanying Machiavelli's emancipation of the passions, effectuated by Descartes. The new science has as its professed aim the improvement of medicine and the prolongation of life. Thus the tension is resolved in the direction of the body and the purpose of life becomes life and science is in the service of easing man's estate. For Plato health was for the sake of contemplation; for Descartes contemplation is for the sake of health. A total revolution in the relation between body and soul is made, one that accords with men's deeds and their wishes while accommodating their love of learning. Following the

indications of man's nature science or art declares war on nature in order to flatter man's fondest wish – never to die.

It is this radical version of medicine that Rousseau faced and which caused him to return to Plato for inspiration. The new science corrupts both morals and science, the former by making men fearful and hopeful about the preservation of life and thus making the means to life the end of life and turning men into poltroons, the latter by turning science into a tool and covering over man's true situation. Roughly reproducing a passage where Thrasymachus praises the power of art and Socrates appears to agree but tacitly disagrees, Rousseau calls into question the possibility of art's overcoming nature and the desirability of such a struggle which would turn man from the fulfillment and enjoyment of his nature. The new science is the domain of the new sophists.

But Rousseau does not follow Plato either in establishing an architectonic art for the control of medicine – which would ultimately lead to the rule of philosophy and philosophers – or in the establishment of a poetic education to make men fearless. Rather he rejects medicine utterly and argues that men are by nature fearless. He contends that nature – without the intervention of men – takes care of them. Plato had asserted, in essence, that a good soul would guarantee a good body, in order to avoid the consequence that virtue is not sufficient for happiness and the resultant moral ambiguity. But this is, of course, not true and is only playfully suggested. Rousseau seriously maintains that the body takes care of itself and that the desires connected with it are sound. He accepts the Cartesian primacy of the body and its desires but denies that the latter are infinite, in particular the fear of death. His intention is to unite the soundness of modern science

with the dignity of ancient morals. And he attempts to achieve this result by showing that it is science itself which corrupts the harmony between man and nature. The body itself, if preserved from the artificial temptations of sensuality or the rigors of Christian asceticism, has a wisdom of its own and needs neither moderation nor courage to produce the effects of those virtues. Plato had improved on the Achilles of Homer in order to make living without the distortion of fear less heroic. Rousseau praises the Achilles who was made immune to death and hence to fear by being dipped in the Styx. The frontispiece of Book I is a representation of that deed, and one of the primary goals of this education is to do something similar for Emile, to produce a capacity to live without the efforts of ancient virtue and without giving way to the fear of death.

Rousseau gives the broadest possible significance to what he is about in one of his most striking formulations. "Naturally man knows how to suffer with constancy and dies in peace. It is doctors with their prescriptions, philosophers with their precepts and priests with their exhortations who debase his heart and make him unlearn how to die." One cannot help being reminded of Socrates' definition of philosophy on the day of his death, "Philosophy is learning how to die." Rousseau marks out the distance between himself and Plato in this way. Both Plato and Rousseau agree, as ever against the modern philosophers, that knowing how to die is the most important kind of knowing and the key to a serious life. But Rousseau says that all men originally possess that knowledge whereas Plato shows that it is the result of a life of extraordinary exertions made by the most extraordinary of men.

Without pretending to exhaust the meaning of that profound

and enigmatic definition, one may confidently assert that learning how to die is identical to emerging from the cave or apprehending that the cave is a cave; for the cave is a fabric woven of the various illusions that give significance to the ephemeral attachments of men whose lives depend on forgetting the impermanence of all they care for. All animals avoid death and seek to preserve themselves, but man is the only animal who imagines a world of meanings which covers over the nothingness of death and which in turn changes his way of life. Family, country, gods, fortune and a science which can save us are all parts of that imaginary world peopled by both cowards and heroes who share this fundamental need for delusion. The philosopher, born into it, must combine the capacity to penetrate its publicly authoritative ruses and the firmness to live a noble life without hope and in spiritual isolation. The doctors are only a symbol of all that ministers to man's fear. Priests with their promises of another life and a certain kind of philosophers with their promises of a protective state and a medicine which, if it will not make men immortal, will at least keep putting off the dreadful day, are the true servants of the cave. The men of the Enlightenment, as much as the men of religion, are deluders for, with all their apparent rationalism, they too help men to avoid staring death in the face. The gravity of the modern situation is that, for the first time, philosophy cooperates with the delusive passions and thus closes off the exit from the cave.

For both Rousseau and Plato fear of death is the pillar that supports the cave. The former, however, argues that doctors, priests and philosophers gave men that fear whereas the latter says that they exist because it existed. If Rousseau is right, then the only task is to preserve the original ignorance of death, shared by

men with all the animals, which prevents man from suffering from the errors engendered by the fear of death. Animals do not change their natures because they must die. Man must be protected from "unlearning," rather than be compelled to learn, how to die.

The governor, provided with a pupil who is ordinary, healthy, determined neither by climate nor fortune nor class, over whom he has complete control and from whom he is never to be separated, begins a new human history with the hindsight acquired from the failure of other beginnings.

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The remainder of Book I deals with the child's vegetative existence up to the time he begins to speak, when he can move others by speech and be moved in turn by them. Quite literally he is at this stage reared like a plant, and the art of the governor consists in observing the conditions in which the plant flourishes and the various stages of its organic development in order to insure that it is itself, in no way distorted or stunted by external circumstance or will.

The first thing by nature is feeding the child. And this presents the first problem; for supposing the child already born, a woman is required for the nursing; and that introduces a male-female dyad and thereby a tension of judgment and interest between the two as well as a split authority for the child who should see only the unity of nature in order not to find a way of evading its authority. Naturally men and women are isolated, united only casually and momentarily for the act of reproduction. The mother instinctively feeds and provides the simple care for the

child and releases it very early. Nature alone guides it and is its master. The governor of this child, a child born in civil society and heir to all of man's historical acquisitions, is the representative of nature, protecting what remains of it, and the artist who harmonizes those acquisitions with nature. The presence of a couple educating the child, if it were not to reflect the forced and inharmonious unions of men as they now are, would presuppose that the opposition between the natural living for oneself and the social living for others had been overcome. And that is the work of the Emile. Emile and Sophie will be a unity that can properly care for the child. In this consists the end and the artifice of Rousseau's education. It makes possible the couple, the nucleus in which self-love and love of others become one.

Thus the natural education must do away with the natural mother and her claim to authority and substitute a hired nurse who is so completely under the governor's authority that she almost does not exist and who disappears as soon as Emile is weaned. She is the only woman in Emile's garden until he is grown and falls in love.

At this point the book takes on the appearance of a manual on child rearing, but in spite of the appearance each of the general topics treated support its general intention and Rousseau's quirky innovations, so gripping for liberal parents, illustrate that intention. The purely vegetative state of the child is presided over by the nurse. Rousseau considers four of the elements necessary to that state: what goes into the child – the nurse's milk; the atmosphere surrounding his whole body and causing the first affections of his senses – air and water; and the free movement of the body and each of its organs – limbs and organs. The last is another attack on swaddling, the larger significance of which has already been

discussed. As for water, it is treated as part of a training designed to make the child capable of enduring all changes of temperature and thus free him from dependency on any particular climate or season and on the inventions which make a more vulnerable man able to withstand extremes. Without the exercise of great courage a man so raised can endure much and can get along anywhere on earth.

As for the nurse's milk, that subject turns into a disquisition on vegetarianism. This is a theme to which he will return. In what Rousseau says here one can find the source of the natural foods movement, which follows the surface of what he says without grasping his meaning. Without actually insisting that meat is not healthy for man or that he is not carnivorous, he brings to bear all the science available to him that points in the direction of man's being naturally herbivorous. This has something to do with the question of the goodness of nature and whether man's relation to other animals including man, is one of peace or war, and it prefigures Rousseau's encouragement of the gentle as opposed to the harsh passions. Plato and Aristotle, of course, did not believe that men are naturally at war and at the same time saw no theoretical difficulty in man's eating other animals. But for them the differences between the species were more clearly marked, particularly that between man and all the others than is the case for all the moderns and particularly Rousseau, for whom rationality is no longer the specific distinction of man and for whom sense and sentiment, which are shared with the other animals play such an important role. Moreover, the intelligible order of nature with its differences in the rank of beings could permit Aristotle to say, with at least partial seriousness, that the other animals exist for man, that killing and eating them is not a violence done to nature, nor a proof

that nature is violent. This premise, with all of its difficulties, is necessary to his politics in order to justify man's use and appropriation of nature. Thus Aristotle prefers the tame animals, those amenable to reason, and particularly those that love men, like dogs. The moderns, like Hobbes, who abandoned that premise were forced, in order to justify man's acquisition of his necessities, to found them on the right of conquest resulting from man's struggle for survival against nature. Rousseau, while again accepting in essence the modern view of nature, wishes to avoid its consequences and does so by denying that most of what appears to be necessary acquisition is really necessary, e.g. the eating of meat (as well as most of agriculture and, even more so, of mining and manufacturing). For the moment, he agrees, as he did in the first lines of Book I, with the Biblical account of the origins according to which man in the beginning was abundantly supplied with the fruits of the earth (without having to wound the earth, as did Cain laboring with the sweat of his brow in order to force it to fulfill his needs) and lived in peace with the animals. Natural abundance, with all of the difficulties in compelling belief, is the premise which he, with at least partial seriousness, substitutes for Aristotle's premise in order to avoid the enormous difficulties presented by the notion of the conquest of nature. Man's reason does not give him a privileged place in a rational cosmos nor does it give him the tools for tyrannizing nature. Thus Rousseau prefers wild animals who cannot be mastered by man's will and cats who do not love man. His arguments for vegetable diet and that milk is a vegetable substance are meant to indicate his stance on this issue.

A return to the country suits the vegetable diet, and it is there one finds good air, according to Rousseau. Natural foods and a taste

for nature, understood as what is untouched by man, are a familiar combination, although for Rousseau they are only conditions for education rather than ends in themselves. The taste for the country follows from the view that man is not naturally a social animal, although it is not a necessary consequence of that view. The ancients, of course, preferred the city. Socrates said he could not talk to trees and rocks. Man's fulfillment is in the use of his reason, particularly in friendship with other men which consists essentially in speech. This is the natural end, and thus cities, which are necessary to the development of the faculties connected with this speech and which are, at best, associations of friends, are natural. The moderns for whom the purpose of life is the preservation of life and for whom the natural relation of men is rivalry and not friendship nevertheless preferred the city because in it that rivalry can best be moderated and because the means of preservation are best provided for by the division of labor. It is in the city that the war against nature is won. This strand of anti-social modern thought culminates in Marx's speaking of capitalism's achievement in overcoming the "idiocy of country life." It is primarily against this modern view of the city that Rousseau reacts. This view teaches that nature and city are opposites, and Rousseau reconsiders whether it is so obvious that in this opposition the latter is preferable to the former. He asks whether in principle the savage does not have it better than the inhabitant of an industrial and commercial city. (For the city is no longer what it was in Greece and Rome; it changes with the change in its end. It no longer represents a conception of man's end.) No amount of human manipulation can make the city livable for man if he is not naturally fit for it. This is true in both the moral and physical

senses. The air of the cities is corrupt not only because of its manufactures but because "man's breath is fatal to his kind." Man is not a herd animal.

And, of course, it is finally not only the modern city, but also the ancient – which is the result of denaturing – that Rousseau rejects, for the happiness of a man is not to be found in speech or reason but in pre-rational sentiments experienced alone and prior to social relations.

All of this is only a theoretical analysis, however, from the perspective of which one will alter one's view of what to expect from cities and how one should relate to them. Civilized man needs society and hence cities. The political solution to the problems of society requires something like the ancient city. Even relative isolation requires unusual gifts and labors and does not constitute a universal solution. And great cities are necessary in order to acquire the science which makes possible a consciousness of man's situation and doing something about it. (Cf. Republic III). But still and all, Rousseau is the founder of the longing for the wilderness, and, at the beginning of his education the little boy, whose life recapitulates the stages of civilization, lives like a savage far from men. Even his governor, as we shall see, is not quite human for him.

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Learning begins with birth and the first impressions largely determine the cast of mind for the whole of life. The governor watches for the first rays of dawning understanding. The baby does not even have a sentiment of its own existence. It is a little machine, full of needs but without the means of providing for those

needs. It is the governor's business to see that the I of the child, who is without knowledge and without will, will consist of a knowledge of the way things really are and a will that freely chooses what is useful in accord with the nature of things. The characteristic feature of the Emile is the analysis of the relation between perception and passion, the effect on learning of desire, the mixture of what would now be called epistemology and ethics. It attempts to bring the world of human concern into harmony with the real world.

Rousseau uses an image to present his view of learning. It is that of a man born full grown – like Minerva from the head of Jupiter, (or, for that matter, like Adam made by God).

Education begins at birth. The baby is born with needs; that is all. In order to satisfy those needs he must learn about himself and about things. Everything comes from experience. A good education assures knowledge and a will which corresponds to it. Rousseau is not innovative in his understanding of learning. He follows the empiricism of the moderns, especially that school which begins with Locke. He is innovative in his consideration of the relation of learning to the whole of life, particularly in his analysis of the sources of error in the passions and the means of avoiding their distorting effect. His intention is to skip that lowest level of Plato's "divided line," where things are seen in the mirror of the prejudices, the level of the cave, and to move to a direct contact with things as they are. The method of the moderns makes this direct contact possible, but the moderns have failed to understand the moral requisites for its success in the domain of science or that of happiness.

Rousseau, in order to represent the beginning point of learning,

imagines a man born full blown, like Pallas Athena from the head of Jupiter. This image also reminds one of Adam as created by God. Rousseau makes it clear that this is not a good arrangement and that the education through natural growth is the only way for man to orient himself in the world. Only thus can he be free and reasonable.

The adult would, unlike the baby, have a sentiment of existence, an *I*. Otherwise, he would resemble the baby. He would experience sensations but he would not know that there are objects which cause them nor that there are various senses which perceive different aspects of those objects. Everything would be together in a single point. Similarly he would feel the discomfort of needs but would not know what those needs were, toward what they tended nor how to use one part of the body to satisfy another nor with what things. Learning is to move those sensations out of that single point, the *sensorium*, to extend them and put them at a distance. The sensations must be turned into representations of things which are known to be outside of the individual. He must come to recognize that he has senses and the contributions of the various senses to the representations of things. Moreover he must come to know his desires and needs and how to relate them to things in the world.

The business of education is to assure that this development is in no way distorted. This means that the senses must be so trained that they accurately represent things as they are, that nothing distort their operation. It also means that the needs, desires or passions must be kept natural. And finally it means that the needs, desires or passions be related to things in such a way that a false view of things does not transform the former or that those

affections of the soul do not turn the representations of things into fictions suitable to human wishes. The governor supervises all of this.

In particular he prevents the various kinds of distortions or perversions, particularly those arising from human conventions. Nature and things take care of the rest. Rousseau's apparent discussion of what we would call epistemology and learning theory turns into an analysis of the sources of error and the corruption of the passions. The first thing of which he speaks is the danger of habit which, from the point of view of learning about things, results in partial or abstract representations, a lack of openness to their various aspects, or receiving things as one likes or as is convenient rather than in their richness and variety; and which, from the point of view of the needs, creates new needs, makes the satisfaction of real needs more difficult and impedes freedom in response to things. Habit, according to Rousseau, acts as a kind of filter between nature and man. Aristotle (referring particularly to education in the virtues) said that education is a combination of nature, habit and reason, and in general the entire philosophic tradition followed him. Habit completes nature and enables a man to act according to the dictates of reason when it develops. But habit is ambiguous. It can be interpreted to be a human construct contradicting nature, both limiting man's freedom and inefficacious in that it splits a man between nature and habit. Further, the man educated in good habits would seem to be like a trained animal whose reason is determined by the habituation he has been given. All these considerations lead Rousseau to try to show that nature unimpeded suffices for the development of a free, reasonable and virtuous man. His rule is that the only habit a child should be

permitted to contract is to have no habits.

In the same paragraph in which he first enunciates this rule he says that a child must be habituated to the dark or he will be frightened by this. Rousseau does this not because he is careless but in order to make clear what he means by habit. The habit would be always to remain in the light whereas nature is a combination of light and dark. First inclination prefers the light where one can more easily distinguish what might do one damage. But man has faculties which enable him to get along at night and giving way to the first inclination would, while stunting nature, make man fearful and thus less free to face any situation which might arise. Rousseau will later return to the question of the dark, for it is the source of many terrors and false beliefs. The teacher indeed habituates but following nature and in the name of freedom. The habits which make a child unnecessarily dependent are properly called habits. The habits formed by Rousseau differ from those proposed by Aristotle in that the former never go against the grain and are immediately supported by nature.

And it is no accident that the first habits Rousseau proposes are connected with objects that cause fear. That passion, as previously discussed, is the foundation of the *bourgeois* with all his failings personal and social and in itself causes men to see things which are not, to invent objects with a content drawn from man's fear distorted view rather than from the perception of the objects themselves. Thus, such a view of the objects in turn feeds and gives reality to the fears, and a whole system of belief and action comes into being, and then there are two worlds, the world of human concern and the real world. Rousseau's whole endeavor is to make the real world the world of human concern. To repeat,

fear seems to be the cornerstone of the mythic world. It is natural but a large part of its consequences is not. Rousseau, always looking to the quarrel between ancients and moderns, tries to render men hardy without denaturing them, avoiding the consequences of basing man's morality on preservation while suppressing the myths necessary to heroism and those engendered by cowardice. He demystifies objects by making them familiar thus, he says, making the child courageous. Such courage is, according to Aristotle, one of the false forms of courage, that based on knowledge that a thing is not terrible or dangerous. Real courage consists in the choice of standing up to something which is truly dangerous, particularly death by wounds in battle, for the sake of the noble. Rousseau does not discuss the truly dangerous here, only what is not really dangerous or what is usually not dangerous. The meaning of the confrontation with death must await further discussion. He only prevents an unnecessary preoccupation with.

Like the puppeteers in the cave the governor passes the objects before the eyes of his pupil, with the difference that he follows the natural order and the objects are the real objects rather than imitations, partly natural and partly conventional. The child is first habituated to loathsome animals, the fear of which would make him less at home in nature and which are the models for mythical beasts, such as dragons, which feed the imagination and people the world with imaginary powers. Second, he is accustomed to masks, the social significance of which is obvious. The theme of men with as it were moral masks – pleasing or terrifying – is often cited by Rousseau. The child will soon see a mask as a mask and therefore recognize nature underneath it without being impressed by this humanly devised means of

deception and control. The physical mask is a harbinger of the moral mask. Third, he will, like Astynax with Hector, get used to the apparatus which turns his tender father into a terrifying warrior. Hector is not a man with a mask but a real hero who must leave his loved ones because of the demands of his duty. His son will become used to the father's manliness as a model without being threatened by it. Fourth, the child will be accustomed to the report of firearms, the actual weapons of war. He will not learn to suffer their wounds but he will be able to recognize the difference between their sound and their effect and thus be able to adjust to much of what is frightening in war. And finally he will overcome the fear of the sound of thunder. Again he will not learn to endure the stroke of lightening, but habit will cause him to forget the rare danger and not to live in fear of the noise. Thunder, it need hardly be mentioned, has frequently been taken to be the sound of the anger of the gods and the lightning bolt the instrument of their punishment. The young Emile will have none of the roots of such a belief in his soul.

This list of terrors overcome is a good model of Rousseau's procedure. Apparently describing the way to form accurate representations of things, he is showing the effects of moral causes on cognition and preparing his pupil to be intrepid with respect to animals and men. Rousseau at every moment is thinking of Greek heroes, Christians and *bourgeois* and the causes of each. Without precisely forming the child for a social end, this list, at least three fifths of which deals with man-made causes of fear, reveals that Rousseau educates a man who is not to be the dupe of society's hypocritical men, its wars and its religions, and by that fact is capable of leading men without wanting to. The natural vocation

will coincide with the social one.

This first stage of education has the advantage that neither imagination nor memory are yet present in the child. The former transforms what is into what is not; the latter assimilates new sensations to old and imperfect representations of things. The child's limitation to the present means that the formation of representations of things based on his sensations can be direct and limited to the reality of the experienced. Thus a store of accurate representations put in a natural order (without the primacy of the unusual or distorted experiences which might be the core in educations dominated by accident) is prepared for the memory which can, in turn, supply them for the interpretation of future sensations. The child's first movements give him the stuff out of which are formed a notion of the qualities that permit the sorting out of the various kinds of material things he senses – hot and cold, hard and soft, light and heavy, big and little and shape – using all his senses but particularly learning to compound seeing and touching and to infer from one to the other.

Learning to separate itself from the things which are not it requires that the child move. It must become aware of extension, which seems in Cartesian fashion to be for Rousseau the essence of all the objects perceived by the mind, the *I*. The child first saw everything as being in his brain. Now he sees them next to his own sense organs and must separate them further from himself, acquire the notion of distance. And here, in the midst of this *epistemological* discussion, Rousseau introduces the second great theme of his moral-psychological teaching, *amour-propre* or vanity. It is, along with fear, the other pillar of the cave.

The issue arises because the child's first gestures towards

things which are beyond his reach have an ambiguous meaning and can be the cause of his first relations to human beings as human beings, as opposed to things. The stretching out of his hand toward what he wants may either be due to his ignorance of distance or may be a command that the object approach. The latter intention is an unnatural result of the natural need he has for the assistance of adults, one which changes his entire attitude toward the world. In either event his frustration will express itself in tears. The question is whether those tears are of real pain or of anger at the disobedience of the adults or the thing.

Tears are children's first language, an immediate expression of the pain caused by their needs which they are unable to satisfy themselves. They are a plea for assistance, an assistance necessary to their survival. Adults respond to these pleas and attempt to give the child what it cries for. At this point two things occur which turn real needs into imaginary ones. On the one hand the child observes that his tears can move the world, that the important thing is not getting this or that particular object but possessing the means of getting any object. A new kind of pleasure arises different from that of real needs satisfied, the pleasure of commanding. The child then starts living in terms of the opinions of others rather than in a direct relation to nature and his own real needs. He becomes spiritually dependent on them, even if he succeeds in dominating them utterly, for he lives for this dominance and no longer acts directly on things or takes care of himself. The adults who care for the child, on the other hand, seek to appease a child's tears by finding out the cause and satisfying him. But frequently they are unable to do so. Tears are importuning, and they attempt to stop them by pleasing and flattering the child or by becoming angry with

him, yelling at him or striking him. Thus a kind of struggle for mastery takes place, a perverting experience for the child no matter who wins. The human intermediary between need and thing opens up a whole spiritual world of imaginary meanings which become more important than real bodily need.

Rousseau illustrates the far-reaching consequences of this development with the first of the many tales which constitute so much of the artifice of the Emile. He once saw a crying baby slapped by his nurse. The baby fell silent, from which Rousseau drew the conclusion that it had a servile soul. Not to rebel against mistreatment is slavish, even at so early an age. Such a being can be moved only by fear and is despicable. But, Rousseau has erred and the baby was silent because it was suffocating with rage, and it finally broke out with sharp cries. It was experiencing anger and resentment. Physical pain played no role in its reaction. And this Rousseau takes as a proof that the sentiment of the just and the unjust are innate in the human heart. A burning ember on his hand would have bothered him less than this light blow given with the manifest intention of offending.

Everything is here in a nutshell. This is the source of the sense of honor, of all the strength of soul and all the enslavement to the opinions of others that goes with it. Resentment, jealousy, envy, pride, flattery, humility and a whole host of other passions that follow in the wake of mastery and slavery come to sight. Rousseau implies that the baby, whose actions and passions are now in relation to other people, who seeks vengeance and the domination of their wills, can distinguish between what harms him intentionally and what harms him only accidentally. Where there is intention, and hence will, a struggle of wills ensues, a beginning of

the dialectic between master and slave. Where there is only blind force or natural necessity, the baby will accept what happens to it without rebellion.

This reaction of the baby is characterized as proof that the sense of justice is innate. Such an explanation sounds rhapsodic and sentimental, the kind of explanation to be expected of Rousseau as he is popularly understood. But it is actually a hard-headed observation. The baby's sense of justice concerns what is owed him, it is a demand made of others. They owe him their attention, and their failure to give it leads to ugly consequences in the child's soul. Its mechanical cries for help have turned into an awareness that there are helpers. The nurse's slap is not only a failure to satisfy its need or a slight additional pain but an affront, a refusal to recognize its right to preservation and relief of pain. As in Hobbes, the first principle of morality, the right to preservation, is identical to the first selfish passion. The child's right becomes the other's duty. One might argue that Rousseau means that the child's anger is a result of the injustice of hitting it when it has done no wrong. But Rousseau makes it clear later that the child is in no position to judge of the validity of the adult's reasons for non-compliance. It only knows that he could comply. The could becomes identical to a should. The child has no awareness of the rights of others; it prefers itself to others and insists that others accept and cater to that preference. Only at a much later stage could it generalize its own rights into a recognition of similar rights and thereby construct a rational system of justice. And the habit of extending its sense of right – which is really only a sense of the possible – to a sense of the unlimited obligation of others would make the construction of that national system of justice impossible.

A further, and most serious and interesting, consequence of the recognition of the existence of will is the baby's extension of it to things. Once the child knows of intention, it sees intention everywhere. Whatever hinders it makes it angry, and it expects things to bend before its will as do the adults around him. Or if they do not, the baby accepts their resistance slavishly, as a result of their stronger will rather than as the way things are and must be. He is a rebel against nature as well as man. The essence of anger is blame; without something to blame there is no anger. And to blame one must believe in the ill will of what one blames. One cannot become angry at what is necessary if one believes it to be necessary. Anger turns the necessary into the willed. Anger is the only passion which animates the world, and is thus the source of the myths which give significance to men's wishes and thus the source of men's incapacity to see nature as it is, in all its indifference, and their inability to recognize its laws and bend themselves to those laws. Xerxes who beats the sea which does not obey him is only the extreme and most revealing instance of what is at work in almost all men. Their reason, which sometimes tells them that this is folly, is only a superficial and inadequate counterpoise to their deepest sentiments. They are in a relation of mastery and slavery with the universe, to which they respond with their hope, their despair, their prayers and their science.

This analysis is very close to that of Plato, but Rousseau insists that these phenomena are not natural to men but are derivative, a result of the early conversion of *amour de soi*, the absolute and simple caring for oneself and one's own preservation, into *amour-propre*, the caring for oneself relative to others, which is the result of the recognition of other men's wills. This conversion is

avoidable and due to faulty rearing. If the child is dependent only on things, never on wills, he will live in immediate harmony with the laws of natural necessity. Emile's early education – up to fifteen, through Book III – is designed to keep him unaware of or indifferent to human beings and their intentions. Instead, believing that things have wills, he will believe that human beings are completely under the domination of natural necessity. According to Rousseau, he will thus never become angry nor suffer the consequences of that passion. His sentiments will be in perfect accord with what the science he learns teaches him about nature. Later he will find out about men, but he will not have to change all of his beliefs about nature in doing so. Or rather he will not have to discover nature in the tangle of beliefs by means of which his passions have made the world conformable to his wishes. Men will take their place in the encompassing framework of natural necessity the understanding of which is fixed within him.

Everything depends on Rousseau's assertion that the baby can make the distinction between men's wills and things, or that it is not natural for men to rebel against things. What he has to say here is similar to what he says about fear of death. No great overcoming is required to make men disposed to knowing and living reasonably in accord with the laws of nature. That is originally in man and need only be protected from corruption. If Rousseau is not right, then again the task of freeing oneself from prejudice would require philosophy and a philosopher's gifts. Most men would be potential Xerxes and would require a restraining education full of salutary myths.

Rousseau's analysis of anger is quite similar to Plato's, and both the Emile and the Republic as wholes reveal the pervasiveness and

centrality of that passion. But there is a decisive difference, for Plato anger is natural and constitutes a separate part of the soul, whereas for Rousseau it is derivative, the result of *amour de soi's* conversion into *amour-propre*. This difference has the furthest reaching consequences, which can only be touched on at this point, and constitutes one of the most important and least studied chapters in the history of psychology. Plato divides the soul into three parts – desire, thymos (roughly translated by anger or spiritedness), and reason; the moderns recognize only two parts, desire and reason, and thus must derive the phenomena connected with the third part, which Plato regarded as primary and irreducible, from one of the two remaining ones, particularly from desire. Plato sticks close to the phenomena and argues that they cannot be reduced, that what goes on in the soul of the spirited man cannot be understood as though care and preservation of the body were its only goals. The spirited man is concerned with honor more than life; no other animal cares what his peers think of him. The spirited man wants to be first and insists that others recognize him to be such. He will not tolerate insult or contempt. He loves friends and hates enemies. Achilles is the great model of the dominance of the spirited part of the soul, he who quarrels with his leader Agamemnon, who punishes him and fights with a river, believing it to be a god which hinders him. Glory is the highest motive of such a man. At his peaks he is likely to be in a frenzy, abandoning both reason and vital desire. His anger attaches him to men's opinions. He is the heroic man and essentially a warrior.

Spiritedness is what makes the soul complex and makes man interesting to poets. Without it to oppose the unlimited desires of the body, man would remain essentially animal, using his reason as

a means of satisfying the desires. *Thymos* lifts man out of concern with preservation. Thus it makes possible both the life of the citizen and the philosopher, the former by overcoming the fear of death, the latter by liberating reason from its servitude to the desires. But it is the enemy of the city in that it is the source of rebellion and causes an unwillingness to accept the equality which is part of any decent regime whatsoever. And it is the enemy of philosophy in that it is unreasonable, concerned with opinion, selfish, if only in a sublime sense, and above all because of its animating character, its search for justification in the cosmic order. Philosophy must liberate the soul from the effects of *thymos*. Thus *thymos* is both the condition of and the greatest threat to the two higher kinds of life, the lives which lend man dignity. The Republic is an attempt to educate spirited men in such a way that they will serve the common good and be open to philosophy. The difficulties of this project are enormous, not to say insuperable. *Thymos* is the element which ties the soul together, but observation of its action calls into question the natural unity of the soul. Real political life always requires some compromise with *thymos* which is such a force in itself and so useful.

The new science of politics, founded by Machiavelli, with its concentration on the actualization of solid regimes, seeking a solution to the political problem rather than more or less stable compromises, brought with it a simplified understanding of the soul which makes such a solution possible. The simplification in question is the excision of *thymos*. With it gone man can be interpreted as an animal who seeks preservation, and a state can be constructed which fulfills that quest, without having to satisfy subtler needs. This aspect of modern thought has been one of its

greatest successes, with the aristocratic taste for honor and the heroic taste for war almost universally condemned as a kind of pathology. The egalitarian and peaceful side of the soul is all that remains as natural and healthy.

Hobbes earliest and most powerfully outlined the prevailing understanding of the soul, and it is to him that Rousseau refers in this passage. One could say that Hobbes partially reduces *thymos* to desire and the rest, under the name of *vainglory*, he tacitly takes to be natural while trying to uproot it by means of exhortation and fear. In one of the most fateful transformations of modern philosophy, he turns the quest for glory into the quest for power, an independent goal into an instrumental one, a splendid, shining motive into a gray, pedestrian one. Men seek not only satisfaction of their immediate desires. They are anxious about future time and possible scarcity of what they need to preserve themselves. They must accumulate the means to provide for whatever they might need. Power is the capacity to provide for one's needs, therefore men seek power of all kinds and to an unlimited degree since they can never know what they will need. But, in particular, it is power over other men – their bodies and their minds – that they seek because men are their competitors for scarce goods and men are the instruments for providing those goods. The competitive relation to other men and the concern for their opinions is thus explained. One must try to be first and be believed to be first in order to guarantee one's preservation. In a sense, this other-directedness is an immediate result of what Hobbes takes to be man's true inwardness, fear of death. However that may be, at least part of the struggle for recognition is explained in this way.

The rest is treated as senseless vanity. War, which is the great

problem according to Hobbes, has three causes, scarcity, fear of other men, and vain-glory. Scarcity can be overcome by rational industry; fear of other men can be overcome by a strong state and a good police force. But vain-glory, which will cause a man to start a fight for any pretended slight, which insists on the first place, cannot be satisfied in such straightforward and reasonable ways. The vanity of vain-glory consists in the opinion of self-sufficiency which makes it possible. Self-sufficiency presupposes either that one has enough power to resist any assault, which is impossible according to Hobbes, or that one does not fear death, which is stupid according to him. The superiority of the proud man is based on foolish presumption, on a forgetting of the equality of all men in the fear of death. But factually all men do not fear death equally. Hobbes tries to show that they do not fear death because of false beliefs which reassure them or an excess of humors. He undertakes to cure them by giving a true account of nature which will frighten them. Just as anger overcomes fear, fear can overcome anger. Hobbes douses the flames of the spirited part of the soul with great draughts of fear. He tries to turn the timocratic man into the oligarchic man as Plato describes them. A fearful being is never a proud one, and the angers of the former are no danger to peace.

Rousseau's response to Hobbes, whom he mentions for the first time in this context, as always starts with a tacit acceptance of the rightness of Hobbes' beginning point and uses what he has learned from Plato to correct Hobbes. Hobbes has again not gone far enough back to get to the real origins although he is the one who first told us in which direction we must go. He has taken a few tattered fragments of social man and called them natural and then by his solutions has further corrupted men. Both the quest for

power and vain-glory as Hobbes interpreted them presuppose an attachment to other men, to their wills and intentions, which would have been impossible in the state of nature. They cannot be explained as results of desire. They are holdovers from the teaching of those who argued that men are naturally social. Plato was right in treating the phenomena, which Hobbes tries to divide up, as a unity stemming from *thymos*. In Hobbes' hands, pride degenerates into mean-spirited vanity in the quest for power, and men seek for distinctions without risk while putting on a mask of equality and benevolence. And the force of the soul is sapped as it becomes suffused with fear. The ancient hero is, for all his vices, a healthier specimen and closer to nature than the *bourgeois*.

Hobbes' assertion that man is a robust child means that he is a strong being who can fulfill the impotent wishes of the child to do harm to those who oppose it. Rousseau denies that any natural child has the intention of harming another person. Animals never have any such intention. They may fight over food or sex, but only the food or the sex interests them. They are never angry about the other's presumption in disputing their right. Such is the nature of desire pure. To desire another's desire requires something else. The difference between man and animal in this respect is that man has the potentiality for such concern. The child who breaks a vase simply because he is active is guided by nature. The child who breaks the same vase to spite the parent who cherishes the vase and has refused him something is already outside of nature, is guided by *amour-propre*, which he has learned from his parent. Rousseau, following the imperatives of science which Hobbes taught, sees man as just another animal and makes the minimal assumption which will permit the phenomena of human action and passion to

be explained. That assumption is that self-love can become double, that it can divide itself into *amour de soi* and *amour-propre*, into a concern for real well-being and one for imaginary well being. There is no reason for this to be so; there is no teleology involved. Man must have this capacity or one could not give an account of his development. *Amour-propre* does full justice to what Plato saw and described. No distortion or explaining away of the phenomena is required as is the case with Hobbes. The distinction between *amour de soi* and *amour-propre* permits an explanation of man's living in two cities – the real city and the imaginary city – which Machiavelli said was the cause of his problem, and it provides a psychological basis for the reconciliation of the two and hence of man with himself. *Amour-propre*, this power by which man separated himself from his nature, is what enables him to have a spiritual history, to become alienated and to search for himself. It is decisive for the understanding of man as an historical being. So rich is Rousseau's meditation on the meaning of anger.

Keeping Emile within the realm of *amour de soi* means that he need not have a cowardly and extinguished soul in order not to be rebelliously proud. He can have the health of innocence and, like a philosopher, live indifferent to opinion. Thus Rousseau answers both Plato and Hobbes. Later, when *amour-propre* inevitably emerges, it can be consciously controlled to heighten the soul without imprisoning it, avoiding the sicknesses of vanity and petty resentment while providing the advantages of greatness of soul and love of justice without the corrosion of indignation. But, it must be remembered, all of this depends on Rousseau's assertion that a baby accepts necessity unless he has learned otherwise. Otherwise the alternatives with respect to the treatment of the spirited part of the

soul would be Platonic temporizing or Hobbean amputation. It is, in any event, one of Rousseau's great merits that he so clearly reminded modern man of the importance and the ambiguity of anger in the economy of the soul.

* * * * *

The end of infancy is reached when the child first begins to speak. This occurs simultaneously with his weaning and learning how to eat on his own and his learning how to walk. He begins to have a sense of his own existence, to have a human unity. His speech means both that he begins to know his needs and the things that will satisfy them and that he can communicate directly with his governor (who is his only contact with human beings now that the bodily attachment to the nurse is broken) without the equivocal instrument of tears. The important consideration when a child learns how to speak is to prevent him from saying or learning what he does not understand. There must be no disproportion between what the child has experienced and what he says, or he will become a creature of opinion and no longer self-determining. Words that have no meaning for him but cause a reaction in adults when he uses them create a kind of magic world of artificial significances that have no relation to the real world and separate him from it. Rousseau's constant intention is to make the child a knower of nature by means of the perceptions of his own senses without the admixture of the opinions, prejudices or wills of other men. This means that he must, as it were, construct his own language. He should never learn a word which does not apply to some sensible object which he has clearly and distinctly

experienced. He must teach his language to adults rather than learn theirs. This means that they must not be in a hurry to make him talk, that they not make a great effort to understand him, that they only give a sign of having understood when they are sure that he is not babbling but is speaking about what he has experienced, about a *thing* that both child and adult see in the same way. Language, though artificial, must be a mirror of nature. The tendency to live off of words is part of the spiritual dependency that destroys freedom and makes men the dupes of charlatans and fanatics. The autonomous man must be a knower, not a believer. Adults must never appear to want the child to speak or to reward him for it, for then he becomes aware that language is a means of controlling others. He will say what they want to hear rather than what are his needs. Learning to speak should be his first lesson in utility: speech is a more precise and sure way than tears to communicate one's needs to those who can help him to satisfy them. Adults should respond to his speech only when he is actually expressing his real needs comprehensibly. Otherwise speech becomes merely a more sophisticated form of the perverse tears used to dominate doting or demanding parents. The child's vocabulary should be kept as small as possible: one word for one idea. Children have few ideas.

Rousseau's animadversions on language here are an expression of the empiricism of the new scientific method which he hopes to make a part of the child from the beginning while protecting his vision from the distortions resulting from nascent *amour-propre*.

Book I states the problem and the goal of education; outlines the conditions for a new beginning; and shows how the baby can be kept educable, a pure instrument of accurate perceptions motivated by natural needs, immune to the two great corruptors,

fear of death and *amour-propre*. Now education proper can begin.

Book II is the book of nature. Jean-Jacques' little pupil enjoys the contentment and freedom of the first man in the state of nature from the moment he gains consciousness of himself until he is twelve. He lives in a garden where he can do as he lists and eat of all its fruits. There are no commandments or prohibitions, no nos, and hence no tempters. His governor, in the guise of Chiron, assists the young Achilles in learning the ways of nature, hiding his own action, which like that of Machiavelli's Chiron consists of force and fraud; half beast and half man he protects the innocence and ignorance of his charge, keeping his heart free of vice and his mind free of error. Liberating him from everything we know as formal education, moral or intellectual, Rousseau makes the promise that this child will grow up to be the only truly reasonable and moral man.

The foundation of this remarkable claim most generally put is that man, although definitively removed from nature, is still partially natural, is still within the realm of natural finality, necessity or law. The cycle of generation, birth, growth, decay and death is unchanged by the fact of civilization or history. All beings fit somehow into the order of things; and all animate beings, except man, accept necessity, accept without rebellion the laws of their being. Man's progress, while developing his faculties, gives him hopes, fears and desires which cause him to forget nature, to hate it and to be unable to submit to its fatality. All of his acquired faculties, powers and learning, instead of serving to enhance natural life, are used to escape the inevitable subjection, thus making man both miserable and vicious. The duality in man which is the source

of all the moral problems is, according to Rousseau, not the natural opposition between body and soul but that between nature and civilization. The task of education is not to aid the soul in mastering the body in the permanent and inalterable tension between the two but to harmonize nature – which is wholeness in man as in all other beings – with civilization. The first stage of education is to keep nature pure, to maintain man's original harmony with it, to fix the acceptance of its necessity in man. Then man's later acquisitions can be allowed to develop within the frame of an uncorrupted naturalness. For example, resignation in the face of death will prevent a man from using all his powers, all things and especially other men to avoid it and will protect him from all the false beliefs which are required to make it palatable for the fearful. Natural independence and self-sufficiency make it easier not to exploit other men. Not needing other men is a better guarantee against harming them than moral laws restraining conflict which presuppose and encourage the interdependence at the root of the desire and the need to hurt others.

Rousseau argues for allowing the purely animal growth of man to take its course, for letting the child fulfill its natural end first rather than from the outset introducing the education for society which establishes inner contradiction and tangles the natural and the social. Man's failings, he will try to show, are a result of the unnatural demands made on him rather than of an innate viciousness or corruption. Hence the negative education he proposes in Book II. There is an inner impulse in the child leading to a natural end – preservation. The child cannot provide for his own preservation; his end is to be able to do so. That is what growing up means naturally; it is not replacing his childish

dependence on his parents with a new childhood dependent on society. The man able to preserve himself independently is not precisely moral, but he is free of one of the greatest motives for harming others. The teacher's activity in what Rousseau calls the inactive method is to protect this natural growth from artificial impediments and to close off the openings to unnecessary desires and social dependencies while preparing the soil for the later implantation of all that is positive in civilization. Here the child recapitulates the life of the man in the state of nature. To forestall obvious objections, it must be remembered that this child left in freedom is under the harsh rule of law, but not human law, and that the negative education is only valid at this stage and must be replaced by another at a later stage. Only at the end can one judge the validity of Rousseau's enterprise which he claims is the only one capable of satisfying the demands of both nature and society.

Rousseau pleads against subjecting children to a gloomy preparation for adult responsibilities by pointing out that most children die before reaching maturity and are thus robbed of whatever little happiness they might have had in life. This is a poor argument, but rhetorically arouses a sentiment of pity and of love of one's children which counterpoises the artificial views of social need or those of original sin which provide the reasons for the torture of children. Natural sentiment supports the scientific argument for letting children live as they please and permits the natural, rather than the conventional, end to be realized. But, it should be remembered, that behind this only apparent preference for childhood lies the fact that what is most natural is what is earliest. Adulthood, especially of evolved man, is of questionable superiority to childhood, from both the point of view of happiness and that of

nature. Rousseau's influence on later thought is here clearly recognizable.

In response to the chorus of protest Rousseau expects from all of his contemporaries, he presents a half philosophic, half hortatory disquisition on freedom and happiness in order to prove that the freedom permitted the child will not degenerate into license and that freedom and happiness are equivalent. This disquisition has much of the *resonance* of traditional philosophy, particularly of the morally respectable Stoics.

Man must in order to be happy take his place in the natural order. In particular his passions must be in accord with that order. Knowing and conforming to nature is the most man can do to ensure his happiness. The rest is chance. As a matter of fact, Rousseau tells us, life on this earth is not a happy affair; we know no absolute happiness; everything is mixed; and suffering dominates over enjoyment; the happiest man is he who suffers least. In saying this Rousseau agrees with the Christian view of life on earth, and the consequence would seem to be resignation and hope of another life.

However, in the next paragraph, Rousseau explains that our unhappiness is caused by the disproportion between our desires and our faculties. If a sensing being could equilibrate desires and faculties, he would be absolutely happy. And he suggests that this indeed is possible. As a matter of fact nature, personified as a good provider, actually arranged things in this way. Man originally desired only his preservation, and nature gave him exactly the faculties necessary to insure it. Neither nature nor divine decree are responsible for the unhappiness of man on earth. It is the accidental development of his virtual faculties – especially imagination –

which upset the balance. That balance could in principle be restored, and, indeed, such is Rousseau's intention. Or, to put it more accurately, the imbalance can, in the care of the individual, be prevented from occurring by a controlled actualization of the virtual faculties and the desires corresponding to them. Man is in principle the master of his own happiness.

There is hidden in Rousseau's statement a reproach against nature. Why should it have given man virtual faculties in addition to those necessary to preserve himself and which upset the equilibrium necessary to happiness? Since preservation is man's only natural end, what is the purpose of those faculties? It is no wonder that the history of man is so unhappy, for those faculties almost had to be used to pervert the natural end. What else was to be done with them? Hobbes, who was the first to see clearly that man's natural end is preservation, took advantage of all of man's wonderful gifts and achievements to make very difficult and very ugly what every animal does easily and contentedly. Far better it would have been to remain in the brutish beginnings rather than at so high a price consciously and less successfully to purchase a preservation provided by nature. Only by a free, we would say creative, act can these faculties which have no place in the order of nature be given a non-noxious or even salubrious place in the order of human life. Ultimately this is Rousseau's undertaking; but, pending the proper moment, he suppresses the emergence of those indeterminate powers in man and keeps him like the other animals rather than allow him to engage in the futile quest for power after power to satisfy desires which are both unnecessary and infinite.

In this latter he imitates the concentration on austerity, self-sufficiency, superiority to fortune and imitation of nature of the

Stoics. But they did not believe man to be a being who seeks only preservation; for them the life according to nature is not automatically given by nature without virtue or wisdom; and they believed that man's higher faculties were part of the natural order and that their exercise was the condition of happiness; bodily pain was for them far from being the *sum* of evil or any kind of evil at all. Rousseau teaches that, although they possessed a moral dignity such as he would hope to incorporate in the life of man, they did so on the basis of an illusion about the problem of morality which was brutally laid bare by Hobbes. Rousseau's imitation of Stoic teaching is just that – an imitation – and what he really presents here is the message about man's natural condition to be found in the Discourse On the Origin of Inequality.

The fatal step for man is the movement from dependence on things to dependence on men. This is how nature gives way to society, freedom to enchainment, goodness to wickedness. Man is born selfish, concerned with his own well being, with getting what is necessary to fulfill his needs. He is free, not in the sense that he is immune to the dictates of necessity – the change of the seasons, the laws of growth and decay, the limits of his own strength, in short, the whole course of nature – but in the sense that there is no authority which has the right to prevent him from using his faculties to appropriate what he wants. Paradoxically this selfish being is also called good. This means in the first place that he has no natural desire to harm anyone. His goodness is innocence, the absence of the intention to do to other men what he would not want them to do to him and thus be in contradiction with himself, or have to regard himself as some special and superior being. In the second place, he is good because he is potentially benevolent toward

beings of his kind; he can become compassionate. He has no duties which contradict his natural inclinations and hence no basis for rebellion.

But when he discovers that men can satisfy his needs, can perform his work for him and help him to push back the limits of the necessary, he no longer is involved with things but men. Now it is not the earth which satisfies his hunger but the farmer. The wondrous compact by which men divide and share their labor in order to produce more and live more easily means that he cannot live without the cooperation of his fellows. He need no longer think about things, only about those who provide them. Without them he cannot provide for his preservation. But what guarantees that they will take care of him? They must need him too. So he must make himself necessary to them. And in case of conflict of interest, each will naturally, rightfully, prefer himself. A man must find a way of forcing the others to continue to provide for him, or he will perish. Power over other men becomes his end, and this is only truly possible to attain by controlling the movements of their souls. There must be a moral law which subjects men as natural law subjects things. But the purpose of the moral law which one wishes to impose on others is the satisfaction of one's own desires; its real meaning is, "It is your duty to take care of me." One's reciprocal attachment to it is hypocritical and will be abandoned so soon as it is to one's advantage. That moral law is itself only an extended self-interest. Interdependence and great needs combined really means the war of all against all. The man who honestly wanted to abide by the laws of mutual obligations would be foolish, for it would take only one man who did not in order for the former to become his slave. Either desire to get the better or fear inevitably

bring about the conflict. The good of each can only be furthered to the detriment of others. Hatred, anger, envy, indignation, vengeance, dissembling, cowardice and pride are the consequences. When men are most in need of morality, they develop the greatest vices. The unnatural demands of morality placed on a naturally selfish being with unnaturally *bloated* needs force men to be immoral. All the energy of their soul is committed to their struggle for survival; the soul's natural simplicity is clouded by turbulent passions; and its goodness, compassion, which is the only natural basis of sociability, must give way before the primary desire for well-being, which is now in conflict with it. A man in this situation who possessed Gyges' ring would necessarily wish to be a tyrant. "Dependence on things, since it has no morality, is in no way detrimental to freedom and engenders no vices. Dependence on men, since it is without order, engenders all the vices, and by it, master and slave are mutually corrupted."

The world of man's dependence on men was perfectly described by Hobbes as the state of nature. There is no ordering principle of particular wills in conflict. Hobbes also prefigured the political solution proposed by Rousseau. It is, he taught, necessary to constitute an artificial power which can order the particular wills as nature orders things. But he vested that power in an individual man or in a group of men. And man can never give inner consent to the rule of men; they know that wills can be changed, can be overcome, can be flattered or deceived. They are always potentially rebels against such an order which is and appears to them to be nothing but the particular interest or whim of a man like themselves. Justice would be but the advantage of the stronger. The imperative which results from this *Thrasymachean* definition

of justice is not submission as to the movements of the heavens but the effort to become the stronger. There is nothing inwardly binding in this arrangement. According to Rousseau, only if laws could take the place of men and those laws had, "like the laws of nature, an inflexibility that no force could conquer" would men accept the yoke of social necessity. They would then again be subject to things not men and would "unite all of the advantages of the social state to those of the civil state," and "join to freedom, which keeps man exempt from vices, morality which raises him to virtue." The general will and all of the arrangements to make it effective described in the Social Contract constitute such a solution. According to it men are free as in the state of nature and also free in a new sense: they are the makers of the necessity which they accept. True morality must be of human invention, an act of freedom. It can in no way result from nature. Nature can at best keep man free of the vices which make it impossible for man to be moral.

The folly of Hobbes, and all utilitarians in his wake, was to wish to ground morality on those very vices. The desire to dominate, which in its turn causes war, may very well culminate in the wish to prevent others from making war against oneself, and the making of contracts to achieve that end. But nothing in nature guarantees those contracts when an individual or a group has the power to get away with breaking them. The history of politics is the history of individuals or classes of men exploiting the rest of society. "...[T]he vices which make social institutions necessary are the same as those which make the abuse of them inevitable." A mercenary morality is not only degrading, it does not work. Thrasymachus is right. If the dependence on men for the bodily

needs is the basis of society, there is no justice. Society is only a battleground and the science of politics concerns only the means of getting one's advantage in it. Selflessness can never be derived from selfishness.

The requirements of civil society as well as those of human dignity require a disinterested morality. Rousseau's study of nature leads him to the demand for a high morality and the recognition it can never be derived from nature. He found a new source, in man's freedom, which will be discussed thematically later in the Emile. Rousseau marks the end of nature as the standard for civil society, if not for man simply. If there is to be a disinterested morality it cannot co-exist with an anti-social being who needs society. The distinction between dependence on things and dependence on men offers the possibility of keeping man a-social, rather than anti-social, and preparing a natural sociability (as distinct from morality). The natural child kept dependent on things will pass the stage where he will become dependent on men for the satisfaction of his bodily needs. Hobbes' man is a child who never learned how to take care of himself. Rousseau's self-sufficient man will not yet be a citizen; but he will not be the enemy of other men.

Rousseau's own reflections on that most powerful of imaginary moral temptations, Gyges' ring, shows the best of what nature can do. Plato's Glaucon demanded that Socrates prove, in defense of justice, that a man capable of escaping the punishment of men would be naturally inclined to benefit them rather than take advantage of them as Thrasymachus' analysis of men's needs would indicate. Rousseau, who thinks always of Plato's questions, responds that with Gyges' power a savage would be indifferent to men and hence do them no harm and that he, Rousseau, in whom fellow

feeling had a chance to develop and who in such an instance would have nothing to fear from men, and their opinions of him, would get a positive pleasure in alleviating their pain which he experiences sympathetically. This much is in nature. But it does not suffice for the practice of justice, for justice requires that caring for others be a duty; and it is precisely when benefiting men becomes a duty, the pleasure in so doing is destroyed. The expectation which others have of him is an alienation of natural freedom. There is no harmony between men's expectations of him and his desire to fulfill those expectations. There is no natural solution to the problem of men's living together. Rousseau must be able to leave them in order not to hate them. And real community means that one cannot leave when one wills. In other words there is no natural link among men which gives them a common interest, no guarantee of the reciprocity which makes friendship possible.

Rousseau elaborates this by means of a little story.

There are two kinds of lives which are not alienated and which are not in principle founded on the exploitation of other men: that of the good man and that of the moral man. Both have as their condition the dependence on things rather than on men, the former on the laws of nature, the latter on the laws of morality or the general will. They are at a tension with one another. One is the solitary, the other the citizen. But both require the avoidance of the life dependent on men. The first three books of the Emile are an attempt to demonstrate the possibility of avoiding the dependence on men connected with preservation. In acquiring the perfections of civilization the little boy will maintain the savage's freedom from vice which is a result of indifference to men. Next it will be shown how he can become involved with human beings, no longer as

things but as human beings, without competition but rather in a spirit of beneficence. Then Rousseau will investigate the possibility of virtue – the free sacrifice of natural inclination to the common good or the founding of contracts for motives other than fear or profit. Finally the relation between the life of the good man and that of the moral man will be studied.

All of this is a result of Rousseau's discovery of the two kinds of dependence and all the consequences resulting therefrom, especially the distinction between *amour de soi* and *amour-propre*. He separated out what Hobbes had mixed up; and on this basis he was able to disentangle the various elements of his own complex soul and reconcile himself to the world. He asserts that "if I have made some progress in the knowledge of the human heart, it is the pleasure that I had in seeing and observing children which rewarded me with this knowledge." These observations caused him to become enlightened "about the first and true movements of nature, concerning which our learned men know nothing." The Emile presents these observations about children and beginning from them Rousseau imagines a growth to adulthood which does not, as do all real lives, depart from nature. The higher motives do not exist by nature but the soul can, as it were, be constructed by the astute control of its potentiality.

Once the distinction between dependence on things and dependence on men – along with the corollary that vice is the necessary result of the latter – is established, it remains to turn this insight into a practice whereby all the lessons of reason can be converted into sensations of things, which are all a child can experience, and asking nothing of him not dictated by the immediate natural needs given him by his body to which he relates

everything, beyond which he cannot go, and to which willy-nilly he reduces the most sublime intentions of his teachers. This is not merely a pedagogical technique, it is an essay in adult psychology and behavior for almost all grown men have remained fixated at this stage of development due to the introduction of more advanced lessons at a time when those lessons cannot fail to become tainted by the primitive motives which they pervert and by which they are necessarily perverted. The right of all men to all things – Hobbes' principle, based on men's felt need for all things to preserve themselves and the reason why force, renunciation and compromise are needed to establish civil society – is but the result of a failure to have experienced the force of things when young, an extension of the real world by an imagination fed with misinterpreted impressions.

The child needs no instruction in order to desire to eat, sleep, walk, move its limbs, enjoy pleasing sensations and avoid painful ones. But he cannot know what health and sickness are. They are abstractions and the attempt to make him act in terms of them would both fail and open him to errors. Even less can he be made to understand that he should not cause inconvenience or discomfort to others or that he should be concerned about their property. None of that can be made sensible to him. Adults must help him to satisfy the first needs without letting him know that they can be instruments of extension of power, without setting goals for them beyond their nature and with full awareness of what a child can and cannot understand. Selfish preoccupation with real needs is the child's only concern; and, therefore, the only proper education at this stage is with fulfilling that end. A child has no idea of good and

evil. He experiences force, or necessity. The idea which he must not get is that necessity is not absolute, that there is a will behind it which itself can be manipulated.

The problem is to get the child to do what accords with his fixed goals and to avoid what does not. Locke's great maxim was to reason with children. Rousseau insists that this is impossible, that what takes place in conversation with children is not reasoning, and he thereby makes his general critique of Locke, the great teacher of liberal society and its morality. To see what Rousseau objects to, let us suppose that the child wants a cookie which is bad for his health. One can explain until doomsday that the cookie will affect his future well being adversely without persuading him, for he has no sense of the future and no general idea of well being. He knows that the cookie tastes good. In order to get him to desist the teacher falls back on notions of right and wrong. An attempt is made to persuade the child that he "must not" eat the cookie. The dialogue proceeds as follows:

Child

"Why must I not do it?"

Master

"Because it is bad to do so."

Child

"Bad to do? What is doing bad?"

Teacher

"Doing what you are forbidden to do."

(As long as the child does not have an immediate sense of what is wrong with the cookie, it is always only your authority that stands in the way of his eating it. One way or the other it is no longer his knowledge of the thing but your will that impedes him. It is an

opposition of wills, and he will not believe that your will functions differently from his. He wants to eat the cookie because it pleases him. You do not want him to do so because that is what pleases you. If you have the stronger will he becomes a slave and full of resentment. If he has the stronger will he become your master and a tyrant over nature.)

Child

"What's wrong with doing what I am forbidden to do?"

Master

"You are punished for disobeying."

(Finally a motive the child can understand. He is made to fear the master, not the cookie. A new motive is given but one that has nothing to do with morality properly understood.)

Child

"I shall arrange it so that you don't know about it."

(Thus the child gets the cookie and escapes the punishment. The best of both worlds. But he lives in terms of the master. His motives are now double. This is the beginning of the split between is and ought. This beginning is not the source of virtue but only of vice.)

Master

"You will be spied on."

(The master is a spy, a policeman. This is the substance of morality for the child.)

Child

"I shall hide."

(Dissembling.)

Master

"You will be questioned."

Child

"I shall lie."

(The first motive for deceit.)

Master

"You must not lie."

(Thus the moral imperative is understood as the master's tool for facilitating the fulfillment of his will.)

Child

"Why must I not lie."

Master

"Because that is doing bad?"

(Justice is the other fellow's good. Bad is good for me.)

This, according to Rousseau, is the sum of the moral teaching that can be and actually is given to children. A host of errors about things and vices in relation to men is spawned by it. The object of desire becomes invested with an emotional charge, a tension and a spurious depth which becomes a part of the child's psychological constitution. Throughout his life there will be a kind of sophistry in the debate between his desires and his reason, and his reason will always seem somehow alien, not his real self. The difficulty concerning the cookie will pass, but the involvement with authority and the vices issuing from it will remain forever with respect to the adult versions of cookies, not to speak of what concerns morality – duties to others – proper.

Now, in looking at this little dialogue, it is not strictly true to say that the child does not reason. He understands perfectly what he must do to insure his advantage as he sees it. He is an expert at the calculus of present pleasure and pain. What the child lacks is:

a) sufficient experience of the thing to know its effects, for example, that the cookie might be bad for his teeth. At most he could be told that, which would be only another intrusion of authority; b) more important, he has no notion of the future. He is motivated only by immediate pleasure and pain. Knowing that he might have bad teeth in the future would not keep him from the cookie. The implicit major premise or maxim of his practical syllogisms is necessarily "All that pleases me now is good. All that pains me now is bad." The cookie pleases him, therefore it is good and choiceworthy. There can be no reasoning about this ground of all the child's reasoning. His will is determined by it as the movement of all bodies is determined by the principle of gravitation. The master really wants to change that maxim, to consider utility or morality rather than immediate pleasure and pain. He believes he has achieved this result if the child abstains from the cookie but what he has done is add motives of reward or punishment, immediate pleasures and pains, which have nothing to do with the thing in question and make a sham of reasoning. He talks to the child of utility or duty but those ideas must be reduced to immediate pleasure and pain thus destroying their independent character and making it unlikely the child will ever be able to get beyond this first level. If one waits until he is twelve to talk to him about utility, he will have enough experience of things to know their effects; and the future, at least the not too distant future, will have a meaning for him. His long-range well-being will be of concern to him, and he will be able to sacrifice today's pleasure to avoid tomorrow's countervailing pain without the teacher's covertly and falsely having to turn tomorrow into today. Here a true reasoning about the nature of the thing is possible, a reasoning

which itself directly determines the will without extraneous, non-rational interventions. Similarly if one waits until he is eighteen and has had disinterested experience of men and is capable of compassion, the well-being of others becomes part of his own well-being. Thus he can reason about their interests and act for the sake of those interests without interpreting men as instruments of his pleasures. Finally, when he is twenty-two and profoundly in love, it is possible that his motives of action be so extended that one can reason with him about what is good for others even when that contradicts his own private good, his particular will, but good for himself to the extent he wills generally, consistently with what all men could will, to the extent that he is no longer this particular accidental man, but man as man. At this point his reason would reason about what is reasonable, i.e. general, and he would then be fully reasonable for the use of his reason would have as principle not the satisfaction of some inclination but reason itself. He would will what he desires not because he desires it but because it is reasonable that he do so.

At each of these stages a new principle of reason emerges which modifies and sublimates the one preceding. Thus the pupil is enabled to experience the various kinds of things on their own level without having to reduce them back to the most primitive interest. Education presides over and encourages the emergence of these fundamental motives in suitable order and provides the objects proper for each – sensations related to the bodily needs for pleasure and pain, the laws of nature for utility, suffering humanity for compassion, civil and domestic duties for morality. An attempt to derive the concerns of compassion and morality from the earlier stages concerned only with preservation is doomed to failure. There

is simply not sufficient motivation in the former to suffice for the latter. The premature use of reason, while introducing errors and vices, attaches reason permanently to the satisfaction of particular, bodily desire. Reason would always be in servitude to sensations of bodily pleasure and pain rather than their master. The extrinsic objects dependent on opinion which make it operate in the dialogue between master and child become the objects of reason. A mercenary and unreasonable calculation, producing men of a corresponding kind, is the result of the apparently sensible Lockean enlightened self-interest. It is no accident that the philosopher who most promoted the *bourgeois* advises a kind of reasoning with children which requires the addition of motives of covetousness, fear or vanity in order to be effective. These are the motives of his adult.

How, then, would Rousseau handle the matter of the cookie the child should not eat? In the first place, what is not good for him and does not carry its lessons along with it in an immediate and not too dangerous way (such as the lesson given by the rose with its thorn in Schubert's song) should insofar as possible be kept away from him. The teacher should eat what the child eats and not try to establish a difference between adult and child life which the pupil will think is capricious. (The only distinction the child should see between himself and his teacher is that the teacher can take care of himself while he cannot – an independence to which he should aspire. It should appear that both have exactly the same needs while only the teacher is sufficient unto them.) Further the adult can and must sometimes say no. But his no should be like a force of nature, not accompanied by expressions of will or reason, just as what he provides the child is given in response to real needs rather

than to pleas or commands. The *no* should be a wall of iron against which the child may beat but which will in no way respond to his importunities. Rousseau adds that no child ever rebels against the answer, "There is no more." This is a reformulation of the crucial premise that naturally man endures necessity patiently but never ill will. Finally, the teacher must try to arrange things so that punishments for disobeying follow from the things themselves in a palpable way so that the child will sense the connection immediately without essentially distorting his experience of the thing. There should be no forbidden fruits, only those that he does not want because they taste bad, they make him sick or the acquisition of which is painful. Such lessons work because they are sensations, not reason, and they fit the motives of the child.

The spirit of the education at this stage is expressed in the picture Rousseau presents of a child playing happily in the cold, shivering, blue with cold, hardly able to move his fingers. He suffers but enjoys his freedom. He is neither pampered nor subjected. He has the full use of his strength without its being wasted in fulfilling duties he does not understand and fighting his teacher and without any sense that he has imaginary powers with which he can avoid necessity. He is within nature and particularly within his own nature. And, Rousseau notes, such a boy, by his experience of natural suffering, is prepared to sense the suffering of others when the proper time comes. Thus he is being disposed to future virtue without his present being sacrificed to it. This education tries to move from innocence to virtue while bypassing the stage of vice or sin which turns virtue into a thing against nature, a constraint. Rousseau's freedom is not that license, the expression of just any self, thoughtless critics accuse him of; it is the inner and total

submission to the iron laws of nature and those of reason. The difference between Aristotle and Rousseau in this matter can be summed up as follows: Aristotle says that a young man must blush or be ashamed because he has desires of which he should be ashamed. A real adult should never be ashamed because he has no bad desires. Rousseau says that shame is never necessary, that one can become such an adult without shame. Rousseau and Aristotle would agree on the psychological character of shame; they would differ as to its necessity. The Christian, on the other hand, must always be ashamed. Belief in his own total goodness would be another sin –pride.

Rousseau's characterization of his early education as negative means not only that nothing should be done but also is a negation of all moral, religious and political teaching. "Let us establish as an incontestable maxim that the first movements of nature are always right. There is no original perversity in the human heart. There is not a single vice to be found in it about which one cannot say how and where it entered." This negation is the foundation of the negative education. Rousseau excuses himself for his paradoxes. But he is not guilty, for in truly Socratic style, he says that, "they are necessary when one reflects, and whatever you say, I prefer to be a man of paradoxes than a man of prejudices."

Emile must be raised in a world of men without living for them or in dependence on them. Rousseau must show how a child can live amidst them without following their example and without being inwardly subject to their morality. Emile must treat and understand other men as he does things without doing them harm or running afoul of the law. Otherwise he would have to be civil before having been natural or having developed the capacity for a

healthy civility. In order to achieve control over the men surrounding Emile, Jean-Jacques must gain their respect. They must like him and be intimidated by him so that they will try to follow his wishes with respect to the child and at least hide, if not abandon, their vices in his presence. The master must be beneficent and impressive.

This is another reason for living in the country, where there is more of nature, where men's relations are more to things than in the artificiality of city life where practically all relations are to men and their conventional interdependencies, where things are esteemed for considerations of vanity rather than for natural use, where the vices are seductive rather than repugnant because they are adorned by subtle arts and where the governor's influence is less far-reaching.

A child's understanding of other adults is formed almost entirely by way of his parents' or his governor's relations to them and their commentaries about them. His governor's example will form his notions about how other men are to be treated and what one wants of them. Habitually those responsible for children convey their own need and use of men, their dependence on them, their exploitation of them, their fear or their contempt of them. The governor's relative independence of other men and their opinions will maintain a similar independence of them in the child who depends on the governor. The latter's benevolence toward them will not produce a similar benevolence in the child but benevolence is a virtue of independence and freedom; it also provides an image which will be of use later in the child's development.

Adults habitually tell children what is wrong with the bad examples of human conduct they happen to see. But such

explanations presuppose a moral and psychological awareness which the child does not possess, and he will always misunderstand them while at the same time learning of the temptations of vice. The governor's explanations have more effect on his imagination than do the examples. When he starts asking questions about those explanations, the governor will find it impossible to find answers on the child's level. This can only appear to the child as an incapacity on the teacher's part, and the moral lesson becomes a deception in his eyes. He wants to refute the teaching rather than learn from it. Rousseau warns the governor not to become the tempting serpent in trying to teach the knowledge of good and evil to innocence. What he must do is attach an appropriate and striking image to the bad example which will discourage the child from imitating it.

Not surprisingly, the first illustration of this method Rousseau gives is the example of anger, that most protean of passions. When the child sees an angry man Rousseau will simply explain that he is sick. This response suffices to make anger unattractive and something the child would not want to experience, for he knows what it is to be sick. The angry man becomes neither terrifying nor attractive but pitiable. There is no need to explain the causes of anger, its justifications and its danger, its effects on the soul, etc. And, Rousseau asserts, it is not untrue to say that anger is a disease. The child's imagination is kept within the physical world, while the desired negative impression concerning this moral phenomenon is conveyed. This explanation also has the advantage that it allows the child to be treated as sick when he is angry and treated for it in a way he will accept. It provides another means for disguising the governor's actions as natural necessities and presenting the truth about things in sensations.

This method, intended to reduce men to the status of things under the sway of necessity and mechanical causation like all the other things the child knows, will not suffice to keep him from believing that, like the man in the state of nature, everything he lays his hands on is his and, in the exercise of his freedom, from unintentionally harming others. He is in a society and must have some idea of the relations of men to men as men and of the morality in human actions. The success of his education depends on this being done without having to use authority or prejudice to contradict his inclinations.

Rousseau prefaces Emile's first moral education with a theoretical discussion about justice. This discussion is thoroughly Hobbesian, and nothing in Rousseau's writings shows more clearly his indebtedness to Hobbes. The foundation of the argument is the distinction between right and duty or law which Hobbes was the first to make. Rights are freedoms; duties are constraints or limitations on freedom. The primary right, which Rousseau equates with the primary duty, is caring for our preservation. Since man naturally cares about himself only, he is concerned only with his rights and, as a corollary, other men's recognition of his rights. This is the first meaning of duty – the responsibility of others to cooperate with him in what he deems necessary to his well-being. Hence the first sentiment of justice is nothing other than anger at the non-compliance of others to what he believes he can demand of them. Duties to others are only consequences drawn from what is required to get the recognition of his rights from others. If one wishes to teach duties to children, one must begin by teaching them their rights, by giving them the sense of justice as a thing owed to them. But in practice children are taught their duties to others first,

and those duties are neither comprehensible nor of interest to them. This is precisely Hobbes' critique of the tradition and his correction of it. Justice and efficacy must coincide.

In order, therefore, to get Emile – who here enters the scene by name for the first time – to respect others' rights, he is imbued with a powerful sense of what is his own. It is important to note that up to this point he had no sense of what is his own; what is his own only comes to light against the background of what belongs to others, or rather with respect to others – his sense that he can make claims on them and resist their claims on him. This is a first step in the moral world, not only because it results in his first notions of conventions but also is his first experience with his own will as tested against others, his first experience of man as such.

Because things cannot defend themselves against the child whereas adults can, it is paradoxically in regard to things first that the restraints must come from within the child. An adult can, and should, hit back, maintaining thus purely physical relations of strength between him and the child. But things cannot hit back and children, without evil intentions, damage them. Of course damage is defined in strictly social terms, i.e. he can do harm only to things which belong to men. He harms the men by the intermediary of their *property*. If they react to him when he breaks their things as they do when he strikes their person, he will not understand the connection. He must be given the idea of property. It comes prior to the idea of freedom, which will protect men as that of property protects things.

So Emile must no longer simply use things; he must have some property. Children are usually told that this or that belongs to them. They will defend those things, but this procedure will not

give them any motive to respect the property of others. The parent's force and lessons have to intervene. Moreover, just as authority keeps them from others' things, authority defines their own things. Their sense of property is arbitrary, and such a sense of property will only be a prejudice which makes it difficult or impossible for them to have a just sense of property relations when they are grown. To tell them that their clothes or their toys are given to them only pushes the problem a step back. How did their parents get them? And it complicates the matter, for what is the status of a gift and why can it not be reclaimed? Children always live in a world of property, and their heads are filled with false and confusing ideas, backed up by illegitimate force, about what it is. Rousseau wants Emile to have a clear standard, one that will both in itself give him respect for others' property instead of making him a fierce acquirer and defender of his own and give him the basis for later coming to terms with the great political problem of the rich and the poor.

In order to accomplish this one must go back to the origin of property; the idea of it should be born from its origins. Thus Rousseau goes back again to the state of nature in order to make the child recapitulate the progress of the species; and, again, the nature of a thing is identical with its origins. What he thereby clarifies in principle, he introduces without corruption into the soul of his pupil. The natural origin of property is man's labor. What he mixes his labor with belongs to him. The principle is converted into practice for Emile with the planting of a bean. His caring for the bean will permit him to derive the principle for himself. Rousseau encourages him in every way to love his labor and its result. Just as his body is clearly him – a thing which sentiment

immediately gives him as his and what he naturally defends – his bean is an extension of himself. He is encouraged to believe that no one has any more right to take his bean than his arm.

Rousseau adapts Locke's definition of property, which itself is a correction of Hobbes. For Hobbes there can be no property by nature, only by convention, by the founding of civil society and its laws, because all men claim or have a right to all things. The force of the sovereign alone can settle these conflicting claims; civil society is necessary because of the infinite need for the powers of self-preservation. Locke argued, in response, that rational and industrious men could by their labor produce enough for their self-preservation, that the natural end is fulfilled by man's thus supplementing nature. In principle preservation does not require civil society because scarcity, the cause of war, can be overcome in the state of nature. The war which is at the origin of civil society is, according to Locke, caused by the idle and quarrelsome who do not work and steal from those who do. Civil society is needed to protect property produced by labor from its enemies. Its role is hence more limited and its goal more easily attained. Rousseau is less explicit about the naturalness of property, for in his mind the first men had fewer needs and hence nature was less penurious and, as well, serious injustices are produced in society by Locke's understanding; but to the extent that there is justly property for Rousseau, its origin and nature is in labor. Because Locke's definition of property has eclipsed all others, we have to be reminded that it was the result of a revolution in thought and that for the ancients a thing most properly belonged to a man not because he produced it but because he could use it well. The violin belonged to the violinist not the violin maker, even though the

violinist contributed nothing to its coming to be. This change is, of course, connected with the shifting of concern from ends to origins, from virtue to vital needs. Just as Rousseau accepts Hobbes' understanding of natural right, he accepts Locke's teaching on property. He thinks through the moderns in accepting their fundamental premises.

Locke's teaching on property is prudent counsel given to rational men, intended to enlighten their desires and refute counter claims, such as those of conquest, inheritance, merit, etc. Rousseau turns that teaching into a primary sentiment of the young Emile, one which preempts and excludes the others.

After having given the planting and raising of the beans a rich significance and made Emile's right to them natural, if not sacred, Rousseau arranges that they be destroyed. It is Emile's first experience of injustice. Not only are there tears, there is anger and with it a search for someone to blame. Emile's indignation is a model of that phenomenon, composed of righteousness and selfishness. An inquisition is established. The guilty man is found. But it turns out that the accused is the injured party and is as angry as Emile. There is a conflict between angry men, a situation of war. Jean-Jacques intervenes to apologize; that is not Emile's inclination. Jean-Jacques promises that in the future they will only work the earth which no one else has worked first. Labor is not enough to constitute the right of property. One must also be the first occupant. But, naturally, that is not a problem, for one can always find "as much and as good" land elsewhere. No need to fight. Just move on. But Robert, the gardener, introduces the first social problem of property. In society all the land is cultivated; it belongs to others. There is no place for Jean-Jacques and Emile to begin on

their own.

Emile has remained quiet. His anger seems to have been stilled. The motive used by Jean-Jacques to produce the result, without embittered resentment, becomes clear with the little boy's first intervention. It is a question, but not one motivated by idle theoretical curiosity. He asks whether the result of scarcity of land is not the loss of much *Maltese* melon seed. He is at least as interested in the wonderful melons as in his beans. They were being raised for his pleasure and are much more delectable than his beans. His anger has been mitigated by desire. It is not so much that he has recognized the justice of the opposing claim or seen that he has no right to blame. Another lust, rather than a reason, competes with revenge and predisposes Emile to seek a solution.

The gardener's response is that there are not often young gentlemen as giddy as Emile. There is a reciprocity of respect for one another's work based on self-interest. He thus teaches the child something about the foundations of certain kinds of contracts in a way that is palpable to him and in accord with his immediate interest – to get his beans protected in the future. At the same time he is taught a kind of lesson about the respectability of labor, and hence of laborers as opposed to idle gentlemen, which will be of use later in his life.

Emile's second and last contribution to the discussion, a response to the gardener's description of the compact among gardeners which constitutes the society on which Emile now depends, is a plaintive expression of his situation, "But I have no garden." He is in the situation of the poor, nature's disinherited, dependent on society for what he needs and wants as well as for the opportunity to use his powers but without the means that make

him a part of society, that would guarantee him the care or respect of its full members. A split between insiders and outsiders – as opposed to the independence and sameness of all men in the state of nature – has come into being. Positive hostility to non-members takes the place of natural indifference or indiscriminate compassion. Emile experiences for a moment the situation of the poor in civil society and *feels* the problem created by the invention of property, the insufficiency of labor as a means of guaranteeing preservation in the case of prior occupancy.

The gardener's response is a brutal, "What difference does it make to me?" And then a threat: he will banish Emile from the garden if he touches its fruits. There are, indeed, forbidden fruits in man's first garden. But the difference between the new Adam and the old is that the former is made to understand why he must not touch the fruit. The commandment is not a mystery or a caprice. The need for inner restraints is recognized in both Rousseau's and the Bible's paradise, but Rousseau argues that the latter's commandments are the cause of vice because they constitute temptations, they go against nature, without any felt reason for compliance. The lawbreaker cannot be considered culpable. His punishment is unjust and can only render him slavish and rebellious at the same time. Emile sees the reason; it is what he himself would do in the situation of the gardener. He is not asked to obey to show his respect or faith. Moreover it is not really the fruit that is forbidden. There is nothing to tempt Emile in the melon seeds. His sin was merely carelessness. Actually, the fruit is for him. He only needs to learn what he must do, or not do, to insure that it grow. Getting it does not depend on being in the good graces of the gardener, but of respecting the processes of nature.

But still, Emile does not have a place of his own in which to work. He is no longer angry, but he is in a position of potential war. Jean-Jacques suggests the making of a covenant by which the gardener will grant them a bit of land in return for rent in the form of part of its produce. Thus Emile gets a notion of how he could have a place within the society of gardeners in order to be able to labor. It is not his own; it is rented. His sense of real property is not allowed to extend beyond his own body. Even the products of his labor, which are somehow his, must be mediated by the society. His right to anything but himself is conditional. Emile is somehow always to be a renter in civil society, more aware of the problematic character of property than is the gardener whose good conscience in his work depends on forgetting how his forefathers got the land which he says is his but was once in common and now is forbidden to the needy as well as to the idle and quarrelsome or to the ignorant.

Jean-Jacques' suggestion is immediately adopted by the gardener, except that he rejects the rent and grants a corner of his garden freely. Thus, although Emile is made aware of exchange, he is not asked to participate in it because he would need a greater sense of the future or greater foresight than he actually possesses to do so without temptation to transgression. Robert leaves it at a threat: that he will root up Emile's beans if Emile touches his melons. The punishment fits the crime. And since Emile gets recognition of his rights as well as the melons he wanted, to commit the crime would, to use Locke's formula, "not only be unjust but foolish," and the latter is more important than the former if one seeks effective justice. Emile has been provided with a trustworthy inner motive for not doing damage to other people's property

without being subjected to what he cannot understand and becoming slavish. At the same time he has, on the level of the senses, learned about the origin of property and therefrom about the right – the problematic right – to property as well as about the exchange, derived from the original right, making its transfer possible. But nothing is really asked of him, so there is no danger of non-compliance. The immediate, natural response to trampling out the seed-bed of the gardener is that his own will be trampled on. There is nothing moral, as opposed to physical, in that. Perhaps most important of all, his anger has been aroused and been quelled without being crushed. He would now be angry if the gardener destroyed his beans for no reason at all and he would defend his property. Emile's contact with men who would do such things and his lessons in how to react to them will come much later. For the moment he has no reason to punish anyone.

As Rousseau makes clear in the next example he gives, the covenant must not be suggested by the master but by the child, or for the child, as does Jean-Jacques in the example. As opposed to earlier teachings in which the world is full of prohibitions, in which the profound and mysterious *nos* are the first experience, Emile's world is a sunny place, full of affirmation, of freedom, of *yeses*. The *nos* are self-imposed consequences of the *yeses*. Emile is not cast out of the garden and labor within it is, if not unequivocally a blessing, not a curse. He respects the garden and is purged of his sin which no longer affects his manner of being. This is as far as one can go in the teaching about property at this stage. It will be treated three times more, under the aspects of utility, of compassion and morality.

To complete the discussion of primary property relations

Rousseau gives another example. He uses a procedure he will use many times in the Emile. He abandons the ideal pupil and takes a real one, whom he calls "your ill-tempered child." He tells us what to do with our children rather than showing us what he does with his. He makes a line thus between theory and practice, between the best and what can ordinarily be done. This child breaks windows, and although it is left somewhat ambiguous, he apparently does so intentionally. The example is much more conventional. Glass windows are less necessary and less natural than beans. It is much harder to demonstrate the right of property in them, for they presuppose the division of labor. Emile will have little that is breakable around. The child in the example, our child, lives in a world constructed of artificial relations and property values. There are servants around him; Emile never makes use of or is served by any. The first stage of the cure is not to repair the windows and to let the winds blow on the child, for, remarks Rousseau, it is better that he catch cold than be mad. Madness, at least in one of its most prominent variants, is trying to harm things, in seeing and responding to them as other than what they are. When the child persists in breaking the windows he is deprived of his freedom, closed up where there are no windows. It is *imprisonment* but the loss of light and liberty of movement are directly connected with his misdeed. He is simply put where he cannot break windows. It is not a punishment in terms different from his action nor one that implies he understands his guilt. There are wills involved, but the parents and the servants appear only interested in their things, not in his intention. No one will help him to gain his freedom either at his command or in response to his supplications. Someone, an anonymous someone, who is not the parent or the master, suggests a

covenant to him – he will get his freedom back if he does not break windows. His freedom is made conditional on a certain social relation to things. But his intentional breaking of windows is also a social relation to things; it is an act he would not perform unless he believed that he was harming the possessor of the windows or that the windows had feeling. The covenant restores in some measure a natural relation to the thing. And it is an act of his own freedom, coming from him rather than his master. It is an arrangement of simple utility, a recognition on his part of constraints concerning property but one kept within the limits of puerile reason and in which he has had to bend to the nature of the thing rather than directly to wills. But this case is less pure: the child must correct an inclination whereas Emile only had to be informed of a mistake. It is ultimately a concession to wills, however reasonable, that is made. There are no melons or beans to mediate between him and others. The agreement is close to a real convention or contract. He must give up one thing in order to get another. This is the treatment of a much more social creature than is Emile.

His covenant must be welcomed by the one with whom he makes it, and there must be no oaths or signs of the covenant. They are extraneous, authoritative, misleading and mysterious. The compact must be self-evident and self-enforcing. Rousseau *assures* that a child not already spoiled will keep his compact. But in a note he adds that utility is never sufficient for a binding commitment. There must be something else to support it. He suggests that "inner sentiment, *like a law of conscience*," will be the additional element supporting contracts. It is not yet the time to discuss this complicated problem. Here Rousseau only makes it clear that the child's agreement is not a real contract, and he should not be

considered morally bound by it; it is only the first indication of the necessity of contracts and the way to prepare for them. The utilitarians take for the end what is only the beginning. Unless some other basis of responsibility is found in man, justice is farcical. He concludes his note with the ominous declaration that the fact that utility does not suffice is important because "it is at this point that man begins to put himself in contradiction with himself." In these two examples he tries to prevent the split – the struggle between two contradictory principles – from developing so soon while keeping the child from being unfit for society. Abstracting from the difference between the boys in the examples, he ends this discussion of property with the remark, "Follow the chain of all this. The wicked child did not dream that in making a hole for planting his bean, he was digging out for himself a dungeon where his science would not be long in shutting him up."

Once duties and contracts have become necessary to protect property, a new temptation arises for man, to hide his crimes so as to fulfill his desire while avoiding the punishments. So there must be a new layer of commandments, not to hide one's actions, not to lie, with further threats of punishment attached to them, in order that the first commandments be effective. Hence there are fresh, and ever more complicated, motives for disobedience without any sufficient inner motive for obedience other than the master's authority and concomitant threats. The moral imperative, then, has as its only effect to encourage immorality without further morality. At best it encourages external conformity, but that conformity has exactly the same source as crime – a calculation of the benefits. He who does not lie, just as he who does not steal, does so only because he fears he cannot get away with it, not because lying is in itself bad.

The commandment is an encouragement to vice without any corresponding encouragement to real virtue. Old Cephalus uses his money to rectify any thefts he may have committed, and that money makes him independent enough to indulge the luxury of telling the truth to other men. But his only reason to bother about the whole issue is his fear of punishment after death. This is not a virtuous temper of soul; it is only an aid to men's living together, and not a very effective one at that.

Rousseau in his discussion of lying continues to evoke the story of the forbidden fruit and its consequences in the Garden of Eden. After eating of the fruit – tempted by the very prohibition against doing so – man's first reaction is to hide. This would never be necessary, according to Rousseau, if he believed the one in whose power he is were well-disposed to him. The hiding is the master's fault for he has not proved to the man, whose only interest can be his own well-being, that that is also the master's concern. And, then, God does the worst thing. He questions Adam about his fault, again tempting him to lie or to blame someone else while turning against him who questions. Rousseau would never ask, "Was it you?" Obedience is the cause of vice.

Rousseau's strictures against the early teaching of virtue and vice has three heads. First, it is not necessary. Well-regulated freedom will attain the desired end more effectively. The "internalizing" of adult expectations in order to insure social conduct becomes necessary only when the demands made on the child go beyond what is natural. Adults are eager to prove to themselves they have a hold on the child, that the child will behave as they want him to without being continually watched. This both makes their task easier and gives them a good conscience. They are

not interested in the child's freedom. They only assume that that freedom is really license in order to justify their conduct. Secondly, all teaching of virtue can result only in vice because no child has a natural motive for self-denial. What is denied him serves only to instruct him in possible satisfactions; otherwise it would not be denied him. What he should not desire ought to seem impossible or undesirable. In this instruction virtue consists only in obedience and is hated. Thirdly, the motives used to determine the desired conduct both are untrustworthy and pollute virtue which should be loved for its own sake. Rousseau is far from ready to explain what might make virtue lovable in itself but argues here for innocence in preference to a mercenary virtue. It is far better not to know the utility of lies than to tell the truth out of fear of getting caught, or because honesty is the best policy, or because one will be praised and admired for it. This is so because fear, policy and honor can accrue to the opposite of truthfulness and because, very simply, such motives have nothing to do with love of truth. Rousseau teaches both the selfishness of man and the purity of virtue and will try to give virtue a real meaning. Virtue will not be the perfection of the inclinations of the soul as it was for the ancients but the meaning of the dignity of man. Telling the truth is simply a quality and sign of freedom. A man who does not depend on the wills or the judgments of other men for what counts in life need not tell lies – at least ignoble ones. As a child his governor will never make his weakness a basis for subjection; as a man, his strength will protect him from the men and institutions who try to subject him. His education should not make him a slave to alien wills or judgments such that he would have to be a hero to be true.

The argument about lies is simple. There are two kinds of lies.

The first concerns facts. Men assert that something is so which is not or that something is not so which is. A child would only tell such a lie if he thought it to be advantageous. But since Emile gets only what he understands to be good things from his governor, he has every interest to tell him the truth about his needs. Only if the governor tried to give him good things – like medicine – which Emile did not really believe to be good, would there be any need to deceive his governor. The *de facto* lie will never be a problem for Emile. The other kinds of lie Rousseau calls *de jure*, by which he means promises to do something in the future which a man has no intention of doing. But Emile will never be asked to promise when he is young, because he has no idea of the future and anything he said about what he would do in it would be sheer fantasy. His education is intended to make him capable of making promises – contracts – in full knowledge of what he is doing and with perfect interests in fulfilling them. But that is the culmination, not the beginning, of an education.

Rousseau cites two more virtues to illustrate his general rule that virtue cannot be taught to children – piety and charity. The former he dismisses quickly, indicating that taking children to church and making them mumble prayers is the only way it is taught and that the result is boredom. Here there is no attempt to show that, as with the other virtues, the function of piety can be served by innocence or freedom. In fact there is no suggestion as to what function piety might have or of what use it might be. Moreover, as opposed to his discussion of charity, Rousseau does not try to show how to deal with the effect on the child of the governor's example in the practice of the virtue. One can only conclude that there is, at this stage, no need at all for piety or its

substitute and that the governor will never be seen practicing it.

The practice of charity on the other hand is given great significance although it is to be forbidden the child. A child cannot exercise the virtue because he a) does not really care for other people, b) because he has no motive for giving what is his; he wants to keep what is his and acquire more. The command to give is unnatural and the practice of making children give involves providing them with things to give about which they do not care or giving back to them those things which they are forced to give and about which they do care. Locke saw this problem very well and provides a natural solution. A child must be induced to give by showing him that he will be the gainer. As always in Rousseau's treatment of Hobbes and Locke, they revealed the problem and, in trying to follow nature rather than authority, corrupted morals. This enlightened self-interest Rousseau calls "usurious liberality." It is not giving, it is taking. To give means to expect nothing in return. "One must look to the habit of the soul rather than to that of the hands." The Christian's charity is a divine commandment to succor the poor, against the acquisitive inclination. Their lot is permanent and can be changed only in another world; the reward of the giver is also to be found in that other world. Locke's charity is but a mitigation of the harshness of acquisitiveness in a society whose increase of wealth will gradually solve the most pressing problems of the poor on this earth and provide rewards for him who relieves the temporary misery of the temporarily poor. Poverty is not a part of the providential order and there is nothing blessed about it.

Rousseau takes an implicit position on the question of charity in the way he presents it to Emile. Jean-Jacques performs acts of charity in Emile's presence and lets himself, in this unique case, be

taken as a model – perhaps even to be covertly imitated. He explains that his charity is the result of a promise to feed the destitute made to the poor when the poor agreed to let there be rich men. This is an allusion, in child's form, to the first social contract as described in the Discourse on the Origin of Inequality. The legitimacy accorded to property by the poor gives them a *right* to charity. Charity emerges not simply from the virtue of the rich and the need of the poor but from the positive merit of the poor. They are not passive beneficiaries but active benefactors. Charity is not a divine commandment but a condition of the social contract as property is its cause. Rousseau does not describe here the rich man's inner motive for keeping his promise, but he follows Locke in treating charity as part of the institutional arrangement of property within civil society, a thing of human making and within the power of human reform. His correction of Locke comes in making the consent of the poor as poor the basis of the right of property. Emile who has no garden and is dependent on the gardener is in a good position to understand this and would certainly sympathize with the complaints of the hungry against the first occupants. The questionable legitimacy of property which came out in the story with the gardener is here heightened while being palliated. Those who would attack property do so not only because they are "idle and quarrelsome," but because they are truly needy. It is in the self-interest of the rich to be concerned for the poor but more for preserving what they have than gaining more. And they lose the principled righteousness they have in Locke's scheme. Charity is, as in Christianity, again a duty for the rich but not one issuing from above, the love of man for the love of God, but from below, from the right of all men to preservation. Emile is not asked to perform

the virtuous activity as is Locke's child – for that would require the addition of an extraneous motive – but he at least knows why it is performed by others. This complements his respect for labor with a respect for the poor who are denied the opportunity to labor productively or to have control over what they produce. It completes his early education about property with a disposition toward the largely conventional distinction between rich and poor and prepares for a gentler, more humane morality than the one proposed by Locke.

Rousseau sums up the negative education in morality with the enunciation of a negative principle of morality: never harm anyone. This rule which follows so easily from the foregoing analysis of the virtues as traditionally taught and understood is deceptively simple while its consequences are both profound and far-reaching, involving a confrontation with all received traditions. In one sense doing harm to no one is the morality of the state of nature and the moral command is virtually self-enforcing. A man who lives alone can do harm to no one. And, as already discussed, in his *ephemeral* contacts with others of his kind there would neither be the objective scarcity which makes his good the harm of others nor the subjective opposition of wills leading to the desire to do harm. But Rousseau goes on to suggest that this morality, which on the surface is but a description of the conduct of a savage or a child and a low and useful compromise intended to get a minimum of decency in human relations, is when thought through the source of the most difficult and sublime of virtues. This is not a provisional morality but morality itself.

Not harming anyone is natural for a savage; for a social man it is very hard indeed. This is not only, or primarily, because the

tangle of social relations necessitates a struggle for dominance or primacy and hence a fundamentally hostile disposition toward others. Rousseau's assertion is more a result of his reflection on what doing good for others means. When the decent Polemarchus says that justice is helping friends, Socrates elaborates the meaning of that formula by getting him to admit that justice must then also be harming enemies. In fact the two are the same because the interests of men in society are in conflict. Helping a man achieve his desire is almost automatically to prevent one or many others from doing the same. Glaucon can assert that one of the foremost advantages of tyranny, the greatest of injustices, is the tyrant's enhanced capacity to do good to friends. It is not only man's selfishness but his love of others which causes him to do harm. If one corrects this definition of justice, as does Socrates, so as to say that one should only help men to the extent that others are not harmed, one agrees with Rousseau that the essence of justice is not doing harm. This can lead to a savage or philosophic indifference to men, never harming them because one does not care about what they care about and because one does not care about them. Or it can lead to the social man's imperative, never to indulge any desire which all other men could not consistently indulge. From this latter alternative – which is a combination of the particular desires or wills with the negative principle of never doing harm – all the positive social virtues can be derived. Thus consistent with man's natural selfishness and the "realism" which seeks effective rather than ideal justice, one can arrive at a rational morality which is both more solidly grounded in human nature and purer than that following from the commandment to "love thy neighbor." The generalization of the particular will, or the universalization of the

maxim of one's action which is the categorical imperative, is nothing but the consistent application of the negative moral principle.

Moreover, helping others has an interested or selfish quality. One gains a very sweet pleasure in "sending a man away satisfied with us." In a statement which is as close to Kant as Rousseau ever gets, he argues for the superiority of the negative virtue which is not founded on any inclination and is without ostentation. Helping other men is a sign of power; it gives one a good conscience; and it engages the hearts of other men. One can hardly get such satisfactions from the negative virtue, in not following an inclination to help or to harm. The inclination is morally neutral. It is made moral by being subjected to the rule that no one should be harmed. Such action is not attractive for any other reason than that it is right. It has the character of disinterestedness. It flatters neither him who asks for our help nor ourselves. Rousseau suggests this rule as a substitute for the Greek gentleman's doing good to friends and harm to enemies and the Christian's universal love. Emile's training in its easy or primitive sub-moral form is the preparation for its transformation into its sublime, moral form.

As a link between the presentation of the non-moral moral education and that of the non-intellectual intellectual education, Rousseau discusses the advantages of his method for allowing genius to express itself without being distorted by a uniform training and without encouraging the precociousness which appears to doting parents to be genius but is only monkeyish giddiness. Although Rousseau is a member of that school of thought according to which men's equality, what they have in common, is more important than what differentiates them and although for him the ultimate moral

dignity is accessible to all, genius is an important category of his thought and in some way tempers his egalitarianism just as national character tempers the essential universality of his political reflection. He speaks as beautifully of genius as any man who ever wrote. His admiration of it is enthusiastic and generous while his recognition of his own place within its ranks is both frank and modest. The superiority of genius is not a title of merit, for it is given not earned. It constitutes an opportunity for theoretical enlightenment and public reform, on the one hand, and for individual liberation, and thereby greater happiness, on the other. It does not constitute a basis of superior political right, for reasons connected with the natural freedom and potential moral equality of men, as well as the questionable status of the theoretical life. It is however the condition of the political contribution made by men like Cato and Condillac – the two examples of genius Rousseau cites here – whose gifts Rousseau combines.

Genius, as it were, takes care of itself. It reveals itself when the proper objects present themselves. It seems that its peculiar quality is an immunity to false ideas. It accepts only what it truly grasps. Negative education is a substitute for genius. It prevents false ideas entering an ordinary mind. Precocious children, forced to act as though they have ideas, use words connected with ideas without having the ideas. They do so because that is what adults want from them, and they judge of their own words by the reaction of adults not from a knowledge of things. Praise, applause and laughter motivate them, and they use the formulas which evoke them as though they were magic spells, "open sesame" or "abracadabra." Thus they become vain, conventional and full of false and confused notions. At best they have memory, not

understanding. And real memory, according to Rousseau, is not a jumble of impressions or words, but an ordered store of ideas accessible to reasoning. Thus there is no real memory without the capacity to reason. The difference between the erudite man and the philosopher or scientist is the adult result of the two kinds of memory. The attack on scholarship contained in this is a precursor of that made by Nietzsche and has the same intention – to restore a unity between life and learning.

Children according to Rousseau receive only images, purely passive representations of things, whereas ideas are notions of things and imply comparisons and active judgments. These views are essentially Cartesian, and the attempt to begin with the formation of clear and distinct ideas based in the first place on images or impressions while restraining the combining, comparing and judging faculty until it is well supplied with such ideas and not dominated by needs is the road to science traced by Descartes. Rousseau merely attempts to make that method a second nature and integrate it in the context of the whole man who is a combination of thought, feeling and action. Children know only the images of things and desire only to learn what relates to the immediate palpable needs or desires. Throughout the whole of life, at each stage of development, there must be a balance between knowledge and action, a bending of desire to the way things are. The culmination of such an education would be the wise man who knows the order of all things and whose wishes are in perfect conformity to it. The way to this end is the science of what children are capable of conceiving at each age and the motives both available and appropriate to making them realize that potential. Children reason about what interests them and use what they see as

the material for their reasoning. Rousseau's charge against ordinary school learning is that it teaches what children cannot understand and the use of which they cannot see. Their small amount of physical and mental strength is wasted on what is utterly meaningless to them, and they yearn for meaningless play. Rousseau wants their whole childhood to be meaningful play.

He, therefore, rejects *en bloc* all of the studies always thought fit and necessary for children. Children are to do nothing, at least as it appears to our eyes. Rousseau first gives powerful arguments proving the uselessness of what is usually studied. Then it is the burden of the rest of the Emile to show that his pupil will be able to acquire all the accomplishments intended by an ordinary education which make it possible to fit into society but without his becoming a puppet.

Teachers teach what produces visible results. This means that children learn things which can be parroted. Geometry, languages and geography are the first objects of Rousseau's criticism. Euclidean geometry comes down to mere memorization of the proofs as presented by the teacher or the book. The child can only see the figure as drawn whereas geometric reasoning requires that he understand that the figure is a representation, an imperfect representation, of a deeper reality. Thus the child could never himself find a demonstration. Far from it. He cannot even reproduce the teacher's demonstration if any of the visual material is changed. He has no interest in the circle he sees; he does not grasp the universal relations which it represents; and if he did, he would not know what the good of such knowledge is. If one responds that he will understand all this later and uses this period of his life to prepare himself for the age of understanding, Rousseau insists that

this is no advantage, that he really has to learn it over again and the habit of mind engendered at this age is docility to authority, boredom with study and atrophy of the organs of independent knowledge. He has learned words not things.

Similarly languages, which children manifestly learn rather easily, are not really learned according to Rousseau. If languages were only words, a child who speaks several languages might be said to know them. But the words of each language are expressions of ideas of things, and each nation has a different perspective on things. To use languages other than his own correctly, he would have to penetrate the spirit of the language and the national character of the people which uses it. The child possesses images to which words are attached as signs. Several languages would simply provide him with several alternative words for the same image. Coherent discourse requires a penetration of the spirit which informs the particular national visions of things. (In this context a problem arises for Rousseau: either his child is learning a particular language with its particular perspective, which must be transcended if one wants to get to the truth of things; or he is preventing the child from getting the peculiar cast of mind of a nation and leading him to a direct contact with things. If the latter is correct, Rousseau does not really explain how this is possible. If the former is correct, Rousseau's attempt to avoid prejudice of any kind would seem to be compromised.) At all events, a child trained in several languages speaks "German in Latin terms, in French terms, in Italian terms. They in truth [used] five or six dictionaries. But they always [speak] only German."

To sum up, children are incapable of relating signs to the things represented by them. The signs are either meaningless or

take on an independent meaning for them. A child's study of geography reveals this beautifully. Maps and globes, mere representations of the world and its various parts, become absolute objects for children with no relation to the real world they are intended to represent and left to explain. Most children can point out Paris on a globe, but that globe is not the world in which they live. They can name all the nations and cities of the earth but they do not experience the earth as a globe nor are they able to relate all those places to where they are. Rousseau insists that no child is able to get from Paris to St. Denis on the basis of all his study of geography. A map of his father's garden would not keep him from getting lost in it. Geography is an artificial world given him by adults and does not help him to orient himself in the world in which he lives. He must stay with the impressions of real things and only move away from them towards ideas of what he has truly experienced.

Most striking and important of all is Rousseau's rejection of what we would call the humanities. This of course follows immediately from the principle that children must be restricted to the world of things and keep from the world of men. But its full significance comes to light when one compares it with Socrates' banishment of the imitative poets in the Republic. Rousseau banishes all poets. Socrates purified them. Rousseau does without them. Socrates said that lies were the first part of education. He meant the poet's tales or myths told by nurses to children and which form their opinions. In the Platonic language, music education precedes gymnastic education. Rousseau says that children must have no myths, that they need no opinions about the

whole. Gymnastic education – training in the use of the body – precedes music education.

Socrates divides his discussion, in the first place, into what the poets say about gods and what they say about heroes. Rousseau divides his discussion into what writers say about heroes and what they say about animals (those of Aesop's and Lafontaine's fables). He makes it clear thereby that there is above all to be no mention of gods; or rather, by his silence, he tells us that gods are included as well as other kinds of beings.

Socrates' discussion is mostly negative, an account of what the poets must not do or say. The positive rules emerge from the criticism. Gods are good and do not change themselves or deceive. Heroes do not think that death is terrible and they are moderate, both in pleasure and anger (as opposed to Achilles who is wrathful and vengeful when his property, Briseis, is taken from him). It may be noted that Emile's subjection to necessity as the fundamental fact parallels and takes the place of the theological reform proposed by Socrates: the first things are permanent and unchanging, indifferent to human whim and not possessed of human passions. And Emile's natural insouciance about death as well as his instruction in property is a substitute for the effect of the heroic model. What poetry was to achieve in speech for Socrates has been incorporated into natural sensation by Rousseau. Socrates gives no example of his new poetry, and it is hard to imagine what it would be like. Rousseau goes a step further: no poetry could fail to have an ill-effect on children. Socrates on the eve of his death turned to writing Aesopian fables; his only poetic endeavor. Rousseau specifically rejects the fable. No falsehoods for children; no opinions; no *cave*.

Rousseau, in making a criticism of all books, uses Plutarch who tells of heroes and Lafontaine who tells of animals which speak. He does not mention the Bible which tells of God, of heroes and animals which speak, but his strictures must apply to it too: without a proper prior preparation and the acquisition of criteria of judgment the Bible also must be both incomprehensible and corrupting. The reader must himself extend the critique, but Rousseau makes it easy for him to do so.

He begins with history, but with a particular variety, that which presents the great examples of heroic virtue which men imitate and which sublimate their aspirations, the stories of his beloved Plutarch, with whom he began as a child (and he, Rousseau, understood) and with whom he ended as an old man. He gives this discussion a heightened significance by again describing his special situation as a thinker just as he began the Emile itself – a solitary, neither a scholar nor a philosopher, not a member of a sect and thus free of sectarian or social prejudices, a sincere observer and reporter of facts. He thereby marks the passage to come as most typical of his whole procedure and his paradoxical innovation. Moreover it permits him to present himself in action in real life, not as the ideal teacher of the ideal pupil but as an actor in a group that is a microcosm of society as a whole. He thus illustrates the prejudices of society and the peculiar difficulties of his relation to it.

The *dramatis personae* of this little tale about telling tales includes, in addition to the leading man, a child receiving a conventional education from a decent but conventional governor. The child is linked to the society of which he is being prepared to become a member by a doting mother who exacts approval of her

son from the assembly. Then there is the society itself including a mysterious wise woman who counsels Jean-Jacques.

The governor uses Plutarch's Life of Alexander to inspire the youngster with courage. In particular he uses the story of Alexander and his physician Philip. Alexander had received a calumniating letter accusing Philip of a plot to assassinate Alexander. When Philip arrives with a draught, Alexander hands Philip the letter and quaffs the medicine while Philip reads the letter. Rousseau disapproves of the governor's remarks on Alexander's intrepidity – either because they are in error or because they are inappropriate for the child. But, giving a display of prudence, he refrains from disagreeing, not wanting to undermine the governor's authority, which would have only disenchanted the child without providing a tolerable substitute.

The child is made to perform for the company at dinner and receives the reward for the pain of learning. His vanity is flattered by applause, and he learns his worth from the reaction of the society. He is a little actor. The character of the society which forms him by its approval is revealed in a heated discussion among its members aroused by the story. Most say that Alexander's act was rash and blame him for it. This is a sensible political judgment – a man, particularly a ruler; should not run the risk of death just to show he is fearless. A few support the governor, admiring firmness and courage. Rousseau intervenes to say that if it took any courage to drink the medicine, it was a foolish thing to do. At that everybody turns against Alexander, agreeing with one another that the act was a folly and thinking that they agree with Rousseau. This, of course, is not what Rousseau meant: the act was not a folly; it required no courage; its beauty consisted in something else.

Rousseau begins to get angry in his education of man but is restrained by the mystery lady who whispers to him to keep quiet, for he will not be understood.

In what consisted the error of the audience? Both original and apparently opposite positions began from fear of death. Those who thought Alexander should not have done it are able to rationalize their cowardice by reasons of state. The others are ashamed of their fears. They praise the hero's being able to overcome what they experience. The hero is their reverse self, or what might become their better half, the positive embodiment of their shame. The hero and the admirers of the hero share the same terror; the former deals with it nobly. The latter see in the hero nothing that is not in themselves. They are hardly able to distinguish true courage from bravado. Alexander's detractors are simply base and likely to become hypocrites in order to conceal that baseness. His admirers are split. The immediate agreement brought about by Rousseau's remark resulted from the opportunity it gave both sides to indulge the primitive fear without the constraint of the countervailing motive of courage or Alexander's example.

The adult confusion illuminates the difficulty of history for the child. (It also shows how Rousseau uses the education of children to illustrate the psychology of adults.) Rousseau, suspecting that the child had understood nothing in the story, takes the child aside and discovers that he greatly admires Alexander's courage in taking bad tasting medicine. The word poison meant nothing to him, for he had no idea of death. The hero is again brought down to the level of his admirer: he is understood to have the same petty concern as the admirer and to be superior only in his capacity to respond to it nobly. As death is to the adults, bad

tastes are to a child. No persuasion could get the child to take the medicine – it had to be fear or Alexander. And Alexander's example operates by means of vanity: Alexander is admired, and the child wants to be admired; the child is also admired for admiring Alexander. It is not the virtue represented which takes hold; it is society's reward for that virtue which mediates between the child and Alexander. And the members of that society are ambivalent or hypocritical in their admiration. The child does not understand, and he becomes an imitator of an alien example. He leaves himself. But for what? An image of the real hero tarnished by the opinions of vulgar men. Rousseau, who cannot change the world, leaves the child with his idol intact. He will take his medicine more easily. But Emile never takes medicine.

This story, so simple, shows the impossibility of teaching history to children. For history is nothing but a collection of names and dates for him who has no moral ideas. It is, Rousseau says, a long way from the discussion with Robert the gardener to the moral ideas requisite for an understanding of history. It might be objected that the child without heroes will have no goals of aspiration, no reverence, no rootedness. Children without stories of Achilles, Jesus and George Washington would seem to have no orientation and no depth. Rousseau would admit this, and in a sense he is like a certain kind of modern rationalist, clearing away the debris of tradition in the name of freedom and science. A child must not bear the burden of a contradictory, antiquated and alienating tradition. Nothing through the eyes of others; everything from the child himself. But Rousseau is not so narrow as those debunkers who make a desert of the world in uprooting its poetry. Rousseau promises to combine science with what we would call

"culture," but without its previous contradictions and the abandonment of freedom and reason it entailed. He further argues, by means of this example, that the ordinary reverence is polluted at its source.

Rousseau understands Alexander, and he almost curses the reader who has to ask what if not courage made Alexander's deed so fair? To understand Plutarch one must oneself have moral greatness within one. There is almost no use in telling those who have to be told. In this one case Rousseau will tell, in order to make it clear that he must teach much by silence. Alexander believed in virtue. Death was not the problem for him. He trusted his friend, and with those who deserved his friendship there was no risk. There is no calculation involved. If he was mistaken, then better to die. But courage played no role because of his conviction that there can be mutual trust, at least among some men. Most men cannot believe that. Only those capable of recognizing the independent beauty of virtue should read Plutarch. Rousseau prepares Emile to love virtue for virtue's sake without the distorting intermediaries usually needed to make it and its exemplars lovable. "Keep quiet, Jean-Jacques," was a lesson he took to heart, which taught him something about his relation to society and which remains present in all his lengthy speech.

Books are intrusions on a child's world. He has no reason to read them, and what he finds in them has nothing to do with the world he is just learning to experience. His memory should be exercised in storing up the experiences of things relevant to his well-being which have been artfully presented to him by the governor in their natural order. But instead children are made to learn fables or parables by heart, in the hope that decent moral

principles will become part of their habit in this sweetened and easily accessible form. Poetry is intended to give them the moral experiences which their real life does not give them or to give a moral interpretation to the world they actually do experience. Rousseau uses Lafontaine to test the success of such teaching. It must be remembered that his parables were not the only ones taught to children. And when he says that Emile will learn nothing by heart, he includes the catechism, to which he alludes in the following discussion.

Following Socrates' criticism of Homeric poetry in reverse order, Rousseau begins with the effect of the poetic form on the soul of the reader and then turns to the moral content conveyed by it. It is, precisely, in the discussion of poetic form that Socrates speaks most emphatically about the unity, singleness or simplicity of the men he is educating and about their being what they are rather than being imitators or actors. Poetry is linked with the doubleness or complexity of man, and it necessarily depicts, adorns and, in some measure, beautifies vice. Its multifariousness has a kinship with wrongdoing and disorder. The unity of man and the prosaic simplicity of goodness are common themes of the Republic and the Emile.

Rousseau chooses the fable which is meant to represent and cure vanity. He tries to see the poem through the eyes of a child. The charm which it has for adults depends upon their knowledge of the realities which it only represents, their awareness of the subtlety that lies behind the apparent naiveté. Rousseau's account of what a child actually sees in it has an exquisite appeal of its own, for it shows real naiveté misinterpreting, and hence revealing, the subtlety of social life and the ideas connected with it. The child's

mind is a kind of natural measure against which the achievements and corruptions of civilization come to light. Rousseau's little study pits philosophic analysis against poetic synthesis.

In the simplest terms, the tale is supposed to teach about the dangers of vanity whereas the child does not have the slightest idea what vanity is. For him the story is about how to get a cheese. Cheese he knows and likes. All the pleasure in the poem comes from the comedy of the crow's loss of a thing so good and the fox's getting it due to the crow's stupidity. This pleasure is provided in a language which is partly incomprehensible and partly misleading for the child, accustoming him to use what is for him senseless speech just at the time when he is being trained in precise speech which applies directly to things. Moreover things, which he has been learning as they are in all their necessity and distinctiveness, become confused and fluid. The line between the possible and the impossible, so important a part of the natural education, is muddled. Animals are given characters they do not have and their specific differences are dissolved. While the child does not understand the human vices the animals embody in the tale, he is taught to see them as human beings. Rousseau stresses – and the allusion is pregnant – the danger of telling a child that animals can speak. Similarly the crow's oath is a perilous lesson, for how can the meaning of an oath be explained? Finally, the child learns about lying and deceit – and the eternal reward for their practice, the cheese. The fox tells the crow that the lesson he has given him is worth a cheese. No child ever believed that. (It is for this reason that all lessons given by Rousseau are disguised as cheeses.)

Turning from the cognitive side of the poem to its moral intention, Rousseau shows that the fables always have an effect

opposite to the one sought for by the writer. In attempting to cure or prevent vanity and sloth, the stories encourage covetousness, lying and avarice. The artist, to make a story of it, has to punish the lesser defect by means of a greater vice. The crow is foolish; the fox, wicked. The crow is punished, and the fox gets away with the desired object and suffers nothing for the indecent means used to acquire it. It is vice against vice. Poetry seems to require the alluring depiction of vice. Moreover, the poem sets morality, the weaker, over against the desire, the stronger. Nature teaches men to want all good things. In the poem the good things can be acquired only at the expense of others. Premature moral education turns desire into vice without providing a motive for virtue. This story must be compared with the one where Emile confronts the gardener to see how the property relations are confused by Lafontaine's characterization. And, finally, there is the problem of identification. The child is meant to see himself as the crow. If he did so, he would try to correct the faults that caused him to lose his cheese. But there is no reason for him to sympathize with the crow – unless he has suffered similar disasters. Such events could presumably be arranged, but only at the price of setting the child at war with others and making him distrustful. The inclination of all men – children simply fall under the general rule – is to admire and identify with the winner, with the more powerful. Rousseau says that this is the choice of *amour-propre* and that it is natural. Everyone wants to have the *beau-role*; no one wants to be humiliated. Preachers may argue for humility. Artists must appeal to the passions as they are. Only when Alexander can seem an object of pity and Emile has been himself a dupe will it be safe for him to read Plutarch and Lafontaine. The first two fables of

Lafontaine – The Crow and the Fox and The Grasshopper and the Ant – incline the child to the two most fundamental vices concerning property, covetousness and avarice, the desire to have more and the unwillingness to give away what one has, as well as encouraging him to contempt for those deprived or suffering want. Not only is his vainglory aroused, but he has moral justification for this disposition in the vices of the crow and the grasshopper. Similarly, children always want to be like the lion who is the king of the beasts and are impressed by his power which enables him to get the better of others. But when a gnat by cowardly stings gets the better of the lion, they are all for the gnat. Success is the standard. In essence Lafontaine's fables, meant to teach a conventional morality, end up essentially with the imitation of the lion and the fox recommended by Machiavelli. This is the natural social morality based on the first passions.

Of the five fables cited by Rousseau, in only one does the child make the proper identification. The little girl of whom Rousseau speaks does not want the constraint of the fat dog's leash. She wants to be free as in the lean wolf. But it is not the lesson that one must be moderate to be free that she learns. She simply wants loose. She is constrained by all the moral rules and demands of obedience. She, as do most children, has the experience required for grasping some of this fable as opposed to the others. She is a prisoner of morality against nature, and she longs for license; she is a rebel. Emile does not need this fable, for he is both free and moderate already. For the little girl, it is the contradiction of all the other rules of morality. And this precisely reveals the whole problem of conventional morality of which the dualism in the fables is only a reflection. On the one hand they preach a stern

morality, like that of the catechism, necessary for speech in society; on the other, they hint at a very lax or base morality which is necessary for action in society. It is Machiavelli's problem again. The high and unnatural demands of public virtue are themselves the cause of corruption. Rousseau does not suggest that the catechism is the moral teaching which should be followed and that all the problem is in men's sinning. Far from it. He suggests a morality proportionate to children's and men's natures. Lafontaine, while being a corruptor of the youth, is a good teacher of the passions for the mature reader.

In agreement with Socrates' discourse in The Republic, Rousseau teaches that poetry expresses the duality in man, the tension between private desire and public duty, and that it thrives on the disproportion between the way the world is and the way men want it to be. The poet is an imitation of an imitator, the legislator. The poet presents nature as it should be to fit man's social needs and thereby covers it over. Rousseau attempts to make nature directly perceived, the standard for society from the beginning. All that Socrates says about the illusions of poetry, its soliciting of the passions and its making it difficult to reason (e.g. the child who thinks, on the basis of the fable, that a cheese can be smelled from very far off) is adopted by Rousseau. And Rousseau ends with a praise of Lafontaine as does Socrates with a praise of Homer. He is a great poet. Rousseau is a competent judge of that, and he criticizes only worthy opponents (like Moliere in the Lettre a d'Alembert). He prefers no poetry to bad or edifying poetry. The poet is necessary for he knows much about man. But he may also be a corruptor. The relation between art and morality is not a simple one; a certain attractiveness about vice seems to be a part of

it. Rousseau's criticism implies both the possible return of poetry and a project for a new kind of poetry. In all of this he parallels Socrates. But he is more extreme in his rejection of it for the young, since he has greater hopes for the reasonableness of men. And he also will need it more later, for in his view of nature there is no beauty without poetry.

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The abandonment of music leaves gymnastic as the whole of puerile education. Socrates, in jest, tried to unify man by paying attention only to the soul, asserting that the body would thereby also be taken care of. Rousseau, in earnest, tries to unify man by concentrating only on the body, asserting that thereby the soul will also be taken care of. He resolves the tension between body and soul in the direction of the body, a simpler and more plausible undertaking, one that accords with modern philosophy and science. But he endeavors to get much more from the body than did others. The remainder of Book II is devoted to it. The proper development of the body is the ground of the moral virtues and of science.

A child's body should grow naturally, without constraint. His natural education is to make his body as strong and as adroit as possible in order to fulfill the primary inclination of self-preservation. His knowledge should be that which will enable the body, which is both instrument and end, to take care of itself. A savage leaves it at that. He develops his mind only to the extent it serves the purpose of caring for the body. Otherwise he is indolent. The civilized child must acquire much more than the savage, but he must maintain the soundness of the savage. The savage is interested only in himself. The civilized man is interested in

everything. The child must – to return to the example just treated – learn how to read, for books are necessary to his future extended interest. He does not need books now, for he does not need their moral teachings nor is he prepared for the science they contain. Learning how to read is painful and connected with nothing obviously of importance. The savage would simply turn away from the task. Emile must be made to lift off from the purely natural level – which is only the perpetual unchanging turning of the wheel of life and death – but by natural means. Emile likes sweets – as do all children. He learns to read because he wants to eat them. He learns not because he is rewarded for doing so by being given sweets. This reading is the means to the sweets. Both reading and writing are means of communication, with those who have the sweets. He wants to learn to read and write and does so from perfectly natural motives. He is gradually moved out of nature naturally.

Mens sana corpore sano is the classic and trite formula of the goal of a good education, and Rousseau adopts it. It is usually understood to mean that there are studies proper to the mind and exercises proper to the body, and that the body is to be – by its strength and health – a good servant of the soul and not, due to the immoderateness of its desires, a hindrance to the operations of the soul. Rousseau, however, suggests that the sound body is the cause of the sound mind. He even almost argues that they are the same. Certainly the proper attention paid to the body will lead to the proper kind of mind. There seem to be three bases for this contention. A) In a sense man is his body. If it exists less, man exists less. B) Intelligence exists for governing the body's strengths and faculties. Without the healthy development of those strengths

and faculties, the mind will not develop and will not have its proper activity. It will either be weakened or will separate off into a fantasy world, perverted because it lacks its base. C) All knowledge comes to the mind through the bodily senses. If they are not powerful and sound, they will transmit less and less accurately.

Rousseau illustrates this thesis and defends it against the objection that men who spend their lives in bodily labor become brutish by comparing peasants to savages. Peasants' minds are indeed crude and sluggish, but as the comparison with the savages suggests, this is not due to the excessive use of the body, but to their subjection to command, tradition and routine. It is the unnaturalness of social relations – particularly the division of labor – which makes them sodden. They have no need of their reason; it actually gets in the way. It is worthwhile to compare Marx and Rousseau on the idiocy of country life. For Marx, it is caused by the subjection to nature, for Rousseau by the subjection to men. For Marx the liberation from the subjection to men requires, in the first place, the conquest of nature; for Rousseau it requires the abandonment of that goal. The savage who is free and without a prescribed task uses his reason constantly and is, within his limits, very adroit and clever. Reason is motivated and sharpened by real need. The comparison between savage and peasant is meant to show that, far from the body and its needs conflicting with the development of the intelligence, it is the purely spiritual beings – society's modes, prejudices, conventions, etc. – which are its opponents.

Ordinary educations are likened to that of peasants while Emile is reared like a savage. The ordinary pupil has no need to use

his mind, for all his action is planned and commanded by adults. He is not required to make his own decisions, to run the risks, suffer the consequences and take the responsibilities. His practical life is entirely arranged, and he is constantly being given precepts to follow in it; and his studies are purely academic or idle, for they have nothing to do with what he sees to be his real life. He becomes doubly bored with and rebellious against reason – which is both useless and constraining. He uses his reason to adapt to and escape from the authority of others' minds rather than to learn about the world and himself. Such a child really ends up governing his governor, for the governor willy-nilly has to compromise with his pupil's inclinations. And all of the pupil's capacities are marshalled to outwit the governor on whom he depends utterly; whereas the governor, who has other interests, gives only very little of himself to the child. This is the source of precocious psychological sensitivity. A healthy child has no more interest in the motives of an adult than he does in those of a horse or a tree. But one who lives in dependence must know the movements of his master's soul. That is his real intellectual expression. He spies on his preceptor – to figure out how to get the best of him in order to regain his natural freedom and to triumph in the preceptor's weaknesses. This premature insight is a mode of destroying authority and produces a low tone of mind for life. These psychologists are always looking for the weak, or contemptible motive in others, for from it they get a sense of release and self-justification.

To repeat a theme which will have to be repeated many times over, the problem for Rousseau is not body and soul, but the strange doubling of the soul which takes place when man confronts

authority and will, the transformation of desire into whim or fantasy. This totally spiritual split between the real and imaginary world is the source of vice and of man's misery. Rousseau's Machiavellianism, or his consistent materialism, makes him insist on keeping the soul or the mind in the service of the body's needs. The corruption occurs when it detaches itself from that foundation and creates an imaginary world. The transformation of *amour de soi* into *amour-propre* is perverse, but it is also what distinguishes man from brute. When Rousseau blames adults for children's vices, he means only that the former ask of the latter what is contrary to nature and causes perversity. He is very hard-headed in his view of children: they care only for themselves, for their own bodily well-being. His rhetoric may lead to the modern pathos about the moral superiority of children, but it is a misinterpretation of his thought.

A child must do only what he wants to do, but he must want to do only what the governor wants him to do. Thus Rousseau adapts for children his definition of the free man: he wants only what he can, and does what he pleases. The governor is master of the weakened ignorant child's environment. He is able to expand or contract the limits of the possible as they appear to the child, and, so long as the child is still disposed to do the possible and renounce the impossible, his action is thus controlled. This is the perfect subjection of the child a teacher seeks, constituted by the governor's ruse which presents itself as nature. The child is really a machine, and one can predict and control his action as one would that of a machine. He ceases being a machine when he acts from whim or caprice, but one can know when and why he will do so. The teacher must be presumed to "know the natural development of the human heart, ...to know how to study man and the

individual... to know beforehand by what [his] pupil's will will be bent on meeting all the objects of interest to his age that [he] causes[s] to pass before his eyes." The sin of parents and teachers is ignorance of all this, not in being too harsh or too soft or whatever else progressive educationists and children usually blame them for. Rousseau extends parental responsibility further than anyone before him because in his view they are more capable of controlling the development of children's nature than had previously been thought. Therefore the capriciousness of children is the appropriate punishment for the mistakes of parents and teachers.

In order to be able to tell a story, Rousseau puts a plaintive question into the mouth of teachers whose charges have already been corrupted: "What are the remedies?" He moves again to practice, away from Emile to a "real" child, to reform rather than founding. His story is about his own educational activity, and it reveals his relation to society, of which this family is a microcosm. The child with whom he deals is surrounded by servants, watched by a doting mother, an heir to a fortune and title, cared for by doctors. All the vices of society, particularly those resulting from conventional inequality, are present. The child has been perverted by them and Rousseau comes into conflict with the society in trying to correct him.

The child has had the habit of acting through the wills of others and thus his primary concern on meeting Rousseau is to test his mastery over him. Will meets will and Rousseau's proves the stronger. The child gets harsh but not vengeful treatment. Rousseau overcomes his own anger; he must show only that he cannot be commanded for commanding's sake. But Rousseau's victory is only momentary because the child can appeal over his

head to his mother's fears for his life. He can use his mother's will to overcome the subordinate's will. The child feigns illness. He is a liar and an actor, appealing to the passions of his audience, using the fear of death he perceives in others to move them. The doctor is the man who serves and encourages such fears for his own profit while being perfectly contemptuous of the motives which make him an important man. He can be used to correct the child. In corrupt situations, corrupt remedies are necessary. The child wants the attention, not to be kept in bed. His ruse turns against him. The mother could only be persuaded to punish the child in this way by means of the doctor's charlatanry. Rousseau's telling the truth and doing what nature prescribes equally for all causes the mother to hate him. She loves only those who deceive her. He is ready to face the risks of death, and he does not know the special importance of an heir. He is ejected from the society as soon as possible.

In the second episode in the drama of Rousseau's relations with this bad little boy, he uses a more complicated stage setting and more complicated motives. The boy becomes the central figure in a comedy. Instead of being told the story about a silly child's punishment for vanity, he is made to live it. Thus Rousseau makes his apology to the poets and, in particular, to Moliere. The vicious Sbrigani from Monsieur de Pourceaugnac is necessary to play on the child's fears and make use of the credulousness born of them in order to render the child to his teacher. The world is populated with unreal dangers in order to deal with the real danger. Everyone who sees this living theater laughs at the pretensions punished, and the vices of tempter are in the service of virtue. In all of this the child lives unconscious that he is the plaything of the

teacher while thinking he is establishing his mastery.

Following his prescription that one must begin with rights in teaching children duties, Rousseau first gives the child a sense of his right in order to put him the wrong. Rousseau gets him to refuse a request to go for a walk. The next day Rousseau returns the favor and does not permit the servants to gratify the child's wish either. The child does not recognize Rousseau's right to the same freedom he has. His awareness of his freedom does not lead to a duty to recognize the freedom of others. Only at the end of his humiliation will he find this reciprocity a sensible guarantee of his own rights and turn away from the attempt to master others. At this stage he attempts to overcome Rousseau by means of manipulating the concern he is sure everyone has for him. He finds only indifference. He threatens and still gets no response. Now only his vanity makes him obstinate in committing a deed the real disadvantage of which he begins to see. Just as when he pretended to be sick, the possibility of Rousseau's being held responsible is all that gives him courage. He is willing to harm himself in order to harm Rousseau. All these foolish and imaginary relations are the result of the desire to control wills.

His journey is one wound after another to his *amour-propre*. The common people feel sorry for him but think he must be evil. (In the mouth of a woman in that scene occurs the only mention of the word God prior to the middle of Book IV.) Street urchins mock him. No one is impressed by his gentleman's outfit. And the scoundrel makes him only too aware of the dangers of his undertaking. The boy's *amour-propre* is humiliated. And on his return home he meets not his adoring mother but his stern father who threatens him with expulsion from his home. The entire

expedition has been a disaster for the child's claims on the adult world. He is still largely motivated by *amour-propre*, and when he goes out again with Rousseau he triumphs in the eyes of those who mocked him when he was alone. But Rousseau has gained control of his will and gradually brings him back to his place in the world of things.

Everything depends on this capacity of the teacher to keep the child in contact with things. They must enter the child's consciousness by way of the senses while the latter are still pure of illusion. "Since everything which enters human understanding comes to it by way of the senses, man's first reason is a sensitive reason." This is how one knows what is. The *tabula rasa* must be filled with true judgments of things. The little country children with healthy organs and real experience of the world around them are the ones who know the way physical nature really works. They are contrasted with the city boy, Rousseau who thinks he can gallop alongside a horse or hit a mountain two leagues away with a rock. That inexperience, plus the moral illusions of his inflated vanity soon to be discussed, meant that Rousseau had to reconstruct his own world which was virtually a myth or a poem in order to know how to live; and very few men have his capacities to do so. His education of Emile is based negatively on his own education.

The child entering the world is like a cat entering a room, distrustful, testing everything, using every sense to be sure that there are no dangers and looking for what is pleasant or useful there. Speculative studies turn him away from learning his place "here on earth." This language is Biblical in resonance and Machiavellian in accent. Speculative studies are identical with

metaphysics or theology which orient men to the first things simply and in relation to a whole containing both this life and the next. The child must know the "the things of this world" first. It is possible to separate the two and live in ignorance of the whole. Or perhaps this sensible universe is the whole.

This is all summed up in Rousseau's statement that he is teaching the most difficult of all arts, the art of being ignorant, or the knowledge of ignorance. This is Socrates' statement of his art or his kind of knowledge. It is directed particularly against the poets who present the whole, consisting of gods and men, things in the heavens and below the earth as well as the things on earth. They must somehow claim to know the whole, and their presentations determine the way men live. The Socratic knowledge of ignorance is equivalent to denying the truth of the poetic depictions of the whole. Socrates knows what knowledge is, and neither poets nor statesmen have it. He has a certitude of the uncertainty of their perspective. Philosophy is the coming to awareness of the distinction between knowledge and opinion, which proves to be the same as the distinction between nature and convention, or the recognition that the cave is a cave. The philosophic life is the only life the viability of which does not require the myths of the poets. It is in the light of such questions that Rousseau's rejection of books and turn toward sensitive reason must be seen. His child can live independently of Homer or the Bible. He can live independently because his needs do not force him to have opinions about what he does not know, because he cares only for his own preservation and is unattached to the communities of men. What he can know – which is based on what he can sense – suffices for what he must do. The philosopher must

learn that he has opinions and do away with them along with the needs that produce them; Emile has never needed opinions, and his method of the senses prevents him from accepting any. This little boy knows how to die, whereas the philosopher spends his life learning how to die. He practices the philosopher's morality: never harm anyone. And he possesses the philosopher's knowledge: of ignorance. The whole of the Socratic achievement is incorporated in an ordinary child.

In order to get this result Rousseau must suppose that it is possible to come to know without having had opinions, that there is a pure state of ignorance between truth and error and that there is a pure state of innocence or goodness between virtue and vice, morality or immorality. And this is all somehow connected with the goodness of the body. It is a Socratic whole constructed out of Lockean parts.

The superiority of the ancients over the moderns, according to Rousseau, was due particularly to their gymnastic. He returns to the ancients on the level of the body. But this is something that was almost as well understood by Locke, and Rousseau refers the reader to Locke's book for guidance on bodily exercises, making only a few additions and corrections.

These parenthetical remarks about the training of the body almost all relate to its moral effects. Clothes are for comfort or protection not display, and Rousseau gives a prescription for curing the vanity of class so often connected with clothing. The same clothes are to be worn the whole year, and this is part of the general intention of making a man who is suitable for all climates. The child is habituated to hot and cold, moist and dry without danger to his health. His habit of life will never make him less

mobile. In his sleep he must not simply be allowed to follow "the law of nature," he must be above it, for freedom in the complexities of civil life requires adaptability. This remark is an important indication of Rousseau's way of going beyond nature in order to preserve it in social man. One might even say that he improves on it for the sake of combining natural and social in man, or for the sake of extending and elevating the first freedom.

The child's governor should accustom him to pain and wounds, so that they do not mean death to him; they will not be alien to his life. The fear of pain doubles pain in causing it to be anticipated and also in connecting it with ideas of death. The body will absorb the terrors that would move the soul. Thus gymnastic is the apprenticeship in constancy and firmness.

The reflection on death gives Rousseau the occasion to mention – as though he just happened to be reminded of it – inoculation against smallpox. This was a very delicate practical subject and a complicated theoretical one for Rousseau. Enlightened men were for it; many religious men against it. It was a clear achievement of modern medicine. Politically, to speak against inoculation meant to side with the secular power of the church against science and also to condemn many children to death. At the same time, to accept it meant the acceptance of the principle of enlightenment, the emancipation of science, which Rousseau was certain could become an ally of despotism as well as a corruptor of morals. He hated fanaticism, but saw the long range threat posed by the self-satisfied rationalism which equated scientific progress with moral and political progress. Here he takes a stand which enables him to warn against the effects of the new science but at the same time to approve inoculation for children in civil society

and attack the motives of those who oppose it. Thus he insured himself the enmity of both parties. Rousseau was not a member of a party or a sect. He knew that the vices in the old world so vigorously and courageously attacked by the Encyclopedists would give way to new vices endemic to their thought. Although they were the minority and in some measure persecuted, they had the dangerous good conscience and were the wave of the future. And Rousseau was preparing for the future. He reiterates his principle that nature is good, and even personifies it as the master inoculator. Science at best imitates nature; it should never fight it. With this reminder, he permits inoculation. He accepts and approves the practice, denies that it is dangerous but rejects the principle on which it seems to be founded. The society presided over by the doctor is not to be desired.

The final reflection on Locke's gymnastic is an expansion on his prescription that children should be taught to swim. Rousseau gives it a new significance in pointing out that the children of the rich learn how to ride and not how to swim and in making it seem that we must choose between the two. He dismounts his child and puts him in the water. The rich are not interested in the useful but the exclusive. Men rarely have to ride and, when they do, they almost always can. Walking is an independent and egalitarian way of achieving the same end as riding. But swimming, which does not come naturally, is sometimes necessary to save one's life and provides man with a new freedom in another element. It, like walking, is independent, in the sense that no animals or machines are required as intermediaries for it, and egalitarian, in the sense that all can learn it without distinction of birth or wealth. His child is at home on the whole surface of the globe, which is divided into

earth and waters. He explains further that learning how to swim will not be dangerous for the child – as some presumably believed it would – for he will share the risks with him and thus his duty to his own self-preservation will guarantee also the child's. Only when men are, as it were, in the same boat can their common concern be insured. Rousseau's "realism" is never more vividly expressed.

Rousseau treats of bodily exercise almost as little as does Plato. The real gymnastic is both evident and of little theoretical interest. It is a thing for specialists. Their difference concerns the significance of the body in the higher moral and intellectual experiences. The novelty of Rousseau's teaching about the body – and the positive part of the negative education – is the education of the senses. And this education is not for the sake of a sound body but for that of a sound mind. The senses are of importance because of what they contribute to the understanding. Again, this concentration on the senses must not be simplistically contrasted with a supposed Platonic denigration of them, for Plato founds his reasoning on the richest and purest sensible experience. The difference has to do with reason's ultimate independence of that experience or whether or not Rousseau is right when, in agreement with Locke, he asserts that "everything in the understanding comes to it by way of the senses." Rousseau's treatment of the senses can just as well be seen as a correction of modern "empiricism" which, although explicitly insisting that everything comes from the senses, is abstract and does not pay sufficient attention to the integrity and fullness of the information gathered by the senses, the information which is the matter of science. Moreover, Rousseau can be understood to be trying to build the method of enlightenment into the very organs of the body rather than leave it to a later

transformation and refinement of primary experience. He thereby reduces the tension between the world of common sense and that of science. This is another step in the unifying of man.

The senses, properly developed, direct the use of the body and its strength. All that the body encounters or needs, all the efforts it makes, should be informed by a knowledge of itself and of the things provided by the senses. It should never be allowed to act without awareness of the possible and the efficacious. The body solicits the activity of the senses and gives them a solid base, and they in turn guide it. By the body's actions the judiciousness of the mind will be furthered. The senses should be heightened and above all kept from errors of habit. "We know how to touch, see or hear only as we have learned to do so."

Rousseau treats each of the senses separately. Somewhat surprisingly he begins with the darkest of the senses, touch – the lowest of the senses according to Aristotle. He does so partly because it is the most primitive and most pervasive of the senses. And it is, according to his description, the one most immediately related to the first of all desires, self-preservation; it warns the body against hostile intrusion. But, most of all, it is the sense of materialists. Touch is raised in dignity as over against sight, usually understood to be the noblest of the senses. Sight senses at a distance; touch lays hold of things. Sight is essentially of forms; touch, of body, and nature is body. In particular touch can always guide us whereas sight requires light.

For this latter point, Rousseau uses the blind as an illustration, and to get the fullest meaning from this example one must think of the Letter about the Blind by Rousseau's former friend Diderot who was imprisoned as a heretic for it. In it Diderot uses the

example of the blind English mathematician Saunderson whose knowledge of the world – which was quite impressive – led him to be a materialist and atheist. Rousseau's argument here tends to the conclusion that touch is the check on errors of sight and that what is perceived by both sight and hearing should be translatable in terms of touch if it is to be considered authentic. The blind man can live in the light whereas those who see are useless at night. We must at least imitate the blind in order to be able to deal with darkness, which both really and metaphorically is one of man's fundamental conditions. Modern men respond that light can be provided by man's ingenuity, but Rousseau rejects machines and their artificial light. Plato said that man must always use the sun. The moderns said that man can enlighten. Rousseau proposes to do without light. Feeling will suffice; and it will render man independent.

Rousseau thus turns the discussion of touch into one about men in the dark. He prescribes many night games, underlining that this counsel is more important than it seems. Night, he says, is naturally frightening to men and even animals. In revealing this Rousseau also reveals that natural man is not so free of unreasonable fear as he usually says; and he gives us to understand that when speaking of natural man he speaks as much of what might be as of what was. Neither courage nor reason withstand this primeval fear. He refers to the effect of eclipses of the sun, which were anciently thought to be signs from the gods and denies that this fear is a result of old-wives' tales as some thinkers would have it. Rather the cause is natural, and it is the same one that makes the people superstitious: ignorance of the things around us. It must first be emphasized that he gives us here one of the

qualities of the people, the same one that characterizes the *demos*, or the cave-dwellers par excellence, according to Plato – superstition. A long footnote quoting Buffon makes Rousseau's real theme even more explicit, for Buffon explains the belief in specters and gigantic figures. Rousseau has silently moved to a treatment of one of the prime sources of belief in supernatural beings – whose place is in the shadows. In doing away with the fear of those shadows, he does away with their imaginary inhabitants. His formula recalls one of Hobbes' causes of religion: ignorance of secondary causes.

Wherever men cannot see their surrounding, their imaginations must take the place of their senses in their concern for self-preservation. And imagination once set in motion produces sights and sounds; and, from thence fear is awakened. Instinct is more powerful than reason; and in the unaccustomed and obscure, imagination is the eye of instinct. Buffon is correct in pointing out that optical illusions contribute to monsters' being seen, but he is wrong in not understanding that the illusions only become monsters by the action of imagination. The way to slay the monsters is to slay imagination. General rule: habit kills imagination, and imagination alone kindles passion. Therefore the child without habits must be habituated to the dark in order to avoid the habit of superstition. Imagination is the enemy. It must be overcome if the child is to be reasonable, and to overcome it not reason but habit is the tool. Imaginary terrors will not be dispelled by philosophy. But the man who undertakes this education must be a philosopher to know that the terrors are imaginary.

Laughter is the great liberator, and gay associations turn what would be a shadowy prison into a place of happy memories. And

this reflection causes Rousseau to remember his own not so happy childhood. In purporting to further the immediate argument, he provides us with another element of the outline of an autobiography which constitutes an important strand of the Emile. This is one of three confessional stories dealing with three successive stages of his life and telling of the effect of his education on him.

Between ten and twelve, about Emile's age at this point, Rousseau was sent out to board. The setting of the story is fraught with social significance. He was lodged in the home of a minister along with his cousin. The cousin was rich and treated like a great heir by the man of the cloth while Jean-Jacques was the poor orphan. The latter, already touched by corrosive resentment, tried to right the status balance by making claims to heroic courage as over against the cousin's cowardice. From an early age Rousseau suffered from an inflamed *amour-propre*. The minister decided to humiliate Jean-Jacques for his boasting – evidently not with the intention of curing his vanity but in order to favor the rich boy. He tried to frighten him by sending him on a dark night to seek a Bible in the "temple." Fear is the great equalizer and is used by the minister to punish pride. The young Rousseau had no fear in open places and even went confidently through a cemetery on the way. But once within the confines of the man-made place of worship his "Roman firmness" began to be shaken, and finally, overcome by terror, he lost his head and fled. The reader of Plutarch, the imitator of his heroes, nobly battles the primordial fear – which is somehow connected with and used by religion – but he loses. Imitation of ancient virtue is an ineffective antidote to terror. The young Rousseau, already a rebel against the injustice of social class,

uses classical antiquity as a shield and as a weapon against the passions on which modern society is founded. He is a very complex little fellow, full of indignation and divided within himself. Returning home a failure, he heard laughter – which he took to be destined for him. That, plus hearing the minister's daughter – in whom Rousseau had a precocious sexual interest – suggest that all go to seek him, drowned the terror of the supernatural with the fear of being exposed. He hides his cowardice. He has a triple motive of vanity: fear of ridicule by the group, fear of appearing a coward to the eyes of his beloved, and fear of his cousin's getting the advantage of him. He lives completely in the opinions of others and is a veritable catalogue of the forms of alienation. But these worldly fears sufficed to overcome the others, and he accomplished his mission. The young Rousseau was interesting but already an unhealthy case.

This richly significant tale is blandly described by Rousseau as proving that "nothing is more capable of reassuring whoever is terrified of night's shadows than to hear an assembled company laughing and chatting tranquilly in a neighboring room." Although this description ignores all the reasons for which Rousseau was moved by what went on in the neighboring room, it indicates the way in which Rousseau, Emile's governor, will counterbalance solitary terror by social gaiety, the other-worldly by the this-worldly. He wants to cut out the terror at its root so that all the self-deceptive ruses of the soul which battles it will not be necessary. Whence the night games. Rousseau does not mention Emile in this context, but this is the first time he suggests social activity, little children playing together and competing gently. The motive which gets the children to dare in the dark is not vanity but

candy, and their laughter expresses good cheer not contempt. The man who has played these games will never hear spirits nor see the witch's sabbath. Naturally, not by imitation, he will perform the great nocturnal deeds of David, the hero of the Old Testament and Ulysses, the hero of Homer.

Touch, when it is not mixed with the false impressions of sight and really acts on its own, since it both instructs man about bodies and is the faithful servant of the desire for self-preservation, is the sense which relates man to nature. The way to correct sight with its illusions is not to use reason to go out beyond it to the forms or *ideas* behind its representations but to use another sense to go beneath it and grasp the matter underlying those representations. The discussion of touch unites the metaphysical and the moral, and it is intended to teach man to live in the kingdom of darkness, which is the real substrate of the world, without fear and without peopling it with creatures of his imagination to which he then becomes subject. Hobbes' state of nature is to be found here, and Emile is taught that he must be on guard against those who surprise him in the dark. With them – there is no distinction between men and animals in this state – he is in a legitimate posture of self-defense since he cannot know their intentions. There is no law, no police and no judge here, only the passion which induces men to protect themselves from what might threaten their lives. The circumambient night contains neither the supernatural terrors nor the natural or civil justice which make men anxious and hopeful at the same time. Emile will at least be at home here. The whole envelope of his body will inform him, warn him, and protect him; his feet will be hard to keep him firmly on the ground; his hands will be soft, better to experience exquisite

sensations ranging from horror to delight as they pass over the bodies which produce them.

Sight is the most error-prone of the senses for its activity is extended and comprehensive, hasty and even in need of illusion (i.e. perspective). Yet it remains man's guide in his progressive motion and the key to his understanding of the world of concern to him. The eye must be forced to conform itself to the realities of extension. Like the *ego* of Descartes' *cogito* it has to be saved from mere egotism, in the intellectual and moral sense. Sight rather than having too little mind mixed in it has too much; in it mind operates prematurely. Mind should work only on what is solidly perceived in the first place rather than informing the perception beforehand. In a sense the place of Descartes' universal doubt about appearances is taken by the confirming sense of touch which distrusts the visible forms. Solidly checked by touch, with all of its operations corroborated by touch, it becomes trustworthy. The scientific method consists in simplifying the complex sensations transmitted by touch (by removing what sight contributes to them) and complicating the simple sensations of sight (by adding what touch contributes to them). The impetuosity of sight, a compound result of the nature of the sense and effect of the passions is to be reined. The second mode of giving accuracy to sight comes by subtle use of progressive motion. This began with the baby who was brought to things rather than things being brought to it, which taught it at the same time the physical lesson about the real relations of things and the moral lesson about the unresponsiveness of things to its will. The senses which are the link between body and soul are used to adapt the *ego* to extension or to harmonize subject to object, with respect to the understanding and to the passions.

Sight can be trained to estimate distances, and the way to get children to want to estimate them is to attach this training to the bodily movements instinct causes them to love and the governor knows how to manipulate. How tall is the cherry tree, the fruit of which the child would like to eat? When we want to have lunch, which town is closer? On the pretext of showing how he can excite a child to physical activity and teach him useful lessons at the same time – to make "the machine and the judgment always to move together" – Rousseau introduces another intriguing tale.

He had to get a young nobleman who was idle to run. The relation of this boy to Emile is unclear: but from later references it can be determined that, in spite of some perplexities, Emile did indeed learn to run in the way here described. Why Rousseau chooses to attribute the boy's idleness to prejudices of class, which Emile would not be supposed to have, rather than to man's natural indolence is difficult to explain. But Emile is from a noble and rich family, and class plays a significant role in the story. Moreover, the child does not seem to be corrupted by the vanity of class; he merely takes advantage of his position for comfort. He is to be turned into an Achilles – the swift-footed – by a crafty Chiron who makes him indeed superior but with motives unlike those which made Achilles proud, i. e., the governor abstains from using exhortations, promises, threats, or an emulation for the desire to shine. Rousseau introduces his story with a suggestive statement about how he uses his own person in his writing and the truth of his tales: "Here is how I went about it: I, that is to say, he who speaks in this example." He plays Socrates to his own Plato.

The motive is cakes. Rousseau habituates the child to get a cake during his walks. Once he sees that Rousseau has an extra

cake, so he wolfs the first one in all the exuberant selfishness of childhood in order to get the second before Rousseau can get to it. But Rousseau, who has evidently taught the child property rights and does not deprive him to punish him, says he can do what he wants with it. He gets peasant boys to race for it. Their motives are just like the nobleman's: they like cakes. The race is fun to watch, and the idle child watches the spectacle with delight. He sees not only the race but also the morals of the other children. They are without pity. They eat what they can get without concern for others; and they cheat in order to win. This is a kind of benign image of the struggle for survival. The child does not appear to get involved himself. The game is fun to watch, and there is an incipient desire to get the cakes which can only be gotten by running. There is a touch of the quest for glory aroused but only a touch. But before the child picks Rousseau has, apparently for the sake of maintaining public order, begun to start the youngsters from different points. The real reason, he says, will become clear later, explaining that he gives so many details because this is such an important business.

Finally the child decides that he must use the same means to get to the same ends as the little peasants. He raises himself to their level and learns a lesson in equality. Rousseau arranges it so that the child begins by winning. His spirit is not made competitive, particularly he is not made envious or spiteful. He does not get into the habit of the little injustices made necessary by the desire to win, either for the sake of the cake or for the sake of winning. His equality turns into superiority, but a superiority in the activities all men engage in, a superiority attained naturally rather than conventionally. The cakes and the new-found joy in

the use of his body, along with the habit and ease of victory, combine to shield him from becoming passionately devoted to domination. This is a social situation, but he does become a member of the society. There is, doubtless, *amour-propre* involved here, but in a gentle and carefully controlled form. At first he is as cruel as his fellows in devouring the prize. But when he is almost sure of winning, he began to divide the spoils of victory with the vanquished. From this Rousseau learns the true principle of generosity. This is no mercenary virtue, and it is one properly belonging to heroes.

Rousseau gradually makes the distances from the various starting points to the finish unequal, and thus victory depends on judgment in the choice of starting point as well as on physical prowess. And herein is supposed to lie the intention of this elaborate staging. The child must learn to judge the distances, to relate his desire and his activity to knowledge provided by the proper use of his eyes. But this simple intention is complicated by a moral one. When the child begins to lose regularly and finally recognizes the reason, he blames Rousseau. Again indignation awakens: his loss is due to injustice, and his concern for justice comes only from his desire to protect his private interest. Rousseau makes clear that there are no rights involved, and that the complaint against inequality is mere resentment. And, in what would appear to be a highly morally ambiguous suggestion, he tells the child that his awareness is the means to sure victory. Instead of objecting to inequality he should take advantage of it. He should keep his superior knowledge to himself and use it in his self-interest. Thus the game becomes one of ruse and judgment as well as bodily activity, and the child has all the motives to use his

powers to the fullest. Finally, it suffices to imagine a cake on some object for the child to give an accurate estimate of its distance. The palpable goal must always be present.

Now, how can one justify the curious moral teaching conveyed here? It is safe to say that Rousseau is not raising a Gyges, a man who uses his special gifts to get the better of others. But it is also certain that knowledge is power and that it will be used by those who have it for the furtherance of them. It has been made clear again and again that a child of Emile's age can only have the morality of self-interest. Thus it would seem that he should not be given knowledge or should be kept away from others. And Rousseau in large measure does this. If this is Emile, it is his only activity in common with other children prior to puberty. But Rousseau gives a prefiguration of Emile's later relation to society. It must be assumed that most men will be ignorant or unenlightened. The enlightened Emile will have tremendous advantages among them. His enlightenment would be dangerous and unexcusable if his use of it had not been preceded by the development of a virtue – not a duty – governing it: generosity. His superiority will be used to give the cakes, or their equivalents, to others. His victory culminates not in eating the cakes but in distributing them. He will selfishly use scarce things neither for his bodily needs nor for gaining honor. He will be above all that. He is gradually becoming a natural ruler who serves the interest of the ruled and the basis of whose rule is knowledge.

The training in sight brings with it the first acquisition of ordinary school learning (with the possible exceptions of reading and writing): drawing and geometry. The former has as its purpose learning the shapes and proportions of natural objects as well as the

laws of perspective, which are necessary to the control of vision. In a clear reference to a passage in the Republic which he knew very well, Rousseau says that he will not send the child to a drawing master who will make him imitate imitations. Nature will be his master in this exercise, which means that the evaluations and perspectives of society, the man-made thing or the man-made view of a natural thing, will be avoided. In this connection, the adornments of the child's bare room (which was set up that way to obviate the necessity of obliging Emile not to break things) will be these imitations of nature. His artifacts will turn him to reflection on nature. And a procedure of framing the drawings and paintings which progresses from ornate golden frames for the earliest and most inexact ones to simple wooden frames for the latest and most accurate reverses the usual movement which confuses purely conventional value with natural value.

Geometry is the first banished art which returns. It will be followed by all the others, each in its proper time and place. What is studied now is not really the science of geometry, for which the figures are only signs of intellectual entities and the relations among the figures are demonstrated by pure activities of reason. Here the figures are the reality, and the pupil attempts to make them as accurately as possible so that superimposition can reveal the fundamental relations. Before geometry abstracts there must be a firm grounding in what is abstracted from. A good grounding for real geometry is thus laid, much is learned about natural forms and the child is kept on the level of sensation which is the only one where he is at home. Geometry, which is at this stage only an activity of using ruler and compass, thus an art of measurement, should be carefully distinguished from drawing which is intended

to accustom to the real world of things seen. The two domains should not be confused with real world reduced to the abstract one. In both studies the suppleness of the hand and the use of sense of sight go together. For drawing the motive Rousseau uses is a natural imitative instinct in children. For geometry he does not give a general one but tells of a child who was forced to choose cakes baked in various geometric shapes and who exhausted Archimedes' art in finding the one which provided the most to eat. The motive is the same as that used in learning how to run and how to read and write.

Hearing is treated in much more summary fashion than the two senses preceding it which were – as are the following two – used as pretexts for raising larger issues. It, as it were, faces in two directions – back toward the low demands of self-preservation and forward toward the artistic completion of man's humanity. Properly trained, hearing cooperates with touch in guiding man through the night and in regulating sight. The child, who as a baby was habituated not to fear thunder and the detonation of cannons, now perceives their relation to lightening and the cannon's fire and can figure out whether he has time to duck.

Hearing is developed and refined by the practice of the voice. It is the only sense whose object can be produced by another organ of the body. Touch and sight were sharpened along with and in harmony with the body's organs, but the relation between the organ exercised here, the voice, and the sense, hearing, is much more intimate than in the previous examples. And the voice is the means of expression of man's inwardness. Touch was perfected by night games, sight by running and now hearing is perfected by music. Music emerges out of gymnastic and is regulated by it.

Platonic music had the double purpose of correcting the Homeric music which aroused and distorted the passions and of harmonizing the passions. Rousseau's music need not busy itself with the first purpose because there is no old or traditional music to overcome. Emile's music has a resemblance to the simple music of Plato's guardians whose passions are simple, except that it is even more perfect because he has no passions that are likely to become unbalanced. Gymnastic has taken care of that. This music assists gymnastic and prepares for a later harmony of the passions expressed in a perfect music. Rousseau distinguishes between three voices – speaking, singing and passionate. The combination of the three in an artistic whole is perfect music; and this music, if it is the expression of a man's capacity to give speech to his passions while subjecting them to melodic order, indicates the existence of what later came to be called a personality, an inward and profound unity. Children are incapable of unifying the three voices. They are even incapable of giving articulate expression to laughter, tears, cries, etc., let alone of giving them the discipline of appropriate song. Platonic music attempted to make articulate speech or reason the ruling partner in an association which had previously been dominated by the passionate element in powerful alliance with the rhythmic and melodic. Rousseau claims they can be kept separate in the beginning – without reason and melody being captured by fear and anger – and then neatly joined. Emile learns only the melodic part of music, singing airs which he himself composes. It remains almost wholly a bodily exercise. But he becomes the master of a further art.

Taste and smell, the two most closely related senses, are discussed at considerable length, but reflection on this passage leads

to the surprising conclusion that they are not educated at all although the explicit theme is education of the senses. Instead we are given a praise of nature and of the providential order of which nature is here said to be the better expression. Nature, which in the case of the other senses was neutral and permitted both their good use and their abuse, is with taste said to have arranged it so that man's most intimate relation to things – his transforming alien bodies into part of his own body – is automatic. As with all sensitive beings – meaning all animals – the Supreme Goodness has made pleasure the instrument of preservation. This comes down to the assertion that pleasure is a sufficient standard for the choice of foods. Taste is apparently the only sense which corresponds to the general description of nature's goodness. On its own, without training or judgment, taste selects what is good for man. Appetite is naturally man's surest doctor and the foods it finds pleasantest in its primitive condition are the healthiest. The business of education here is not at all refining the sense but only protecting it from change.

One sees that taste is not a sense from which anything is to be learned, and the way it is treated has to do with Rousseau's moral intention. Taste, although a sense, is almost indistinguishable from the desire it serves, hunger. Fear is the negative expression of the desire for self-preservation and hunger the positive one. The transforming and distorting effects of fear have been dealt with in the discussion of touch. Now it is hunger's turn. It makes men dependent on things and the various forms it can take determines the character and extent of the dependency. Tastes for simple and easily accessible things, not belonging to any particular place or climate, make men able to adapt to any country and any station. A

nation's cuisine makes its citizens into plants which can only flourish in its cultural soil. It is just this kind of change in taste, in both the strict and the extended sense of the word, which Rousseau tries to prevent in identifying the simple and the available with the natural. He makes it clear that "the Author of things" did not help him in his task, for alone of animals man's tastes change with his way of life and form a second nature underneath which it is difficult to find the first. Rousseau indicates how the first can be recovered and tries to keep his pupil from developing a second.

In this extremely significant and deceptive passage Rousseau establishes taste as the touchstone of naturalness and being oneself. The little boy who was forced to take medicine repugnant to him became the creature of myths. The good was external to him, and he had to be made to admire an Alexander the Great he did not understand. He also became the tool of doctors. Emile will always stick by his own taste; he will have confidence in it, and it will be a healthy one. Everything must pass the test of taste. No authority can hold out against this clear, distinct and pleasant criterion.

The sensations connected with taste are particularly lively, and this has something to do with the concern we have with what is to become part of our substance as opposed to what surrounds us. Nothing that we put in our mouths and are going to swallow is indifferent to us whereas much of what is reported by the other senses can be and is ignored or remains neutral. Moreover, the activity of taste is entirely physical and material – it works almost entirely by direct contact on bodies, it is the materialists' sense – and imagination – says Rousseau – plays less of a role in it than in the activity of any of the other senses. Imagination mixes a moral element in sight, hearing and smell, but says nothing to taste. The

smell of a perfume brings with it a variety of associations and connotations that the taste of a cake could not. Taste is immediate and "realistic." "Thus, generally, hearts tender and voluptuous, characters passionate and truly sensitive, easily moved by the other senses are rather luke-warm about this one." If one prefers such characters it would seem that taste would be the lowest and most contemptible of the senses. But Rousseau draws a contrary conclusion which at the same time reveals the entire principle of his education with a clarity to be found nowhere else in the book: in order to govern children one must lead them by the mouth. Gluttony is the motive Rousseau uses to get effects from children which he could get by no other means without corrupting them. Suddenly one becomes aware that in every example of healthy education given thus far the child was concerned with something to eat: the melon in the garden, the custard in learning to read, the candy in the night games, the cake in the running, etc. And the healthy child's reaction to the fable of Lafontaine is guided by his interest in the cheese, while the little student of Plutarch is misled by teaching which asks him to deny the evidence of the sense of taste. Food will continue to be the motive through the end of Book III. On the other hand, the unhealthy examples all involve children, including Jean-Jacques himself, motivated by vanity. A child who learns to write for the sake of getting sweets will write love letters when he no longer cares all that much about sweets. But the child who learns to write out of vanity will always be a writer for the sake of vanity. Vanity remains and feeds on and is fed by everything, whereas gluttony gives way. In childhood imagination and vanity are a couple. Imagination at this stage undermines that knowledge of and acceptance of nature which is

the whole purpose of the early education. Later imagination can innocently and fruitfully mate with love, but only if it is not vanity's concubine. Rousseau's suggestion is that sex will take the place of gluttony in the young man; and imagination plays its proper role in love. Then Emile will acquire the human depth Rousseau also seeks. This provides us with the real plan of the Emile: Books I-III deal with nature, science and preservation. *Amour-propre* and imagination are kept from emerging. Books IV-V deal with morality and love. *Amour-propre* and imagination come to the fore, but in the service of love. Sex is the motive force which lifts man beyond his simply natural needs. In Books I-III the governor adroitly adds food to objects that would not otherwise attract. In Books IV-V he keeps the young man ignorant of the object of his desires in order to use his new energy to give him sublime concerns beyond his natural inclinations. This is the outline of Rousseau's project for uniting nature and civilization without dividing man against himself.

After establishing the palate, in its natural state, as the proper criterion for acceptance or rejection, pursuit and avoidance, and showing how it can be used, in the jargon of modern psychology, to "motivate" without opposing the pleasure principle.

Rousseau's use of food in the education of the child combines many advantages. Man in the state of nature is concerned only with his preservation – which means most particularly with feeding himself. That is the goal he understands, which comes from within him and is supported by instinct; it is by nature that he goes beyond nature. Food is purely material and sensible and is thus within the range of the savage's and the child's intelligence and does not arouse imagination which distorts their vision of nature. Pleasure is the

immediate principle which is the foundation of all the reason of which they are capable, and taste is the incarnation of the pleasure principle. By carefully being made to believe that the civilized acquisitions are a part of his quest for food, the child learns without being terrorized or made vain. This is how he is made to do what the governor wants while thinking he is doing what he wants. Ordinary educations always have to add unnatural motives that set up a conflict between inclination and duty. Moreover, and this is the greatest advantage of the method, as the child grows older he will lose interest in food; it will no longer be his prime source of pleasure. After puberty no healthy young man cares very much about food; he is excited by other things. The intellectual and moral acquisitions made possible by the use of food remain, while the extraneous...^o

Rousseau returns to the question of natural taste with specific reference to meat. Since good and bad are to be judged in the mouth, the character of man's relation to other sensitive beings depends on whether he wants to eat them or not. The relation of man to man is included here because man is one of the animals and a man's first awareness of himself as well as of other is as a sensitive – desiring and suffering – being rather than as a rational one. The later development of compassion supposes a community among the sensitive. Rousseau makes more explicit the vegetarianism to which he alluded in the first book and really leaves it at the assertion that children do not naturally like meat. Of all the primitive tastes which must be preserved intact, this is the most

^o□ [Approximately one manuscript page of text has been lost.]

important. It seems that Rousseau argues its goodness from its desirable moral effects more than its naturalness or its contribution to health. Meat-eaters are cruel and ferocious whereas the Zoroastrians, who are vegetarians, are the gentlest of men. As suggested earlier this gentleness founded on diet is Rousseau's substitute for a rational natural duty to be kind to men which was part of ancient thought and his response to the natural brutality which Hobbes drew as a consequence from the denial of ancient thought.

To support his contention Rousseau turns to an authority. He cites chapter and verse –admitting that it is alien to his subject but sure that most of his readers will be grateful to him for doing so. He cannot find a text from the Bible, so he must use his favorite Plutarch, whose teaching appears to be closer to nature. It is a long quote – freely adapted by Rousseau to make his point – partly exhortation against indulging the horrible taste for flesh and blood, partly history of the practice of using animals for food. As for the latter, man is presented as being very needy in the beginning. The earth had been imperfectly formed, apparently coming to be by natural accidents and in the absence of gods. In extremis, when they were about to die of hunger, the first men were forced to eat their gentle companions. Later men continued the practice even though the earth had sufficiently developed to provide sufficient vegetable nourishment. They had overcome their horror of the bloody deed, and, without the original justification, could only be qualified as murderers. In this later stage they had – and presumably still have – the protection of Ceres and Bocclus, gods of the fruits of the earth. This account is the opposite of the Biblical account in which the earth was perfectly formed by God in the

beginning and men had no need to eat flesh. Man's condition deteriorated in the presence of God – who was not averse to animal sacrifice, even preferring it to offering of the earth's produce. Finally it was He who, after the flood, ordained that man be the terror of all animals and eat of their flesh. According to Plutarch the beginnings were less good, but nature, once fixed, was a gentler mistress. Rousseau sides with Plutarch, and the little boy whose mouth rejects flesh and blood rejects much more in so doing. Natural taste is a shield against unnatural opinions. Modern opinions produce sanguinary men no matter what their claims.

Smell is related to taste as sight is to touch; they are sorts of messengers to the more fundamental senses about what is going to affect them. This remark reflects back on sight and touch and on Rousseau's materialism. Smelling is not so much a satisfaction in itself as the promise of a satisfaction to another sense. Touch and taste are the senses connected with what man really is and with the needs of his preservation. Smell's fullest development requires the activity of the imagination which gives smell an independent life by the variety of associations and anticipations it provides. Thus the pleasure of smelling a flower, which for Plato and Aristotle is the sign of the possibility of a pure pleasure, one not preceded by any need nor followed by any deprivation, and thereby indicating that all the faculties are not simply in the service of the body's needs, is for Rousseau entirely a creature of imagination, an unreal reality made possible by a rechanneling of smell's natural vocation. This is similar to their difference concerning sight, the ancients understanding it as the sense most akin to man's purely contemplative perfection, Rousseau as the sense of illusion properly controlled by man's bodily preservation. Smell can become

extremely active and have a powerful emotional impact when it catches a whiff of e.g. the perfume of a beloved; but, as we shall see, the loveable is not in things themselves but is a product of the romantic imagination. The perfume would leave a child or a savage indifferent. Smell is the ambiguous sense which reflects the ambiguity of the soul. It is naturally the passive slave of the active "realistic" sense, taste, but it can become a rich source of fantasy concerning things which are not to be eaten. Imagination can turn it into a corrupter or an enricher of the sentiments. At this stage it is left quiescent. Teachers are warned not to try to deceive taste by smell – giving ill-tasting medicines a sweet odor – for taste will dominate and turn the odor sour. The pleasure of smell will only be of interest when it can be emancipated from taste.

Up until now Rousseau has been dealing with sensitive or puerile reason which "consists in forming simple ideas by the conjunction of many sensations" as opposed to intellectual or human reason which "consists in forming complex ideas by the conjunction of many simple ideas." He has now brought his pupil to the limits of puerile reason and the next step is no longer that of a child but a man. But prior to taking that step Rousseau stops to take a look at his pupil. He puts him on stage for us to see, the spectacle of perfected youth, the grown-up child. This beautiful portrait with which Rousseau concludes the book of nature shows the limit or the peak of purely natural development effected by purely natural motives. The childhood of this man-to-be is the improved or civil version of the childhood of man presented in the Discourse on the Origin of Inequality. It is offered to us as a proof of the plausibility and desirability of Rousseau's enterprise. Here is a vision of childhood which can warm the heart, excite phantasy

and satisfy the longings for both freedom and nobility. This literary incarnation of Emile is meant to demonstrate to the senses that Rousseau's image of man can rival – or, rather, surpass – that issuing from a Christian or a Greek education. The principles of his education are intellectually sounder and the results more morally satisfying.

Rousseau prefaces his description of Emile with a reflection on himself as the observer of the boy, as the subject to whom this object is revealed. In so doing he casts light on the difference between himself and his product and on the difficult question of their relation. Succinctly, Emile, immediately a part of nature, is incapable of such a reflection, of self-consciousness. He sees what is, nothing more, and is fully content with what is; past and future are equally indifferent to him; he has neither regrets nor hopes. He has no sentiments and, his imagination is still dormant. Rousseau, on the other hand, sees both what is and what is not; his heart is full of sentiment and his imagination is only too active. Nature makes a merely physical impression; it does not move. For the man who has become somehow separated from it, nature must be enriched by memory and expectation. Imagination can adorn nature which reveals itself as containing an essential ugliness: death. Emile's realism is based on a fundamental ignorance of death. There is an essential ambiguity in Rousseau's disposition to nature. Contentment with it is both partly illusory and partly based on the privation of sentiment and imagination. But sentiment and imagination are in most cases the causes of man's misery. Rousseau here shows us the two possible kinds of healthy human being: the contented natural man, and the civilized man whose sentiment and imagination are not instruments of enslavement and delusion but of

a fuller satisfaction and awareness; the source of a poetic delight at nature on the level of reflection. Rousseau's relation to Emile is that of the civilized man to the natural man. His feeling is characterized by a longing for the innocence of the first men. He knows better, but Emile is happier. The awareness of man's finiteness corrupts simple pleasure, but in Rousseau it does not lead to a mad attempt to avoid death or to avoid facing it. Rather, his imagination is used to contemplate the beauties of the happy naturalness; and, in old age and its decay, he sees the beauty of youth and growth. He is superior and inferior to Emile at the same time.

This passage is at the source of the romantic movement and its longing for a goodness which is irrevocably in the past. In particular it is the origin of Schiller's distinction between naive and sentimental, Emile representing the former and Rousseau the latter. The child, Rousseau says, is related to the adult as spring is to autumn. Childhood and spring are lovely in themselves, and they suggest the blooming of the future to the imagination, but autumn and the mature adult – however perfect – call forth only the bleakness of winter and death. The adult state is not a participation in a permanent natural perfection, a being which is a proper and fair object of contemplation as the ancients argued. It is but a transitory moment – founded on nothing – in the flux of becoming. The poet's art provides the beauty which permits evolved man to reconcile himself with life and death, with nature. Emile makes the old Rousseau vital again. Their relation is that of poet to poem. Rousseau can use his fully developed faculties to make Emile, and see himself in his making. He looks at what he makes and sees that it is good. Imagination, the enemy, becomes the savior.

The joy of contemplating the child is interrupted by a stern teacher who takes him away from his natural contentment and closes him up in a room full of books. His life is full of commandments connected with books, books which tell him about what he cannot understand, what he need not know and which present a gloomy world that casts a shadow over the one he lives in. Rousseau's education preserves the delight in the boy's naturalness. His perfect childhood has been achieved without breaking the circle of contentment and in a harmonious, playful, independent relationship between governor and child, without admixture of constraint or authority. This is the achievement Rousseau puts on display.

Emile's body is beautiful to look at, and it conveys a moral impression – openness and freedom without insolence or vanity. His head is erect, bowed neither by fear nor by shame. When brought to a group of adults he does not cling nor seek for attention. He is not involved in the world of grown-ups. He answers what he is asked, if he can. He has nothing to hide and no inclination to show off. He speaks directly, with clarity and simplicity about what he knows, and there is a perfect proportion between what he says and what he does. He does not live in a world of words; his intelligence is used to judge well the world in which he acts. In a not too well concealed contrast to the twelve year old Jesus disputing with the rabbis, Rousseau promises that his twelve year old will not embarrass his adult interlocutors with indiscrete questions.

His total absence of habit means that he responds to each thing fresh and uses all of himself rather than being limited and molded by the abstractions of example or authority. He says what

he sees and does what his inclinations tell him to do. His moral notions have to do only with his own rights or freedom, what belongs to him and his possibility of making agreements. He does not precisely know what is another's, but rather what is not his. Similarly, if you ask him to do something for you in return for a promise to do something for him later, he will be eager to comply; but Rousseau does not suggest the reverse – that if you do something for him he will be glad to do something for you later. His freedom or the primacy of his own well-being remains unaltered. Above all he has no idea of duty, and he can be commanded no more than the sun or the stars. He knows that there are other beings like himself, with the same desires, but he does not feel for them nor does he recognize that they have any right over him or that he is obliged to obey them. He has a will, and they have wills, but those wills are in his view directed toward things. He has no, or almost no, concern for their opinions. Emile is obliging when it is easy for him, for he has no ill-will; and, to the extent he cares about opinion, he wants a favorable opinion of his goodness. He would not change himself in order to get that opinion. So much for what he does for others.

When he wants something from others, he has an expectation of benevolence, for he has lived in a world where life's possible struggle has been set aside. He asks only for what he really needs and cannot provide for himself. He knows that he is relatively weak and adults relatively strong. He will address himself to all men equally, regardless of rank, about which he knows nothing. If he is refused, he will not take it to be a sign of the ill-will of a person but of the necessity of things. While this will not always be truly the case, Emile's response is the most salutary for his respect

for his fellow men and for his own independence. When he later recognizes the ill-will of man, with such a disposition, he will not become vengeful.

When observed by himself, he will be seen always to act purposively, never just to prove that he is free and powerful. His thought is absorbed by his action, and his action is thoughtful. He is vigorous and adroit; he knows things, ends and means. Never motivated by fear, he, above all, is aware of necessity and wears its yoke lightly. It is the framework within which he works and which he will accept throughout his life. He has a unity almost never found in adults: he plays at work and has a perfect seriousness at play, while they toil joylessly for the necessary and enjoy themselves frivolously and without necessity. Emile's whole life is playful seriousness or serious play.

Because of all this his superiority will come to light when he is with others of his age. Although they are his natural equals they will accept his leadership because he is able to do so much, because he knows nature so well. In this little world the problem of government is solved, for arbitrary rule based on birth, power or authority are replaced by consent of the ruled to the rule of the best. He has no right to rule, he will rule without seeking to rule and without seeing advantage to himself in so doing. Without legitimizing anything other than a democracy, Rousseau produces an aristocratic ruler whose superiority rests solely on his education. Emile is the kind of man Jefferson thought of when he spoke of the natural aristocrats necessary to a good democracy. Emile's aristocratic character is natural in the sense that it is based on no convention but on real superiority; but it is not natural in the sense that he has a superior nature. Rousseau prepares for a resolution of

the tensions between freedom and society and between equality and good rule. Emile the natural boy is also the natural ruler.

Rousseau concludes Book II with a story explaining how the success of such an education can be tested. Learning that is really digested and related to life can be seen only in action. Emile will look like an unpolished little rascal to the inexperienced eye. The father who asks his son where is the kite whose shadow they see knows what counts. A correct answer requires experience, clarity and judgment – the application of knowledge to changing situations. The natural education reveals itself only in natural situations of natural concern to the child. Aristotle's pupil Alexander best revealed his master's gifts not in discussions of metaphysics but in breaking a horse. This lovely tribute to Aristotle shows what Rousseau thinks a philosopher really is and how much he respects his ancient masters. He is in a long line of teachers beginning with Chiron. And in his little portrait of his pupil Rousseau makes it clear that Emile is closer to the products of the Homeric teachers than those of the Biblical teachers. The frontispiece of Book II represents Achilles and his teacher. Its last line tells us of Alexander – who imitated Achilles and has already been presented to us as the noblest of men – and his teacher.

Book III

This is the book of science. In order to grasp its significance one must remember that Rousseau first appeared on the scene of European letters with a work which argued that the arts and sciences corrupt morals and are therefore inimical to human happiness. Now he experiments with a resolution to that paradox, attempting to incorporate a scientific or enlightened attitude into

Emile's soul, free of the enslaving passions engendering and engendered by science. The critique of enlightenment culminates not in a choice between brutish innocence and corrupt civilization but in perfect enlightenment. Rousseau smashed the belief in the parallelism between intellectual and moral progress which characterized almost all the enlightenment thinkers. But he did not return to the view of his ancient teachers that the tension between civil society and the life of the mind is permanent and irreconcilable and that, therefore, moderation alone should govern one's expectations from science. Nor did he opt for the abandonment of civilization; innocence is both irretrievable and imperfect. Rather he undertook the daring and dangerous project of reconciliation.¹

This project is rendered feasible because, as we have seen, man was according to Rousseau originally a whole, not split between the contradictory demands of body and soul. Man's spiritual development was fortuitous in its random emergence it got involved with and hastened that dependence of men on one another which is the cause of vice and enhanced the inequalities which make for the war between master and slave. The arts and sciences, hence, increase desire, provide hope for overcoming necessity and escaping death and live off of and encourage idleness and luxury. Moreover they dispel the shadows cast by the salutary myths of god and country and liberate the already selfish and competitive individual from the restraints imposed by healthy community, which is the only salvation when men have come to

¹ [The manuscript of Allan Bloom's commentary on Book III is in a rougher condition than his commentary on Books I and II. The draft of this manuscript has three other possible beginnings. See Appendix for these alternate beginnings.]

need society. Similarly, scientific reason extracts men from that original fellow feeling which characterized natural man. And, finally and above all, capitulating what has gone before, the arts and sciences feed on amour-propre, providing the basis for distinction and domination, substituting talent for virtue and humanity in public esteem. They cover over the true self and give primacy to a world of appearances. But for all that Rousseau's critique of the arts and sciences is more severe and his partisanship of moral virtue more strict than Plato's, he is able to effect a reconciliation Plato would have thought impossible because civilization is not a part of nature. Its elements can be disentangled from the desires and passions to which they accidentally became attached and rewoven into the fabric of a free man's soul in such a way as both to increase his freedom and to protect it from the enslaving prejudices of civilization. Thus Rousseau's apparent return to ancient thought and practice as a standard by which to judge enlightenment results in a radicalization of the enlightenment ideal of scientific reason's becoming the ground of the ordinary man's conduct. His critique of the arts and sciences and its resolution in Emile's education is the source of the later distinction between civilization and culture. Civilized man is the one characterized by the split between nature and society, inclination and duty, instinct and learning. The cultured man is the one whose acquisitions form a harmonious whole, an organic unity with his nature. Jean-Jacques is no longer the obedient pupil of nature practicing the negative education but has now to supplement nature or be the creator of a culture. This is the time, the only time, when Emile can become truly reasonable, learn to use and to understand nature as it really is. His senses have been kept pure and, as exemplified by the sense of

taste, are solidly fixed in their judgments of things. Opinion has not intervened between him and them. And, because he has not yet reached puberty, the passions neither make their demands on his energies nor color his perspective. For a short moment, a healthy twelve year old has, for the only time in his life, more strength than his needs demand. The incredible first efforts of learning and coping with his environment are past. He can now take care of his simple bodily needs and he is not yet involved with other human beings. Imagination, whose goals occupy all the strength and will of adults, is still dormant in him. Now he can learn the invisible principles of nature and accept their necessity because he is constrained to deny or distort that necessity by neither the desires of childhood nor the passions of adulthood. Prior to his entry into the social world the knowledge of nature and the method of science can become part of his being, as it were part of his instinct, a defense of that instinct against all that imagination and perverted science can do to it. He will have the advantage of the savages but will also have the knowledge the savage cannot have, knowledge which can aid his preservation and prevent the emergence of the mythic world which tyrannizes man. Emile's cosmology will be free of that admixture of fear, hope, and amour-propre which confounds the natural world and the divine. In other words, again, there will be no deceptive shadows on the wall of the cave. Emile will be the objective man of science, but not as the scientist in a laboratory narrowly limiting his concerns, shielded from his preferences with his learning neatly separated from his real life. His reason will guide his whole life and will not conflict with his instincts, desires or passions. It is in the service of his happiness without its being distorted by that servitude. Necessity will be in

his thought as well as his senses.

At the end of Book II Rousseau gave the example of a little boy who proved his education was good not by reciting poetry or imitating geometric proofs but by immediately figuring out where a kite was from its shadow. This was a miniature of true cultivation -- the senses, the sentiments and the tastes formed harmoniously by their learning, a union of speech and deed without display or pretension. Similarly, all the science of Book III results in Emile's almost instinctively being able to find his way out of a woods in order to eat the lunch for which he hungers, and in his choice, not from principle but inclination, of a peasant's dinner over a rich man's feast. He is led by his mouth throughout, and his educated palate is his standard of judgment. He depends on no one to find out the way things are, and his learning does not involve him in the system of opinion.

It is important to note that it is only the sciences which are to be learned at this stage. The arts must wait until later for their rehabilitation, for they depend more on human and social, as opposed to purely natural, relations, on imagination and on opinion. Rousseau wants to fix the natural order in its rational articulations in Emile's soul with iron solidity prior to the emergence of sentiments or imagination. They will fit somewhere between the sensations of objects and the laws of nature which underlie the experiences of the senses and set the limits of the universe, but they will not affect that essential reasonableness. Emile's sensations are perfectly suited to Newtonian physics which ????? to the truth of nature. Rousseau, by passing the level of images and imagination, moves carefully up his version of the divided line, making the total psychology of his pupil fit ontology. There is to be no

disproportion between life and knowledge. Sensations are turned into ideas, and those ideas are congruent with the sensations which are of material objects. Rousseau indicates that nature is matter in motion and that notions of the beautiful, noble, and moral are of human origin, results of imagination supervening on nature. He was one of the first to recognize that these notions, so necessary to a human life, are undermined by the new science -- which, as I have said, he took to be true. That science thought through makes life unlivable, and those who follow it actually deviate from it in their lives although it impoverishes their lives and their lives undermine their science. This is the problem vulgarly known today as the "two cultures," and Rousseau sees the profound difficulty of reconciling them. The choices would seem to be an inhuman world of atoms moving in the void in which man would at best be understood as another animal and love or morality would be denied any status, or a mythic world somehow ruled by priests and in which reason would be but a tool of prejudice or submerged by fanaticism. The Emile is an elaborate attempt to give an account of what is human in man in a cosmos which does not support humanity. But, now, Emile is but a reasoning animal, free, without need of or obligation to other men; his desires are all material. He is a perfect instrument for receiving the new science without perverting his humanity to fit it or perverting it to suit his humanity. He can live according to the law of nature (which is to preserve himself). Primacy is here given to the man who can live without the tyranny of tradition or authority, without the prejudice of class, nation, or religion, the enlightened man. The beginnings of knowledge are treated in almost Biblical fashion, almost as though tasting of the fruit of tree of knowledge were to

be the beginning of man's misery. But the similarity underlines the difference, for the result is not inevitable nor is it a divine commandment which man transgresses. The dangers are two, and both can be guarded against. The first is error, to which ignorance is to be preferred. (Ignorance -- as opposed to false opinion -- is possible according to Rousseau, Plato to the contrary). But it is not God's providence which supplements ignorance but animal instinct. The second is pride, but not because man wishes to rival God but other men. The corrective to both is not pious obedience but concern for one's real well being. Rousseau invokes the principle of utility as the proper motive and the standard for learning.

In this Rousseau is utterly modern. At no point is there any suggestion that learning is for its own sake, that there is a theoretical impulse in man. His curiosity is entirely in the service of his preservation. Reason does not discern or establish the end. It is only instrumental to it. Nature gives the end. But herein Rousseau again differs with those thinkers who fathered the utilitarianism we know -- Hobbes and Locke. They argue that men desire the useful, but they do not say useful for what. They mean useful for what men desire. But they do not say what men do or should desire. Therefore men pursue means to they know not what ends. We have knowledge of means, of what is secondary, but not the ends which are primary. To be sure both Hobbes and Locke say that preservation is the end, but in what is necessary to preservation they do not say, for anything and everything may contribute to it. Power, Hobbes' formula for the useful, is neutral and can serve any end. The very acquisition of power can change the possibilities of achievement and hence the ends. Desires increase with imagination and the power to satisfy them. Man adapts himself to the

acquisition of power and becomes the mean to the end of the means. Similarly, Locke's rational and industrious man who seeks comfortable preservation continues to work to acquire goods for the satisfaction of ever increasing and changing desires. The pursuit of property becomes an end in itself, and man is the tool of that which he can produce. The mastery and possession of nature becomes the conquest of human nature as well; hence the end for which the original quest was undertaken disappears, and human activity becomes meaningless. Everything is means, nothing end. Power is objective; desire subjective.

Rousseau responds to this apparently necessary impulse in utilitarianism on its own level. He does not try to limit the desires on the basis of extrinsic moral principles or reasons drawn from higher reaches of the soul. He does not, in other words, resort to "the imaginary republic." Rather he distinguishes two stages of natural development. The first was treated in Book II. The desires are naturally moderate he argues. Only premature lessons of reason, imagination, fear or vanity extend them. Thus he lets them develop without such lessons and fixes their inclination and extent. Then reason can appear as an aid to the satisfaction of those desires not an agent of their transformation. The ends are permanently established in the first stage. Their fulfillment as well as their protection are guaranteed in the second. Utility can therefore have an absolute rather than a relative sense. Reason does not soften the inexorable bonds of necessity but confirms them and gives consciousness to desires which are disciplined to accept them. The reason which serves preservation need no longer lie in the unreasonable element of hope of conquest of all necessity, in particular the necessity of dying. And man is something definite.

These two stages are not founded on two different principles in the soul. Rousseau does not distinguish, as would Plato and Aristotle, between self-regarding and other regarding desires, or between desires for the pleasant as opposed to the good. All natural beings are self-regarding and identify the pleasant with the good. He merely separates the moment of the development of desires and that of reason whose end is their satisfaction. The procedure is similar to the one he used concerning fear of death. He never denies the premise of the modern political thinkers, but his reflection on man's history modifies and mitigates that premise. Rousseau is a utilitarian, but nature guides the application of the principle of utility much more for him than it does for Hobbes or Locke. Emile's desires are settled. His learning will not bloat or transform them. The power of science will not make him needier or more dependent.

With the emergence of utility, Emile gets his second fundamental principle of action, added to pleasure and pain. Not only can he now begin to reason in addition to sensing, he can be reasoned with. His soul begins to get a structure. In Book II the child could not be reasoned with because his immediate sensed pleasure was the premise of his action. To get beyond that extrinsic rewards and punishments had to be added. He can be reasoned with because he has a sense of the future; he can balance a future pain against a present pleasure; things that would not have interested him begin to do so because he can connect them with his future well being. His vision of his future well-being must, of course, be determined by what he thinks well being is now. He can give up a mushroom now in order to have ice cream later. But he cannot, without being perverted, give up ice cream now in order that he be moral or wise

later. "At fifteen one sees the happiness of a wise man as at thirty the glory of paradise." Throughout life men usually live in terms of images which are not their own and which put them at the mercy of charlatans, for they have become separated from their own experience. Emile's inner experience teaches him the reality of the goals which define the useful. But he sets the standard of what is good and he cannot be talked out of it, and he will bend to no authority.

With his understanding of the notion of the useful, Emile moves a step beyond the material and beyond force. He can be moved by speech. The tutor who first was a force of nature now becomes a helper in the quest for knowledge. He is separated out of nature, becomes somehow human, but not as will but as reason. There is now spiritual action at a distance. And his control over the child becomes even greater once the latter has been taught to ask the use of everything. The use of speech is to discover the useful, and although the pupil forces his teacher to teach him only the useful and to explain what is useful in what he teaches, the teacher can make the child do and speak only what contributes to the useful. He is now constrained not by objects but by his own thoughts. The way to control the child is to make him care only for the useful, and the unerring way to knowledge of the beings is the question "what are they good for?"

Geography is the discipline which guides and unifies Emile's first investigations into nature. In Book II Rousseau had rejected geography as a study appropriate to young children, insisting that no child could relate a map to reality or could, using a map, find his way in his father's garden. Now, in this little Eden, Emile is going to be able to find his way on his own and construct his own maps.

Very prettily, the study of earth and sun will help Emile to find his place in the cosmos. He will move out from his little place in his father's home to the limits of things and see how the heavens are related to him. And he will move back from the heavens to his home and understand that he is part of the system of the whole. His frame of reference is nature as a whole and the permanent, rational principles underlying it.

Rousseau compares Emile to a man left alone forever on an island. Healthy curiosity will lead him to find out the extent and the resources of his island -- for the sake of his own well-being, without consideration of others and without idle speculation. The earth is the island and the sun the object most striking to the senses. "Thus the philosophy of almost all savage peoples turns solely around imaginary divisions of the earth and the divinity of the sun." Emile's philosophy will also concern the division of the earth and sun, but his division of the former will not be imaginary and the latter will not be a god. He moves from ignorance to science bypassing the stage of error -- particularly religious error -- through which the human race went and from which it is so difficult to liberate it.

Emile must be made to observe the sun; he must not be told about it nor shown it in symbols. He must be moved by his own curiosity. Rousseau describes bringing the boy to see the sunset and then the sunrise and indulges in a vivid poetic description of the latter.² Conversations at sunrise are to play a great role in Emile.

² He seems to prefer sunrise, just as he preferred spring to autumn or childhood to maturity. Becoming rather than being, promises rather than fulfillments, seem to be more suggestive to his imagination. This aspect of his teaching can help to clarify his view of nature and is a fertile field of comparison with the ancient authors.

But here the beauties of the setting do not exist for Emile, and in a sense they do not exist at all. "It is in the heart of man that exists the life of nature's spectacle." Beauty and its accompaniments constitute the highest level of Rousseau's divided line, but they have no correlates in things. Ultimately Emile will be a man motivated by the beautiful as well as the useful, but now his very indifference to the beauty of nature is his great advantage. He sees things as they are with a cold eye, and that awareness is the frame within which fancy will later have its day. But the frame must be sound and unbreakable.

The movement from sensation to reason or ideas is epitomized in Emile's observation of the sun. First he sees that it moves across the sky. Then he reasons that it must move in a circle, which he does not see. Good reasoning begins from sound observation of phenomena sensed without any admixture of opinion. His first reasoning consists in putting together what he now sees with the geometric figures with which he had previously played. Now he see east and west, rising and setting, and very speedily he can get the idea of the poles and hence of north and south. Then he is made to observe that there is a summer orient and a winter orient and reasons to the movements which could account for that fact. He constructs the solar system in his mind without the need of artificial symbols. Soon he will on his own be able to do what those first Greek scientists did who liberated men from the tyranny of the cosmic deities -- predict eclipses.

Emile's astronomy is Ptolemaic, not because Rousseau thought the sun revolved around the earth but because there is no reason to deny the evidence of Emile's senses which are the only possible basis for his discovering Copernican astronomy without getting it

on authority like the rest of us and thereby corrupting the instrument of learning and independence.

Emile has been studying the heavens and at the same time studying the earth, learning the movements of the sun and how to get around the countryside where he lives. His map-making requires knowledge of direction, of north, south, east and west. For that he must use the sun. In moving out and down from the heavens Emile has met himself halfway. But to use the sun for orientation is complicated and time consuming. Maybe there is another discipline which can join geography and astronomy in orienting man in his island. Rousseau suggests a road to physics which intersects with these other sciences, thus establishing organic connections among them that will maintain the coherence of his pupil's learning and form a chain of truths for him.

However the education in physics requires a complicated preparation of which Rousseau tells in one of his elaborate stories -- another of his apparent digressions. Rousseau here chides the readers for their impatience and indicates that he does not write for him who cannot understand this story which requires interpretation. Toward the center of his book he no longer presents it as a disorganized hodge-podge. At the beginning he adopted the perspective of the vulgar; we now approach his own opinion. He presented a little model of the problem of writing for the public in his interpretation of the story from Plutarch in Book II. No one, or practically no one in his audience had the inner experience to grasp Plutarch's meaning, and without that it is worthless to translate the narrative into discourse, for the discourse would only be words that related to no experience. What is true of reading Plutarch is true of reading Rousseau. He begins his story by

saying that this is the most useful part of his work and ends by insisting that all this detail is more important than it seems.

The story is similar to the earlier one's where Rousseau stages an elaborate scenario in which his pupil is an unconscious and unwilling actor and from which the boy learns a lesson about his relation to other men. It is the second one explicitly involving Emile, the other being the one about the beans. Both bring intense sorrow to the child and cause him anger. The two stories have Biblical overtones and seem to involve the punishment respectively for eating the forbidden fruit and for violating the tree of knowledge. But the social aspects of the present story are surprising inasmuch as Emile is learning the science of nature which does not necessarily involve other human beings. Emile's experience is to act as a prophylactic against the social temptations of science and thereby illustrates the relation of science to society.

The child's temptation, fall and punishment have been prepared for a long time by his tutor who has excited his curiosity with the phenomena of magnetic attraction. The observations were apparently idle, and no attempt was made to explain the events. They were simply facts for Emile and Jean-Jacques. Then one day at a fair they see a performer who attracts a wax duck with a piece of bread. (The duck is the only actor in this scene who has the healthy motive of food for his action.) The vulgar think he is a sorcerer, because the event appears miraculous. They move from the effect they do not understand to a wonderful cause and admire him who can produce the effect. Their need to understand is the source of superstition and the belief in the supernatural. They thereby are easy marks for the man who does know nature's hidden laws, and the rewards they give in money and applause are

sufficient to involve him. It is precisely at this point, where action at a distance occurs, that special care is needed against false beliefs, charlatans and the involvement in public opinion. Emile too is by nature one of the vulgar, but his education has distinguished him from the vulgar. He does not believe in sorcerers, not because he was told they do not exist but because he knows how to be ignorant. The scientific method is now part of his instinct; and, implicitly, he is proof against the belief in miracles. He can see an effect and wait to find the cause. This method seems to exclude the possibility of divine causation, at least of particular events.

When they return home, the two scientific partners eagerly apply their earlier casual observations of magnetism to the explanation of the extraordinary event they have witnessed. Curiosity seems to motivate them, but underlying that curiosity is the desire to gain the applause which is, as Emile has learned, the knower's reward. The utility involved in the investigation is the satisfaction of nascent vanity.

And the boy is given his fill of that satisfaction. The little physicist returns to the fair and steals the magician's thunder. Covered with admiration and praise he is beside himself with joy. A career is opening up before him. He has all of the equipment of an intellectual: knowledge, which can astonish the ignorant. He also has the germs of the intellectual's character; a love of learning which has as its only purpose the manipulation of public opinion. Emile's concern for his real well-being is in danger of being submerged by the desire for imaginary goods, an insatiable desire because it is imaginary, one which will cause him to lose touch with himself and to define himself according to the opinions others have of him. Most of all, he wants to be first. We are at the origins

of inequality, and this story presents a picture which accords with the real history of man as told in the Discourse on the Origins of Inequality and explains the vices described in the Discourse on the Arts and Sciences. The sciences contribute a new dependency, and they cause men to become false in order to survive in the marketplace of popular taste. They are the means of inner enslavement in the search for mastery.

Just as Emile's success in outwitting the magician and winning the audience is the beginning of his corruption, the severe humiliation he is made to suffer is the antidote which will permit him to avoid recapitulating the unhappy history of the species. When he returns to the fair a third time at the magicians invitation, expecting even greater glory, he finds that nothing works and that he has lost his public. And, as in the story of the beans, his disappointed hopes express themselves in anger, self-righteous anger, moral indignation. His sense of outraged justice is awakened when he believes human wills are opposing him. He is not being given his due. His self-esteem is wounded by the contempt of the audience. Emile, who accepts the dictates of necessity so gently, cannot endure the affronts of men. Science, which was supposed to be the realm of necessity, has involved him for the first time in the realm of will. His first pride turns quickly into his first spite and envy. If he is not first, he must suffer from being second, for he is not self-sufficient. If affairs were left like this, Emile would simply be dispirited, with the germs of mean, resentful passions stored in his soul, still longing for the success which escaped him. There must be a resolution so that, with the lesson learned, the boy can return to nature armed against what perverts it and without the vices of humbled pride. Like Robert the gardener, Emile's antagonist, the guilty party, puts

him in the wrong and, becoming his teacher, gives him his lesson while putting an end to the war of wills. The magician visits them and reproaches them for robbing his means of making a living. What appeared to Emile to be glorious is for the magician only a disreputable way of providing for his bare necessities. Money has no charms for Emile. The magician has only contempt for his audience which is made up of ignoramuses, whom he exploits and who would abandon him if they had any knowledge. The magician most of all must take away the charm of the crowd's applause. Rousseau calls him a Socrates, partly because of the way he teaches and partly because of what he teaches. One is reminded of the confrontation between Socrates and Thrasymachus, both men of learning and both despisers of the crowd because of their knowledge and the crowd's ignorance. The difference between them consists in Socrates' inner freedom from the influence of public opinion and Thrasymachus' utter enslavement to it. The latter is a phenomenon of vanity and produces an inner contradiction, a man's devoting his life to what he despises and using what he believes to be high in the service of the low. Rousseau believed that most intellectual life is Thrasymachean in character, knowledge used as a tool in the struggle for primacy, an abandonment of natural pleasure for factitious satisfactions. It is excusable, if not laudable, to make one's living -- if one has to -- out of astonishing, pleasing or frightening, the multitude. What is unforgivable and foolish but tempting is to think well of oneself for it. The charm of applause must be overcome -- because it is likely to tempt the unwitting -- for it is the true corruption of the knower. This little story is like an inoculation -- a little injection of the disease in order to fend off its more virulent forms.

The magician, after explaining how he tricked Emile, (so that the child will not be baffled by human invention which his science of nature could not discover), gives a further lesson in equality. He lives for pay, so they offer him a gratuity. He refuses, saying that "I get paid for my tricks, not my lessons." His serious thought is not for hire, and social or economic class cannot make him dependent. His is the pride of independence. Emile is not jealous of him but he cannot be condescending to him either. The magician is only human, but he has human dignity. He leaves blaming Jean-Jacques for the incident and suggests that his experience should be an authority for Emile. Thus he mitigates the humiliation by parceling it out, reduces Jean-Jacques to an equality with Emile while actually causing the latter to look to the former's understanding without rebelling against the capriciousness of ordinary authority. The parent or tutor must (and here Rousseau follows Locke) move not as is usually thought from severity to camaraderie or being a buddy but the reverse. For life requires severity. But this severity must be accepted by the child.

The final step in this training in the morality of science is a return to the fair to see whether Emile can control himself, whether he can watch the magician fool the simple folk without wanting to enlighten them. His only motive in exposing the old faker would be to distinguish himself among the ignorant. He might speak of love of truth, freeing the people from ignorance, doing away with their oppressors or any of the other excuses used on such occasions. But they would all be fraudulent, for he would only be substituting his authority for the magicians -- unless, that is, he could really teach them all the science of physics. Given the impossibility of this -- at least on this occasion -- it is better to leave the benevolent

manipulator of the shadows of opinion to satisfy the longings of the superstitious many. These are the limits of enlightenment. Random refutation of popular prejudice stems from impure motives and has questionable effects. Emile has above all learned a lesson in how to keep quiet, the same lesson Jean-Jacques once learned from a lady. He no longer desires to shine in this area, and, if there is any vanity involved, it consists in the satisfaction of knowing the truth and not becoming the dupe of the illusion. There is a complicity of knowers but no desire to compete with the magician for attention since Emile is free of the magician's demeaning dependence. His knowledge is for himself and for his own utility. If he is ever to enlighten men it will have to be for motives other than those that he now has or that other scientists usually have and with a fuller knowledge of the goals and effects of enlightenment. The relation of truth to society is grossly oversimplified by the enlightenment. Rousseau attaches such importance to this lesson in silence that he states that if Emile were ever to open his mouth he ought to be strangled.

With this first movement of vanity first induced and then crushed, the two can return to the pure study of physics with their judgments unclouded by the vapors emitted by vanity. This is the essential step in scientific education, and it is not one which has a place in the scientific education of the enlightenment and of which science is unaware. Thus the waters of learning are muddied. The story encapsulates Rousseau's entire critique of enlightenment. Science itself does not make a man scientific and unless the soul is properly prepared science corrupts morals and corrupted morals corrupt science. Using the Platonic critique of enlightenment Rousseau produces a super-enlightened man whose passions are in

accord with the enterprise of science.

When the two scientists look at their duck not as a miracle or as a means of advancement but as a human making based on the natural principles of magnetism, they note at last, having learned from the magician that magnets act through other bodies and imitating his trick that the duck stuffed with iron and under the influence of the magnet always comes to rest in the water pointing in the same direction. Next they notice that that direction is north. They have invented the compass and thus a new means of orientation. The idle observations of physics have proven of utility to the astronomer and the geographer in their construction of a world system. Everything hangs together; the sciences are complimentary and coherent.

Their invention of the compass illustrates Rousseau's nuanced disposition toward machines. The apparatus of modern science permits a certain progress in discovery, allows for a division of labor in research, saves time. But it risks bringing back another kind of superstition in the faith in the machine. The machines become the reality and what they represent is forgotten. No individual can penetrate back to the sources of all these machines and discover the nature which underlies them. One begins to read the dials as men once listened to oracles. They take an absolute value. Artificiality and, most dangerous of all, the charm of competence alienate from nature, and Rousseau tries to restore the goodness of nature as opposed to nature understood as an enemy to be conquered, the view which informed the founding of modern science. Science begins as an attempt to understand nature and ends up by destroying it. It is not only that science produces power the uses of which it can neither prescribe nor control and is allied with the

birth of passions that practically insure its abuse, it affects the minds of its practitioners in such a way as to damage and atrophy their intellectual faculties and disrupt the relationship of those faculties with the rest of what afterwards came to be called the "personality." Specialization, which seems necessary to the advancement of science, means that its practitioners are both dependent on all that went before and that each knows only a tiny part of the whole. There are many partially skilled men who know their area and collectively know many areas but no one can be wise. There is a body of knowledge but no head which can survey it or grasp it as a whole. This knowledge may be socially useful, but not only does it not secure the life of the individual it maims that life, making the individual a part of a larger, lifeless organism. The division of manual labor and emergence of the market destroys his bodily independence; the division of intellectual labor and the emergence of the market place of ideas destroys his spiritual independence.

If the child were made a present of a compass he would be charmed by its mysterious action, pleased by its usefulness and probably awed by the imposing presence of an anointed tool of science. The cool, objective atmosphere of a laboratory and the authority of its operatives is a form of intimidation we know only too well. Emile might well later learn how the compass was made and on what principles, but that would be a passive and dependent experience. He could orient himself but his own powers would not have been put to use; he would be less. Here he has been given a good reason to find north, has exercised both his mind and body in trying to find means to do it and has invented the instrument himself without the awareness that it has been done before, an

awareness which would sap the eagerness caused by necessity and the thrill of discovery. He uses all the powers that men without machines would have used, has learned the principles from nature itself and, finally, has the machine which facilitates his future work while, at the same time, not respecting it overmuch. This is a compromise between nature and science made in the name of both nature and science as well as of human wholeness. Emile will move more slowly to the center of modern scientific practice, but he will really know what he is doing and have a good reason for doing it. It is well to note that throughout this discussion Rousseau appears to maintain a neutral stance amidst the various metaphysics of modern science, in particular with respect to Descartes and Locke, idealism and sensualism, although one can detect a slight inclination toward Locke and his popularizer Condillac. He concentrates on what is shared, an understanding of nature as reducible to atoms moving in the void and subject to mathematically expressed laws as opposed to e.g. Aristotle's nature of ends and irreducible, essential differences among kinds of beings. Rousseau tries to move from common sense experience to natural laws without resolving the problems concerning the ultimate ground of such knowledge. Newton seems to be the model or the perfection of natural science. Rousseau wants his little pupil to arrive at something like Newton's articulation of the necessity of things without Emile's himself being a Newton or being dependent on or a blind follower of Newton. Above all, the goal is clear and distinct perception of facts, along with mastery over the temptation to premature abstraction or generalization. Again knowledge of ignorance is the rule. Rousseau attempts the perhaps impossible task of reconciling a reductionist science with the contours of nature as it is lived and experienced.

Now Emile's learning has an organic order related to his ordinary experiences. He does not lead the double life of the schoolboy who has his real private tastes, sentiments, and pleasures and then his classroom routine -- courses in physics, astronomy, and geography -- each committed separately to his memory, which becomes a kind of filing cabinet that delivers answers to questions put to it by others who have stored the information and given it an artificial order. Such a boy's studies have no relation to his tastes, sentiments and pleasures which remain uneducated, and his only motive for the studies are fear and vanity. He is forced to believe that one day they will be necessary in order for him to live in the artificial world of men, to get along with others. There will always be a disproportion between his real "self" and the "role" he must needs play.

Emile, however, still lacks a final sense of the good of these things he has learned. When his labors go against his grain, one day when they are no longer a game, he finally asks what is the use of astronomy. Jean-Jacques, instead of giving him a lecture, arranges for the two of them to get lost in the woods near lunch time. Suddenly Emile, whose instinct does not guide him and who, unlike a savage, has a home to go to and needs for food which cannot be found growing on trees or lying on the ground, recognizes that what he knows can save him, he can take care of himself without fear of starving or depending on the good will and sagacity of other human beings. He is lost but he can find himself, everywhere and always, because he knows the whole and what his place within it is. His hunger attaches his learning to his needs and pleasures. His basic needs remain unchanged, but he can, independently, facilitate or guarantee their satisfaction without the obfuscation almost

inevitably connected with man's awareness of the whole. His being has extended to the limits of the universe without his having become more vulnerable.

After his success in teaching astronomy, geography, and physics, Rousseau concluded the section on natural science by recording a failure in teaching chemistry. His pupil is not Emile who is always shielded from his mistakes. Whether chemistry is particularly difficult to teach -- because its subject matter is not so visible, and it is very much a science of the laboratory, one which reduces phenomena to their elements -- is not specified. But here Rousseau looks more like an ordinary teacher, giving a lecture. He wishes to arouse the child's interest in this science. He goes about it by showing him how ink is made. The child poses the question with which he can control his tutor and his education, "what's the use of knowing this?" Rousseau for some reason does not try to persuade the child that it is useful to know how to make ink. Perhaps because the latter has no pressing desire to write, or perhaps because he is able to make ink without understanding the chemical processes which enable him to do so. In any event, Rousseau hits upon a means of appealing to the child's interest, one that would probably attract most healthy men: how to find out whether one's wine has been doctored with unhealthy additives. And here Rousseau puts on his white gown, enters the laboratory, fills the test tubes which bubble at his command, and in general makes use of all the impressive hocus-pocus which gives the scientist such authority. Using an array of abstract terms which have not been related to sense experience, he comments on operations he performs, the reasons for which he does not explain. The prescriptions for the experiment are like the instructions in a

recipe. Everything is on the authority of the chef. At the end of the former it comes clear that one of the wines is pure and the other contains lead, just as the result of the latter is a dish. But Rousseau has failed utterly, for whereas the chef's authority is finally legitimated by the diner's palate, the chemist here can gain no legitimacy because both the pure and the impure wine taste alike to the boy. Not only the procedure but the result must rest on authority. A future good which the boy cannot understand must be invoked in order to get him to prefer one wine over the other. The experiment can only appear to be idle prestidigitation to him. The healthy palate remains the standard of nature throughout these first three books. Any attempt to coax the child out of his taste would make him the prey of convention and charlatanry.

The errors Rousseau presents himself as making constitute a catalogue of the pedagogic vices. He lectures rather than lets his pupil discover for himself. He does not begin with phenomena which are in themselves striking or interesting to the pupil. He uses abstract and technical names. He presupposes the child will have adult concerns, i.e. fear of death or pity for the exploited poor. He introduces a theme, adulteration for profit, that does not properly belong to natural science but implies awareness of social relations and men's intention to do harm. He acts as does an expert civil servant working for the Food and Drug Administration, or for some consumer group, awing the people with a science they cannot follow, taking care of their welfare and thereby depriving them of their intellectual and moral freedom, not to speak of guaranteeing their own livelihood. This being taken care of may be needed by some but not Emile or any educated man.

Emile must indeed someday come to grips with malevolent intention, but not before he is strong and enlightened enough to avoid being corroded by it or competitive with it. And someday he should pity the poor, but not before he is inclined to it. Now he would only make vain displays in response to exhortations to charity. This whole passage is suffused with Rousseau's own indignation at the exploitation of the poor, and he is indeed a precursor of the consumer movement as of so much else. But here he is concerned with the educational abuses of scientists and moralists. Their ends are at least partially good, but they exhort to virtue without providing proper motives for it and thereby subvert those ends while corrupting men's characters. Rousseau refers back to the story about the boy who admired Plutarch's Alexander. All that was learned there about the vices and the alienation engendered by precocious learning and the acceptance of authority is relevant here. Rousseau ends with the phrase, already quoted, affirming that, "at fifteen one sees the happiness of a wise man as one does the glory of paradise at thirty." Rousseau's education is intended to outwit the merchants of wisdom and paradise. We are reminded of his earlier assertion that it is doctors, philosophers, and priests who unlearn us how to do. The chemist and the priest are not so far apart when they each, in their own way, tell men that wine is not really what their taste tells them it is. The best antidote to their appeal is Emile's intransigent reliance on the evidence of his own tongue.

Evoking Plato's Phaedrus Rousseau blames the god who invented writing. "I hate books," he says, and then goes on to introduce the first book to Emile's education. This contradiction is intentional, for the book in question is intended to replace all other books,

including the one Rousseau especially means but cannot mention, the book, the Bible. The blanket condemnation serves the function of silently banishing the book which most influenced education and guided the imagination of those raised with it and by it. The turn to books, previously forbidden, is allied to the first use of a forbidden faculty, imagination. Emile is now to be allowed to enter the imaginary world, to be where he is not, to emulate heroes who are not, to alter his conduct here and now because of attachment to phantoms which are nowhere at no time. Rousseau merely introduces a new hero, Robinson Crusoe, to take the place of those drawn from Plutarch and the Bible.

The purpose of fundamental books, the kind we no longer have in our education, those one lives with all one's life and to which one always returns for pleasure, inspiration and guidance, is to provide a view of the whole which is not immanent in individual experience, to present a view of what is most needful and most important, to set goals of human perfection. What Rousseau is really doing here is covertly changing the content of the traditional vision of the whole, transvaluing values. The fundamental human situation, which unites and gives meaning to the various human pursuits and needs, is the state of nature as described in Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau, not the world of the Bible or Plutarch. Robinson Crusoe is the literary work which embodies those teachings, showing a solitary man struggling to survive and procure a minimum of well-being in an indifferent nature, caring only for himself, having utility as his only standard of action. Rousseau began Book III by speaking of a philosopher stranded on an island and then asserting that the earth is man's island. Robinson Crusoe picks up that image and brings it to life. It like the Bible is architectonic and provides a

standard for what really counts. Rousseau points to his intention by cutting out the first segment of the novel which has much religious matter in it.

The state of nature teachings remain abstract. Men in the civil state, with its security, plenty and artificiality are likely to forget what they are supposed to have learned about the purpose of life and society from the natural state. The latter is no longer present to them. But he who lives with Robinson Crusoe and identifies with him will always have sound judgment and healthy taste. Rousseau, thus, improves on Hobbes and Locke by making the state of nature a part of his pupil's active imagination as well as of his calculating reason. It is a living reality for him. This is not to gainsay the fact that, for all the essential common ground shared by Hobbes and Locke with Rousseau in their understanding of human nature and the origins and ends of society, Rousseau's teaching, as represented by Robinson Crusoe, is different in that it suggests a possible self-sufficiency and independence from civil society which raises questions about obligation to it more radical than those posed by the two former thinkers.

Although Emile imitates a personage from a book, a practice condemned by Rousseau in the story of the little reader of Plutarch's Alexander, the case differs in such a way as to avoid the dangerous consequences of that practice. Alexander's love of virtue or greatness of soul, just as a saint's quest for paradise, is utterly beyond Emile's understanding while Crusoe's pursuit of the useful is exactly the same as his own. At most Crusoe confirms Emile in being himself. Moreover this hero is not in competition with other men. Nor are his achievements such as to be unequalable or unsurpassable; thus this model does not arouse despair or envy.

Rousseau gives an example of imagination in its full force giving support to the real world. That dangerous faculty, which Machiavelli attempted to suppress, is allowed its freedom and helps to reconcile the is and the ought rather than causing their opposition.

Now, Emile is not to think himself Robinson Crusoe in order to go off and live alone but in order that he understand society from the perspective of nature. Emile is to be the natural man living in society, and the charm of Defoe's tale -- as opposed to Rousseau's account of the natural man in the Discourse on the Origin of Inequality is that Robinson is not an utterly alien savage or semi-brute but a man who exercises all the faculties of civilized man and learns how to adapt the arts to the natural condition, reconsiders his goals and corrects his judgment. The imaginative experience in the state of nature is particularly meant to provide an understanding of and measure without admixture of public opinion for the production and exchange of goods. This is the aspect of society which we call economics, and Emile's first experience of society concerns economic relations. He could not understand the moral, sentimental, or political links which attach and oppose men to one another, but he is capable of grasping material relations, especially those that have to do with survival. Rousseau separates out each of these stages and introduces them when Emile's soul develops sufficiently to incorporate them. Rousseau intimates that economics is the foundation on which the rest is built, that it is the infrastructure. It is in some sense the key to the understanding of social relations, and he prepares the way for Marx although he never asserts that economics simply determines or exhausts the meaning of all social relations. All to the contrary, he attempts to

recapture the freedom from the compulsions of the division of labor and private property which is always virtually present in man. Emile or Robinson, working alone on their islands, can produce just enough to survive. The arts they use to do so are qualified natural arts by Rousseau, whereas those that men practice together and whose product is a result of division and distribution of labor are called industrial. The latter, they note, are quite remarkable, for with the same amount of work produce double, and more, the quantity. This was Locke's great theme, and it is also Rousseau's. But two further observations qualify Locke's enthusiasm for the industrial arts: a) Whereas men previously were self-sufficient and independent, these arts presuppose society and make it necessary. b) The surplus resulting from the division of labor permits some men to be idle whereas the others work to maintain them in that condition. These effects of the division of labor, which remain only observations at this stage, will in the long run raise important moral questions for Emile.

The reason why it is so necessary to be aware of the natural arts practiced by the solitary, although they do not suffice for the man in society, is that the former judges of the arts according to their real utility whereas, in society, the arts are esteemed in inverse proportion to their utility. The problematic, or mad, character of society only comes to light against the background of nature. The rare, expensive and useless things are desired in order to distinguish oneself. They are respectable in public opinion, about which no solitary man cares but which is decisive for the social man. The physical dependency engendered by the division of labor leads inevitably to a dependency on the collective judgment of those who participate in the system of the arts. The distinction between

artisan and artist is a symptom of their development.

Rousseau here seems to destroy the ground of the fine arts and to be insensitive to beauty, but later he will show that this is far from the case. But he insists that the fine arts as we know them are essentially a product of the desire for distinction and exclusiveness which leads to fashion rather than art and the desire for ostentatious possession rather than natural enjoyment; they are not part of the system of commerce. Public opinion is neither knowledge nor is it the product of the autonomous individual. Emile must both know and decide for himself, not for the sake of being an individualist or original or a non-conformist but in order to be free. The state of nature teaches real value, and Rousseau underlines that the most important element of education is freedom from prejudice. One of the most important sources of prejudice is the economic interdependence of men. Such prejudice is inevitable unless a man possesses a true standard of value and such a standard is not readily available. Emile's because of the reality of his imaginary life will turn society's valueings upside down. Without being a philosopher or having been subjected all his life to sermons, the boy will despise goldsmiths and admire iron workers; he will practice the aesthetic of the hardware store in preference to that of the jewelry store and value their proprietors accordingly.

The picture of Emile walking through the social world incapable of seeing the world as others see it or understand how things generate the opinions which are commonly held, reminds of Plato's description of the man who, having gone out into the light and seen the beings, returns to the cave and cannot even see the shadows which are the objects of all the concerns and disputes of the

prisoners and are the source of honor and reverence. This creates a problem for him in living with his fellows, and the man who led him out of the cave in the first place is accused of having corrupted him. Rousseau, like Plato, introduces a father who accuses the teacher and gives a Thrasymachean speech, arguing that the opinions of men are what really count and that one must adapt oneself to them to get along or get the better. Man is the most important of the beings with which a man must deal, and the teacher has rendered the pupil unable to deal with men and a laughing stock among them. The proper study of man is man, and that study is named rhetoric or some modern equivalent to it. To this Rousseau responds, as does Plato, that the man who knows the prejudices of men without knowing the truth becomes the slave of those prejudices, be he the king of all the earth, and he loses touch with the truly pleasant life. First a man must know "the things in themselves"; then he can learn how men see them. He will at first be incompetent in the world of shadows or society, but he can adapt himself, whereas the man who begins with the opinions will never see the things in themselves. Opinion will insinuate itself into the latter's vision to such an extent that he will be unable to recover its purity, and his sentiments, even in the utmost solitude, will always be haunted with the concern for what others think of him.

For Plato the things in themselves are to be found only in the ascent from the cave to the realm of the ideas, a hard journey, to be made by only a few. Rousseau discovers a readier access to the truth, one potentially open to all men, a trip to Crusoe's island or an awareness of the state of nature. The understanding of what the beings are has had to be altered and an education devised which

prevents the birth of opinion. In these fundamental respects Plato and Rousseau differ, but formally Plato and Rousseau agree that being must be the standard by which to measure human opinions, and that the distance between nature and convention is immense. Little Emile's dream of going off to live on his island is in this respect Rousseau's equivalent of the potential philosopher's vision of the idea of the good.

Rousseau himself, however, had to undertake an endeavor of liberation of the magnitude of Socrates', an endeavor requiring the greatest genius, for he had begun by learning the opinions of men. He details his long, rough road back to the simplicity of being in, inter alia, the Confessions, the Dialogues and the Reveries. Emile's easy progress is made possible only by Jean-Jacque's own harsh experience, and the two become clear only in relation to one another. Rousseau the philosopher reformed education in a way Plato thought impossible so that Emile could know nature without being a philosopher.

Thus, in this remarkable passage Rousseau defends the Platonic quest for "imaginary republics", attacked by Machiavelli as the obstacle to success and contentment, as well as to decent politics, but situates his own imaginary republic on the low but solid ground of the new continent discovered and explored by Machiavelli.

Rousseau suggests a second principle, in addition to utility, for ordering the arts: the need they have of one another; beginning from those that are literally at the beginning and presuppose no prior art and ending with those that begin their work only after many other arts have completed theirs and are intricately intertwined with many other arts. The criterion of natural value is

independence, and there is a parallel between the rank order of the arts and the rank order of human lives. Moreover, living an independent life requires the mastery of the independent arts. And, as in the previous case, social man's esteem for the arts is in inverse proportion to their natural value. The practitioners of the most derivative arts are most highly rewarded, as opposed to the laborers who draw the raw materials forth from nature and make them available for human use and who are held in low esteem and receive low pay. The regard in which the former arts are held is the sign of men's dependence on unnecessary things and one another and is allied with the uncritical admiration for the division of labor. Men's vanity is a result of their weakness. Men are minted in ever smaller denominations, part of a complex system, more and more specialized, unable to survive if any cog in the machine fails, so far from being able to practice all the arts necessary to them that they cannot even grasp the whole of which they are parts.

Emile, on the other hand, from his island perspective immediately sees which arts are most important for him and will aid in the fulfillment of his fantasy. He thus grasps the material order and prefers the farmer, the blacksmith and the carpenter to all the advanced technicians, and arranges the arts according to their origins. He sees the whole and the place of each part in it, and his judgment is exercised in surveying that whole. The synopsis which overcomes the limitation of the specialist's narrow vision was for Plato the philosopher's final achievement. Emile has it from the start: and his independence is not merely spiritual, as is the philosopher's, but also comprises bodily freedom from the society of the arts, at least in imagination. His life to come on his island is

perfectly satisfactory to his desires, and he wants only those arts which will make it possible, meaning that he must be able to perform them all himself and they must provide for his survival. He goes from workshop to workshop, learning about all the arts and at least putting his hand to each, exercising and relating both mind and body. If he sees an art that makes a machine that might be of use to him he insists on seeing where all the parts come from and how one gets the raw materials for them, just as in the sciences he accepted no authority but always went back to first principles. He is aware that the arts he cherishes and practices are little honored in society, but he also sees that on his island these other artisans would need him and honor him, for they would be lost without him. And the island is the privileged perspective, because it is nature itself and will never change; it is the permanent condition underlying all others, and it is where man is simply man, whereas the others are creatures of artificial and changing tastes and conventions. He despises the complexity of advanced techniques when without improving man's spiritual life it robs him of his intellectual independence and his bodily vigor.

At this point Emile is in a position to gain his first awareness of the necessity and purpose of political institutions, for their origin can be found in the society constituted by the exchange of labor and goods resulting from the division of labor. This society provides another focus for Emile's learning, for the market brings together all the various arts, the men who practice them and their products drawn from all parts of the earth, exacting tribute from both land and sea. At this stage, and this stage only, Emile has the eye of an economist, seeing man as a market animal whose motives, actions, and relations with others can be explained by the desires satisfied in

the system of exchange. He differs, however, from the economist in having a fixed natural human purpose by which the market's success or failure is judged, whereas for the economist the market serves whatever ends men wish to use it for and it in its turn alters men's ends.

Emile's contact with these social relations has been prepared by his encounter with Robert the gardener, both in terms of the character and usefulness of exchange and the proto-moral notion of property. Making use of that early experience he can use his new faculties of generalization and his detailed knowledge of the sciences and the arts to grasp the complex system. Most important, he learns that "no society can exist without exchange, no exchange without a common system of measurement, and no system of measurement without equality. Thus every society has as its first law some conventional equality." Society rests on an agreement among men to accept rules which are not founded on nature. The best examples of such purely conventional entities are, according to Aristotle, weights and measures (as well as laws of sacrifice). They require government for their establishment and enforcement. Rousseau says that two kinds of conventional equality must be established, among men and among things. Equality among men requires laws, agreement about what equality means, or in what respects men are to be equal; whatever the content of the laws all are equally subject to them. (Rousseau notes that conventional equality is very different from natural equality. Natural equality consists in men's utter independence and indifference to one another. Conventional equality is necessitated by their interdependence and hence is inextricably linked with all that causes men to be unequal, for some to dominate and others to be

dominated. This tension initiates a movement that culminates in the general will which restores effective equality, for at all earlier stages conventional [in?]equality is radically imperfect and inferior to natural equality.) Emile's first notion of laws and government must be connected with the rights of property which underlies the economic order. The establishment of conventional equality among things of different kinds is made possible by the invention of money which reduces them to an artificial sameness. Money too requires the backing of government in order that its useless nature be held equivalent to things of real use. Both kinds of conventions are subject to the most terrible abuses and are the source of all the ills of civil society as well as some of its advantages. But Rousseau does not try to inform Emile of these abuses or awaken in him the indignation at tyrants and the rich or the pity for the people and the poor which he himself experiences. He is here content to make Emile aware of the real usefulness of society while leaving him merely surprised by men's foolishness and free of any temptation to imitate it. The understanding of society with which Emile is presented is roughly the same as that presented to Glaucon by Socrates in his description of the city of pigs. But Emile remains satisfied with the simple fare which made up the feasts of the inhabitants of that city whereas Glaucon demands dainties which introduce the corruptions of the inflamed city. Rousseau keeps Emile in the state of innocence of the city of pigs, where there is neither justice nor injustice, virtue nor vice. His eroticism will find its fulfillment, he will move from innocence to wisdom, without having to pass through the state of corruption. To accomplish this, Rousseau performs his greatest tour de force in the early education the principle of which is to lead the child by

the mouth. He takes Emile to a grand dinner in an aristocratic household. This puts all the lessons Emile has learned and all the lessons he is to learn together in a gastronomic guise. This dinner is the veritable synopsis the philosopher seeks. Here all the actors of the social scene are set in motion, aristocrats and commoners, rich and poor, masters and servants, men and women, and even philosophers. Here all the arts have been put in play to provide the food and the splendid setting; and presupposed are the sciences which underlie the arts. It is the cave transposed into a dinner table. From here Emile can see the whole economic order and get a glimpse of the social order which he cannot yet understand but which he can already learn to despise. And this situation interests him because it appeals to his greatest pleasure, eating as well as tempting his nascent vanity. When Emile is most caught up by the heady experience Rousseau reminds him who he is, Robinson Crusoe. He does so by posing a question, "Through how many hands has all of this passed before reaching you?" The solitary who has to think of how he will provide himself with everything he wants or needs is led back in thought through the fantastic complexities of the division of labor. He sees that all the earth and all the nations of men, at the cost of much sweat and many deaths, and all the arts and sciences, the glories of civilization, have been harnessed to his appetite, to feed him at noon the substance which he will leave in his toilet at night. In reflecting on the true character of this dinner he is the philosopher in the midst of the drunken revelers. He sees the folly of it all. He is well on the way to being a competent judge of the good and bad order of society. Rousseau fixes Emile's impression of the dinner, and at the same time avoids a movement of vanity which might arise from the

reflection that the whole world is at his service, by leading him to another dinner, a peasant's dinner, where everything has been produced on the peasant's land and by his family, a model of social self-sufficiency as close to nature as a division of labor permits, a dinner akin to that served in the city of pigs, with just those slight additions which will attract Emile's little sweet-tooth. His real well-being is better served there. But Rousseau does not point this out to him with all the appropriate reasonings. He simply gives Emile the choice of returning to dine at the aristocrat's or the peasants. Without hesitation he decides for the simpler meal. His healthy tongue guides him in this important decision. This is the last time that that organ will suffice for making the right choice. Childhood is coming to its end. But the tongue's teachings will stay with him.

Rousseau tells us that after a long journey he and Emile have almost arrived home again. After a certain self-forgetting, they now are ready to concentrate on Emile's self again. From that little sentient atom he was, his mind has wandered out through the heavens and around the earth, has explored and discovered the laws of nature, and incorporated them into his vastly extended soul. He has become conscious of his place within the whole. The third stage will be self-consciousness, learning who he is, what this being who can know all this really is and wants. (The echoes of Hegel one may hear are intentional.) On returning Rousseau is happy to find that the enemy - sex - has not yet taken possession of Emile. This enemy, properly tamed, will be the instrument of his full humanization.

The last thing that remains to be done at this stage is to put all that has been learned to use in appropriating what is necessary for

Emile's preservation. Up to now his subsistence has been provided to him. He must be able to live by his own efforts and do so without becoming a creature of other men. Crusoe's island is only a fantasy. Emile learned from bitter experience with Robert that all the land has been divided up and no one can subsist without having something to exchange for the things he needs. He too must have a specialty, so here Rousseau insists that Emile must learn a trade. This is the suggestion for which the Emile is perhaps most famous, and it was adopted in most educations afterwards. Actually Rousseau took it over from Locke, although he gave it a much broader significance. And, as with all of Rousseau's popular proposals, the practice was adopted but its intention forgotten.

The surface reason for Emile's learning a trade is, as was said, to make him able to live in society. He is to be a specialist as are all working people, but he is to be a specialist in such a way as to avoid the spiritual specialization of workers. He must be able to make his living from his trade without becoming a man of his trade, and he will practice a trade that is always necessary, in which he puts little of himself and in which he needs least to ingratiate himself with others and other's opinions of him personally have little to do with their willingness to hire him. The trade will enable him to be in society but not of it.

Everybody has to feed himself and his family. Rousseau cites the sovereignly inhuman and witty saying of a high official to a low journalist who excused his trade by saying, "I have to live." The minister's response was, "I don't see the necessity." Rousseau does. Nature dictates to every man that he must live. There is indeed a higher morality which sacrifices life to duty, but it is not to be found in the economic order. The demand that a man starve rather

than follow a dishonorable or indecent profession is only the dictum of the stranger or the privileged. Greater motives and a transcendence of nature are requisite to heroic virtue. Emile is not yet ready for that nor can it fairly asked of the poor in a society where the rich are not heroes. Rousseau seeks only to avoid a tension between preservation and decency.

There is, however, a class of men in society who can apparently avoid any abasement to earn their bread and also the need to abandon their humanity in a socially defined specialist's role -- the rich and well born. It is to them that Rousseau most directly speaks. Learning a trade is only an innovation in their education. The education of the poor, if it can be called that, consisted exclusively in learning the trade to which they were destined. That was, in the eyes of rich, a sensible education. Liberal education was for those who could devote themselves to the good, as opposed to the necessary, life. From this point of view the trades are contemptible, connected with a mutilated humanity. And Rousseau largely agrees with this evaluation of the trades and the life of the poor. What he denies is that the rich are free. They depend utterly on wealth and social position of both of which they can be easily deprived. Almost, inevitably, in addition to suffering from a lack of awareness of their real dependence, they are drawn into the system of prejudices which supports the conventional and largely accidental social order of which they are a part. Rousseau's purpose is not to demote them to the workers' class or to create a society of workers. Work is too problematic for him, and he does not look forward to an age when all could be liberated from it. To the extent that a rich boy is made a worker, it is in order to avoid his having a worker's soul while making him face the real

necessities and thus be free of his own situation. A man must always live in full consciousness of the possible end of the order in which he lives and try always to be something which can survive such changes, to be unchanging in the face of change. This is what it means to be a man, as opposed to a member of this or that nation, age or class. Work, or at least some kind of work, is truly cosmopolitan, the same everywhere, equally necessary everywhere, and therefore its practitioners are in principle freer from prejudice than those who exercise its higher functions. The artisan (as opposed to the farmer) can go physically anywhere and spiritually he is always ready to go. Possessing an artisan's skills is, according to Rousseau a greater guarantee of independence than is great wealth. But it is not that he expects Emile to have to work to make a living but rather that he wants to liberate him from the fear which might make him slavish or blind. Rousseau uses the trade in order to make Emile the master of...*

APPENDIX

A.

Book III

This is the book of science. Here Rousseau experiments with a resolution of the paradox he enunciated in the Discourse on the Arts and Sciences. He argued that the arts and the sciences are fatal to virtue and hence to human happiness; and thus he denied the premise of the enlightenment - that there is a parallelism between moral and intellectual progress. The choice he appeared to leave was between virtuous ignorance and corrupt civility and civilization. But here he suggests the possibility of re-establishing

the unity in man which was ruptured by the emergence of the arts and sciences and the consequent tensions between man's natural self-sufficiency and freedom, on the one hand, and the dependency increasing needs and passions engendered by the life of the mind, on the other. This new harmony created by the tutor between nature and the fortuitously emergent arts and sciences is the precursor of what later thinkers were to call "culture," the formation of the whole man and the organic unity of a people's tastes, learning and way of life, a unity which does not come into being automatically. The tutor who was up to now nature's obedient pupil must now abandon the negative education and become very active in order to incorporate the activities of reason into nature without their becoming the tools of the vices.

The Discourse analyzed the problem of the arts and the sciences from the point of view of the *homme vulgaire*, and he resolves that problem in the Emile by the proper education of the *homme vulgaire*. Rousseau's critique in the Discourse is partially only a return to the ancient and, particularly, Platonic understanding of the relation of philosophy to civil society. As Rousseau puts it, philosophy undermines the beliefs which attach men to country and to god, thereby sapping the foundations of community. The result is selfish individualism. Intellectual life, moreover, can flourish only where there is luxury and idleness, in an atmosphere of neglect of citizen duty.

B.

Book III

This is the book of science. It is well to remember that Rousseau first burst forth on the scene of European letters with a work which argued that the arts and sciences corrupt morals and are

hence hostile to human happiness. Here Rousseau experiments with a resolution of his own paradox and tries to render whole the being which was rent asunder by the conflict between nature and civilization, to incorporate science into his imaginary pupil without the vices ordinarily engendered by or accompanying the sciences. This Emile will be a fully scientific man, or one who uses the scientific method in all his thought. Thus the critique of the enlightenment culminates in a truly enlightened man. Rousseau is the first to distinguish between what later came to be known as "culture" and civilization.

C.

Book III

This is the book of science. In it Emile moves, on the level of cognition, from sensation to reason, and the motive of his action changes from immediate pleasure to utility. Speech itself can now move him, and the question "What is it for?" guides his inquiry and his action. The fact that this question is meaningful for him means that he can grasp the nature of things and that he knows his needs, to which the things are related. The teacher no longer has to appear as a force of nature but becomes a thinking being. His action on the child is not simply material but at least partly spiritual. He gradually separates himself from the simply natural, and for the child he is halfway between a thing and human, i.e. moral, being.